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
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**THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV
CONTROVERSY, 1948-58:
A DOCUMENTARY RECORD**



THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV CONTROVERSY, 1948-58: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD



Edited by Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury
Introduction by Hans Kohn

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INTRODUCTION

The documentary record of the first decade of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, prepared by the East Europe Institute, will render great service to American students of political theory and international relations. It not only broadens our factual knowledge; it also enhances our understanding of the position of Communism in the contemporary world. It reveals some fundamental tensions in Communist doctrine and practice which often are hidden from the outside observer. Among those tensions the one caused by the prevailing strength of nationalism has played a prominent role in the dispute between the motherland of Communism and the second most important Communist country in Europe. Soviet Russia under the leadership of Stalin and Khrushchev, and Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership, were in 1948, when the dispute started, and are today, in its eleventh year, nations entirely subject to, and governed by, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of history and society. Both were, and are, equally dedicated to it. What has separated them for the last ten years are not minor doctrinal differences but nationalist considerations.

The first Soviet document of the record presented here, a letter from Moscow to Belgrade dated March 20, 1948, speaks of the fact that the Yugoslav Communists had accused their fellow-Communists in the Soviet Union of "great-power chauvinism." In its reply the Yugoslav Communist Party stressed its love of its own country and complained that the economic position and the behaviour of Soviet Russian experts in Yugoslavia exactly followed the pattern set, or supposedly set, by Western colonial administrators or "advisors" in dependent or semi-dependent territories. Naturally, the Yugoslav Communists did not formulate their complaint in

these words, but the leaders in the Kremlin clearly understood the implication and answered accordingly. They termed the Yugoslav statement essentially anti-Soviet, because it identified the Russian Communist ambassador with an ordinary bourgeois ambassador and put the foreign policy of the motherland of Communism on a par with the foreign policy of capitalist imperialist nations.

Ten years later, the fundamental conflict between aspirations to national independence or self-determination, and a supra-national imperial and ideological order based on the indisputable authoritarian leadership of an "older brother" among the various participating nations, continues without let-up. Khrushchev, who in 1955 sincerely tried to end the dispute, could not find ways of accommodation. The spirit of Yugoslav nationalism threatened to encourage nationalism throughout the Communist empire. In this situation Peiping, in May 1958, took up the cudgels for Moscow. Within the Communist realm, both Russia and China represent "great power chauvinism" in relationship to the smaller nations. "Regarding the mistake of the Yugoslav Communist Party in departing from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and sinking into bourgeois nationalism," the Chinese Communists proclaimed, "we consider the criticism made in June 1948 by the Information Bureau of Communist Parties basically correct."

It is irrelevant to an understanding of the issues involved whether one calls the position taken by the Yugoslav Communists "bourgeois nationalism" or "national Communism." Naturally the Yugoslavs themselves declare that they are free from, and opposed to, such a "heresy," whatever its name. Nor does it make much difference in the world of reality whether in the case of Soviet Russia one speaks of "great power chauvinism" or, as the declaration of the Communist Parties at the fortieth anniversary of Lenin's seizure of power stated—a declaration which the Yugoslav Communists refused to sign—of the need for "the subordination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a world-wide scale" with "the invincible camp of Socialist states headed by the Soviet Union."

Tension between nationalism and Communism did not originate in 1948 with the dispute between Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia.

Rather, it goes back to the time of Lenin's seizure of power. It is inherent in the attempt to establish a strictly unified world order in the age of nationalism. That tension has increased since 1945 when Communism, until then confined to one country, became official doctrine in a number of European and Asian nations outside the Soviet Union. But the one country controlled by Communism after 1917 was itself a country inhabited by many nationalities. It was an empire holding against their will peoples of very different origins and backgrounds and subjecting them to the leadership of by far the most numerous among those nationalities: the Great Russians, who effectively occupied all positions of power. Lenin understood the potentialities of such tension within a multi-national Eurasian empire from the beginning. Marx lived in western Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century at a time when the peoples of eastern Europe, of Asia, and of Africa were not yet stirred by nationalism. He had neither understanding of nor sympathy for the "awakening" of "dormant" nationalities; he recognized nationalism only for the highly developed "historical" nations of the West. Lenin, who grew up in eastern Russia, was one of the first to understand the growing impact of nationalism, not only among the peoples of eastern Europe but also of Asia and Africa. Marx foresaw in the *Communist Manifesto* that the twentieth century would become the age of pan-industrialization. What he did not foresee was the fact that the twentieth century is with much greater rapidity and intensity becoming the age of pan-nationalism. For tactical reasons, for the sake of Communism and not of nationalism, Lenin tried to take the new nationalism into account.

He did it primarily within the confines of the old Russian empire. The relationship between Great Russian or Soviet Russian nationalism on the one hand and that of peoples outside the Russian empire on the other hand was for obvious reasons of no practical importance to Lenin. The Communist regimes of Hungary and of Munich were too shortlived to demand any tactical decisions about their relationship to the then as yet unconsolidated power of the Communists in Russia. For Lenin, therefore, nationalism was not a problem *per se*, nor did he accord to it any independent existence or rights. It was a subsidiary problem of the social revolution,

subordinated to the question of establishing, maintaining, and expanding the dictatorship of the proletariat, or rather, of the international Communist Party which Lenin, consciously and theoretically at least, did not identify with Great Russian Communism. Fundamentally Lenin like Marx was an internationalist, hoping for the amalgamation of all peoples. In his ultimate world picture there was no room for small nationalities or for a multiplicity of tongues. His goal was the fusion of peoples into units of maximum dimensions as a step toward fusion on a global scale. For that reason he was, like Marx, partial to great nations, and in his case to the Great Russian nation and its absorption of all the small nationalities.

But as the master tactician that he was, he resisted every attempt to belittle the national question from an "international" point of view in the "transitional" period. His theory of nationalism was a weapon in his revolutionist struggle. "From the point of view of Socialism," he wrote, "it is absolutely a mistake to ignore the tasks of national liberation in a situation of national oppression." According to him the Socialists among the ruling or privileged nations were to stand, before the victory of Communism, for the abrogation of all national privileges and for the right of the "oppressed" peoples to establish their independence. In every step they took they were to have regard for the sensitivities of oppressed peoples on national issues. Socialists among the oppressed peoples were, on the other hand, to proclaim the identity of the interests of their proletariat with those of the proletariat of the "oppressing" people. Thus, on the nationality question, the Socialists, under capitalism, had to "swim against the stream." Lenin was convinced that the nationality question would retain its significance for a long time even under the dictatorship of the proletariat, until Communist policy had succeeded in extirpating nationalist hatred and mistrust. In his concluding speech at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on March 19, 1919, Lenin declared: "The Bashkirs distrust the Russians, because the Russians are at a higher level of civilization and have used their civilization to rob the Bashkirs. Consequently in these remote districts the name Russian means 'oppressor' to the Bashkirs. . . . We must take that into account, we must combat it. But that takes a long time. We

must go to work on this very cautiously. Above all such a nation as the Russians, who have aroused a wild hatred in all other nations, must be particularly cautious. We have only now learned to manage better, and even that only some of us as yet. Thus there are Communists among us who say that there should be 'uniform schools,' and that accordingly all instruction should be given in Russian. In my view a Communist who thinks in this way is a pan-Russian chauvinist. This tendency still exists in many of us, and we must fight it."

Thus Lenin devised a Communist nationality policy which for the time being, "as a transitional stage to the full unity of the workers of all peoples," proclaimed the principle of federation of equal nationalities. But in view of the strictly centralizing tendencies of Communist doctrine and the Soviet Party the question remained, who would set the tone and determine the language within the "full unity of the workers of all peoples." There could not be genuine equality. During his last year of activity, 1922, Lenin himself became painfully aware of the degree to which Great Russian chauvinism asserted itself among the Party members. It would be better, he warned, "to stretch too far in the direction of complaisance and softness toward the national minorities than too little." He realized the importance of the issues at stake for the expansion of Communism outside the Soviet Union. "It would be unforgivable if, on the eve of the emergence of the East, we should undermine our prestige there with even the slightest rudeness or injustice to our own minorities." The Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 under Stalin's leadership rejected Lenin's warnings against Great Russian chauvinism. But at the Sixteenth Party Congress, in July 1930, Stalin himself complained of "the existing deviations in the Party in the field of the nationality question. I have in view in the first place the deviation of pan-Russian chauvinism and secondly the deviation of local nationalism. . . . These deviations exist, and the important thing is that they are growing. There can be no doubt about that."*

* The best introduction to the theory and practice of the national problem in Communism will be found in Samad Shaheen, *The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self-Determination*.

Only four years later, in 1934, Great Russian chauvinism ceased to be a deviation. The Soviet government itself directed the re-writing of the history of the Russian empire and of the Soviet Union in a new, or rather in the old, nationalist tradition. For almost twenty years, until the death of Stalin in 1953, the preponderance and leadership of the Great Russians among the peoples of the Soviet Union, and after 1945 the preponderance and leadership of the USSR represented by the Great Russian Communists among all the peoples living under Communist regimes, became official Moscow policy. Stalinist national Communism went to great lengths in its chauvinistic fixation on Great Russian originality and priority. It outdid the nineteenth century Czarist regime which had never accepted such an extremist nationalism as an official policy. In a similar way, when Stalin's efforts at friendship with National-Socialist Germany had failed, after 1941 Communism under Stalin outdid previous Russian regimes in the official adaptation of pan-Slavism. Until June 1941 Stalin had of course done everything possible to maintain good relations with Hitler in spite of German aggression against Czechs, Poles, and Serbs, but in his report to the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1941 he accused Hitler of the wish to "exterminate the Slav peoples, the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, and Byelo-Russians." The next day in his address during the Red Army parade he called upon Soviet soldiers to let themselves be inspired in the war by "the manly images of our great ancestors—Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov." By no dialectic could these feudal Orthodox saints and these Czarist Russian generals be regarded as the ancestors either of an army supposedly representing the many equal nationalities of the USSR or of an army which had its origin in a Marxist proletarian revolution. The principle of collective racial "guilt" was applied by the

Its Historical Evolution up to the October Revolution (The Hague, 1956); Alfred D. Low, *Lenin on the Question of Nationality* (New York, 1958); Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York, 1956).

Moscow Communist government during the war against the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, and several Mohammedan peoples in the northern Caucasus and in the Crimea. The Great Russian people, Moscow proclaimed, were the decisive factor in the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War against Germany. "For this reason the peoples of the USSR feel toward the Great Russians boundless confidence, tremendous love and gratitude." The same love and gratitude were expected from the Slav peoples, who, like the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, were regarded as "younger brothers" of the Great Russians, since the Great Russians had not only won the war against Germany on behalf of the whole Soviet Union, but had also liberated the Czechs and the Poles, the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians.

What the Moscow pan-Slavists had hoped for in vain in 1867—the union of all Slav peoples under the undisputed political and cultural leadership of the Great Russians—was almost realized by the Moscow pan-Slavists of 1945, thanks to official government support which had been refused in 1867. In his *Russia and Europe*, Danilevsky had demanded in 1869 the creation of a pan-Slav union under Russian leadership including all the lands east of a line drawn from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic. In 1945 this imperial dream seemed realized. On December 8, 1946 a pan-Slav congress met in Belgrade. It witnessed the triumphant affirmation of Moscow's hold over the Slav world. The Yugoslavs were regarded as the second-ranking Slav nation and Tito as the most trusted fighter for Communist pan-Slavism, second only to Stalin himself. In his opening address Tito asked: "What would have happened if the glorious Red Army had not existed . . . with Stalin, the man of genius, at its head . . . which with innumerable sacrifices also liberated the Slav nations in other countries? For this great sacrifice which our brothers in the great Soviet Union made, we other Slavs thank them." A pan-Slav committee was elected and Belgrade became its seat. A little more than a year later, Communist pan-Slavism came to an end. The Yugoslav "defection" created in the Slav "family of nations" a situation similar to that which existed in the nineteenth century as a result of the nationalist enmity of Poles and Russians. Like Poland then, Yugoslavia now

became the "Judas" and the "traitor," and a tool of "Western scheming" against the Slav cause which the Russians identified with Moscow and with their Communism. The Yugoslavs rejected the "great brother" as the universal leader on the road to progress and liberty and as the protector of all Slavs and all Communists, to whom gratitude and veneration were therefore due. Though Moscow had to abandon its pan-Slavism, Communist dialectics continued to face the task of harmonizing the emphasis on Russia's nationalist uniqueness and the glorification of Russia's past with condemnation of even the slightest emphasis on the national originality of other peoples.*

The situation became so intolerable in the last years of Stalin's regime, and increased tensions so strongly within the Communist camp, that Khrushchev, as part of his de-Stalinization policy, tried to return to Leninist nationality policy. In his famous special report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered in the closed session of February 24-25, 1956, Khrushchev referred to Stalin's "monstrous acts which were rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state." Stalin, Khrushchev continued, followed a chauvinistic policy not only within the Soviet Union but also in its international relations. He played "a shameful role" in the development of the conflict with Yugoslavia. This conflict, Khrushchev insisted, "contained no problems which could not have been solved through Party discussions among comrades." In this point Khrushchev underestimated the power of nationalism. He succeeded in reducing the excesses of Great Russian chauvinism which had disfigured the Stalinist era. Through his visits to Yugoslavia, to India, and to other countries Khrushchev tried to break the circle of nationalist isolationism and egocentrism which Stalin had built around the Communist Great Russian empire. But the relationship between Communism and nationalism in the twentieth century represents a fundamental contradiction between Communist theory

* See on this period Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1953) and, in a related field, Charles W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets* (New York, 1957).

and practice, which no dialectic juggling with definitions, nor even diplomatic niceties, can solve.

The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute offers a perfect illustration of this contradiction. It is no accident that Yugoslavia's two Balkan neighbors, Communist Bulgaria and Communist Albania, have until now most faithfully adhered to the Stalinist line of anti-Yugoslavism. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, fellow-Communists and fellow-Slavs, have for over seventy-five years, under all kinds of regimes, fought each other over the control of Macedonia. Tito's Communism was unable to solve Yugoslavia's Albanian problem. Since the first Balkan war the Yugoslavs have claimed the northern part of Albania, and the Albanians have wished to "liberate" their racial brethren in Serbia, which is contiguous with northeastern Albania. These Albanians form the largest non-Slav minority in Yugoslavia. Following the principles and practice of Leninist nationality policy, Tito created the autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohija for the Serb Albanians, as he created the "republic" of Macedonia as a federal unit of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. How far he succeeded in solving the nationality problem in his Communist order can be as little ascertained or answered today as can the question of whether and to what degree Khrushchev has solved the nationality problem in his Communist order. It is significant, however, that the present leader of Soviet Russia delivered his recent sharp anti-Yugoslav attack of June 3, 1958 in a speech before the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sofia. In this speech he called the Yugoslav Communists a Trojan horse of imperialism. Today as ten years ago, what separates the Yugoslav Communists from most of their fellow-Communists is not so much doctrinal differences as nationalist considerations.

Hans Kohn

I. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE COMINFORM, 1948

ON JUNE 28, 1948 the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties (Cominform) published a resolution expelling the Yugoslav Party from the international Communist community.¹

Information published subsequently revealed that tension between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been mounting since March of that year, and quite probably even earlier. All that is publicly known, however, is contained in an exchange of letters and communiques between the Yugoslav and Soviet Parties and governments in the period from March 20, 1948 to June 29, 1948 which were released later in the year.²

These documents refer to earlier exchanges and incidents which were never made public. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently explicit to provide clear insight into the causes of this unprecedented dispute.

¹ The Information Bureau of the Communist Parties was established on October 5, 1947, by the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Yugoslavia. The Cominform succeeded the earlier and much larger Communist International (Comintern) dissolved on May 15, 1943. Its main function was the exchange of information and the coordination of activity among the member Parties. During its lifetime the Cominform published *For a Lasting Peace! For a People's Democracy!*, a weekly issued in various languages. Its headquarters were first located in Belgrade, but following the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute were removed to Bucharest. The organization was dissolved on April 17, 1956. In the text of the correspondence the Cominform is occasionally referred to as the Informburo.

² The full text of this correspondence is available in English in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948.

The basic cause of the conflict seemed to be the Yugoslav refusal to bow to certain Soviet demands. Conscious of having gained power without Soviet assistance, proud of their long and successful Partisan warfare against the Germans during World War II, the Yugoslav Communists felt that they owed much less to the Soviet Union than did some other Communist governments of Eastern Europe which had been installed only with the aid of the Red Army. As a result, the Yugoslavs in the postwar years were predisposed to resist persistent Soviet efforts to interfere in their domestic affairs. On its part, the Soviet Communist Party was quite unaccustomed to any insubordination or contradiction, nor, in the heyday of Stalinism, would it countenance the slightest degree of independent action by any of the foreign Parties. From their peremptory tone, it is evident that the Soviets were, in their own view, addressing inferiors from whom only prompt and unquestioning obedience was expected. Nor did the Soviet Union ever expect or even imagine that the Yugoslavs might defend themselves against encroachment and thus offer a challenge to Soviet hegemony.

The Yugoslav attitude, as reflected in Belgrade's communications, was entirely different. It was conciliatory in quality and intention. Throughout the exchange, Tito and Kardelj³ endeavored to convince the Soviet Party that it had been misinformed, and that the Yugoslavs would "prove, by deeds, that the accusations against us are unjust." Characteristically, one of the last Yugoslav communications of this period ends with a pledge of loyalty to Moscow and the Socialist "camp." Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs were neither inclined to capitulate without reservation, nor disposed to countenance the omnipresence of Soviet influence in their internal affairs.

The manner in which the controversy grew is interesting. Initially, it appeared to center on the withdrawal of Soviet military and technical advisers from Yugoslavia. This, however, was only to

³ Marshal Josip Broz Tito, then Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Yugoslav Communist Party; later President of Yugoslavia and First Secretary of the League of Yugoslav Communists.

Edvard Kardelj, then First Vice President of Yugoslavia and member of the Party Politburo; later Vice President of the Federal Executive Council, Secretary of Yugoslav League of Communists, and member of the executive committee of the Central Committee.

serve as a pretext for the introduction of other and more fundamental issues by the Soviet Party. In fact, the leaders of Communist Yugoslavia were seen in Moscow as truculent and unreliable dependents whose subjugation was imperative under the established canons of Stalinism. Consequently, they were soon accused not only of deviation, arrogance and ingratitude, but also of the cardinal sins of Trotskyism and Bukharinism.

These charges may seem implausible if not actually grotesque. Yet they acquire meaning in the context of the internal purges which took place within all the East European Communist Parties during Stalin's last years of power. They served, as did the indictments of Gomulka, Rajk, Kostov and Slansky, to underscore the fact that, in the eyes of the Soviet leader, national sovereignties and state boundaries were meaningless in the postwar Communist world.

The Yugoslavs could not bring themselves to share this view, and hence the effort to make them confess, recant and offer their complete submission. Hence, too, the brazen Soviet attempt in the Comintern resolution to instruct the Yugoslav Party to purge its leadership after it had become apparent that that leadership would not perform the required ritual of self-abasement.

The quality and meaning of Yugoslav resistance was finally appreciated only with the passage of time. The refusal to submit to dictation set a precedent in the history of international Communism. Yet, it is clear that the Yugoslavs had not set out to create such a precedent. As the documents show, they did feel compelled to uphold their interests; but they equally show that Tito, Kardelj and their colleagues hoped for reconciliation, almost irrationally and to the very end. Moscow, on the other hand, had no interest whatever in permitting the growth of heterodoxy as an established principle. It demanded nothing less than complete capitulation and by so doing gave clear definition to the whole issue. It reduced it quite simply to the question of whose country Yugoslavia was henceforth to be.

“ . . . we are amazed, we cannot understand .

1. LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, MARCH 20, 1948.

This item is reprinted here in its entirety, as the first available document on the dispute, and because it raises openly all the issues which were the public cause of Soviet-Yugoslav misunderstandings—the status of Soviet civilian and military experts in Yugoslavia, and the Soviet practice of obtaining information directly rather than through government or Party channels. In addition, it introduces the leitmotiv of the Yugoslav communications, the insistence that their position was misunderstood by the Soviet Union.

On 18 March General Barskov told us that he had received a telegram from Marshal Bulganin, Minister of People's Defense of the USSR, in which we are informed that the government of the USSR has decided to withdraw immediately all military advisers and instructors because they are “surrounded by hostility,” that is, they are not treated in a friendly fashion in Yugoslavia.

Of course, the government of the USSR can, when it wishes, recall its military experts, but we have been dismayed by the reason which the government of the USSR advances for its decision. Investigating, on the basis of the accusation, the relations of the junior leading people of our country towards the Soviet military advisers and instructors, we are deeply convinced that there is no basis for this reason for their withdrawal, that during their entire stay in Yugoslavia relations with them were not only good but actually brotherly and most hospitable, which is the custom toward all Soviet people in the new Yugoslavia. Therefore, we are amazed, we cannot understand, and we are deeply hurt by not being informed of the true reason for this decision by the government of the USSR.

Secondly, on 19 March 1948, I was visited by the Chargé d'Affaires Armaninov and informed of the contents of a telegram in which the government of the USSR orders the withdrawal of all civilian experts in Yugoslavia also. We cannot understand the reason

for this decision and it amazes us. It is true that the assistant of Minister Kidric,⁴ Srzentic, stated to your commercial representative Lebedev that, according to a decision of the government of the FPRY,⁵ he does not have the right to give important economic information to any one and that for such information the Soviet people should go higher, that is, to the CC of the CPY and the government. At the same time Srzentic told Lebedev to approach Minister Kidric for the information which interested him. Your people were told long ago that the official representatives of the Soviet government could obtain all important and necessary information directly from the leaders of our country.

This decision was issued on our part because all the civil servants in our ministries were giving information to anyone, whether it was necessary or not. This meant that they gave to various people state economic secrets which could, and in some cases did, fall into the hands of our common enemies.

We have no special agreement, as mentioned in the telegram, to the effect that our people have the right to give economic information, without the approval of our government or Central Committee, to Soviet workers in the economy, except such information as is necessary to them in their line of duty. Whenever the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Lavrentiev, asked me personally for necessary information, I gave it to him without any reservation, and this was also done by our other responsible leaders. We would be very much surprised if the Soviet government were not in agreement with this attitude of ours from a state standpoint.

At the same time, with regard to this case, we are forced to reject the complaint about some sort of "lack of hospitality and lack of confidence" toward Soviet experts and Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia. Until now not one of them has complained to us of anything like this, although they have all had the opportunity to do so personally to me, because I have never refused to see any of the Soviet people. This is also valid for all of our responsible leaders.

From all this it can be seen that the above reasons are not the cause of the measures taken by the government of the USSR, and it is our desire that the USSR openly inform us what the trouble is,

⁴ Boris Kidric, member of the Politburo; then Chairman of the Central Economic Council. Died in 1953.

⁵ Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

that it point out everything which it feels is inconsistent with good relations between our two countries. We feel that the present course of events is harmful to both countries and that sooner or later everything that is interfering with friendly relations between our countries must be eliminated.

Inasmuch as the government of the USSR is obtaining its information from various other people, we feel that it should use it cautiously, because such information is not always objective, accurate, and given with good intentions.

Once again, accept the expression of my respect.

President of the Ministerial Council,
J. B. Tito

March 20, 1948

“... rumors circulating ... that ‘the CPSU is degenerate,’ ‘great power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR’ ...”

2. LETTER FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO TITO *et al.*, MARCH 27, 1948.

This Soviet communication refers to a letter of March 18, 1948 which has never been published as well as to that of March 20 and a number of incidents on which further details are not available. The letter furnishes valuable insight into the real nature of the disputed issues and sets the tone of subsequent exchanges.

The letter contains the first reference to surveillance of Soviet personnel by Yugoslav secret police, and lists what Moscow felt to be Yugoslavia's principal sin: an anti-Soviet attitude, failure to adhere to political and ideological orthodoxy, and toleration of allegedly pro-bourgeois elements in the Yugoslav government. These accusations are tantamount to a declaration that Yugoslavia is deliberately pursuing an anti-Soviet and therefore anti-Communist po-

licity, that it is in fact behaving treasonably. The reference to Trotsky and Bukharin leaves no doubts concerning Soviet intentions, nor does the accusation that Velebit is a British agent. The Soviet note, by putting forth such charges, thus deliberately pushed the dispute beyond any possible reconciliation short of abject surrender by Tito and the Yugoslav Party.

There is a note of irony in the fact that the brunt of the Soviet attack is directed at Milovan Djilas, then head of the Agitation and Propaganda section of the Yugoslav Communist Party, later Vice President of the Federal Assembly, and now Tito's prisoner.

The document is reproduced in its entirety.

Your answers of March 18 and 20 have been received.

We regard your answer as incorrect and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question of Gagarinov⁶ can be considered closed, since you have withdrawn your accusations against him, although we still consider that they were slanderous.

The statement attributed to Comrade Krutikov⁷ that the Soviet government has allegedly refused to enter into trade negotiations this year, does not, as can be seen, correspond to the facts, as Krutikov has categorically denied it.

2. With regard to the withdrawal of military advisers, the sources of our information are the statements of the representatives of the Ministry of Armed Forces and of the advisers themselves. As is known, our military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia upon the repeated request of the Yugoslav government, and far fewer advisers were sent than had been requested. It is therefore obvious that the Soviet government had no desire to force its advisers on Yugoslavia.

Later, however, the Yugoslav military leaders, among them

⁶ Member of the Soviet Trade Mission to Yugoslavia.

⁷ Aleksei D. Krutikov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade.

Koca Popovic,⁸ thought it possible to announce that it was essential to reduce the number of advisers by 60 per cent. They gave various reasons for this; some maintained that the Soviet advisers were too great an expense for Yugoslavia; others held that the Yugoslav army was in no need of the experience of the Soviet army; some said that the rules of the Soviet army were hidebound, stereotyped and without value to the Yugoslav army, and that there was no benefit to be derived from them.

In the light of these facts we can understand the well-known and insulting statement made by Djilas about the Soviet army, at a session of the CC of the CPY, namely that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army. As is known, this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no opposition from the other members of the CC of the CPY.

Hence, instead of seeking a friendly agreement with the Soviet government on the question of Soviet military advisers, the Yugoslav military leaders began to abuse the Soviet military advisers and to discredit the Soviet army.

It is clear that this situation was bound to create an atmosphere of hostility around the Soviet military advisers. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet government would consent to leave its advisers in Yugoslavia under such conditions. Since the Yugoslav government took no measures to counteract these attempts to discredit the Soviet army, it bears the responsibility for the situation created.

3. The sources of our information leading to the withdrawal of Soviet civilian specialists are, for the most part, the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Lavrentiev, and also the statements of the specialists themselves. Your statement, that Srzentic allegedly told the trade representative, Lebedev, that the Soviet specialists seeking economic information should direct their request to higher authorities, namely to the CC of the CPY and the Yugoslav government, does not correspond to the truth. Here is the report made by Lavrentiev on March 9:

Srzentic, Kidric's assistant in the Economic Council, informed Lebedev, the trade representative, of a government decree forbidding the state organs to give economic information to any one at all. Therefore, regardless of earlier promises, he could

⁸ Colonel-General Koca Popovic, then Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav army; later Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and member of the Federal Executive Council.

not give Lebedev the particulars required. It was one of the duties of the state security organs to exercise control in this matter. Srzentic also said that Kidric himself intended to speak about this with Lebedev.

From Lavrentiev's report it can be seen, firstly, that Srzentic did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC of the CPY or the Yugoslav government. In any case, it would be ridiculous to think that it would be necessary to approach the CC of the CPY for all economic information while there still existed the appropriate ministries from which Soviet specialists had previously obtained the necessary economic information directly.

Secondly, it is clear from Lavrentiev's report that the reverse of what you write is true, namely that the Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.

It might well be mentioned that we have come across a similar practice of secret supervision over Soviet representatives in bourgeois states, although not in all of them. It should also be emphasized that the Yugoslav security agents not only follow representatives of the Soviet government, but also the representative of the CPSU in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet government would agree to keep its civilian specialists in Yugoslavia in such circumstances. As can be seen in this case, too, the responsibility for the conditions created rests with the Yugoslav government.

4. In your letter you express the desire to be informed of the other facts which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the straining of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts actually exist, although they are not connected with the withdrawal of the civilian and military advisers. We consider it necessary to inform you of them.

(a) We know that there are anti-Soviet rumors circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that "the CPSU is degenerate," "great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR," "the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically" and "the Cominform is a means for control of the other Parties by the CPSU," etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as "Socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary" and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent

of "revolutionary Socialism." It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic,⁹ Kidric, Rankovic¹⁰ and others. However, the fact remains that such rumors have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU and the CPY.

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU, even as the CPSU has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be aboveboard and not underhanded and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhanded and dishonest and of a hypocritical nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU and to blacken the Soviet system.

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.

Again, one might recall that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU, Trotsky also started with accusations that the CPSU was degenerate, was suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. It is well known, however, that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.

(b) We are disturbed by the present condition of the CPY. We are amazed by the fact that the CPY, which is the leading Party,

⁹ Colonel General Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo. Chairman of the Economic Council until April 1958 when he became Chairman of the Yugoslav League of Labor Unions. At the time Assistant Minister of Defense.

¹⁰ Colonel General Alexander Rankovic. Vice President of Federal Executive Council and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee (formerly Politburo). At the time, Minister of Interior and head of Military and Secret Police.

is still not completely legalized and still has a semi-legal status. Decisions of the Party organs are never published in the press, neither are the reports of Party assemblies.

Democracy is not evident within the CPY itself. The Central Committee, in its majority, was not elected but co-opted. Criticism and self-criticism within the Party does not exist or only barely exists. It is characteristic that the Personnel Secretary of the Party is also the Minister of State Security. In other words, the Party cadres are under the supervision of the Minister of State Security. According to the theory of Marxism, the Party should control all the state organs in the country, including the Ministry of State Security, while in Yugoslavia we have just the opposite: the Ministry of State Security actually controlling the Party. This probably explains the fact that initiative among the Party masses in Yugoslavia is not on an adequate level.

It is understandable that we cannot consider such a Communist Party organization to be Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik.

The spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY. An increase in the capitalist elements in villages and cities is in full swing, and the leadership of the Party is taking no measures to check these capitalist elements. The CPY is being hoodwinked by the degenerate and opportunist theory of peaceful absorption of capitalist elements by a Socialist system, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.¹¹

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Party is the leading force in the country, has its specific program and cannot merge with the non-Party masses. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is considered the chief leading force and there was an attempt to get the Party submerged within the Front. In his speech at the Second Congress of the People's Front, Comrade Tito said: "Does the CPY have any other program but that of the People's Front? No, the CPY has no other program. The program of the People's Front is its program."

It thus appears that in Yugoslavia this amazing theory of Party organization is considered a new theory. Actually, it is far from

¹¹ Eduard Bernstein and Georg Vollmar. Prominent German Social-Democrats, "revisionists" of orthodox Marxist theories. Nikolai Bukharin, Old Bolshevik, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party. Prominent leader of the "right opposition" to Stalin. One-time head of the Comintern. Executed in 1938 during the Moscow purges.

now. In Russia forty years ago a part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-Party workers' mass organization and that the second should supplant the first; the other part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-Party mass organization of workers and peasants, with the latter again supplanting the former. As is known, Lenin described these Mensheviks as malicious opportunists and liquidators of the Party.

(c) We cannot understand why the English spy, Velebit,¹² still remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia as the first Assistant Minister. The Yugoslav comrades know that Velebit is an English spy. They also know that the representatives of the Soviet government consider Velebit a spy. Nevertheless, Velebit remains in the position of first Assistant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia. It is possible that the Yugoslav government intends to use Velebit precisely as an English spy. As is known, bourgeois governments think it permissible to have spies of great imperialist states on their staffs with a view to insuring their goodwill, and would even agree to placing their peoples under the tutelage of these states for this purpose. We consider this practice as entirely impermissible for Marxists. Be that as it may, the Soviet government cannot place its correspondence with the Yugoslav government under the censorship of an English spy. It is understandable that, as long as Velebit remains in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, the Soviet government considers itself placed in a difficult situation and deprived of the possibility of carrying on open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These are the facts which are causing the dissatisfaction of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU and which are endangering relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

These facts, as has already been mentioned, are not related to the question of the withdrawal of the military and civilian specialists. However, they are an important factor in the worsening of relations between our countries.

CC of the CPSU

Moscow,
March 27, 1948

¹² Vladimir Velebit. Deputy Foreign Minister until 1948. Following the Cominform accusation became Chairman of Federal Board for Tourism. Appointed Yugoslav Ambassador to Great Britain in 1953.

**"No matter how much each of us loves . . .
the USSR, he can, in no case, love his own
country less . . ."**

3. LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, APRIL 13, 1948.

The original Yugoslav document is a lengthy one. The most significant passages are excerpted.

This reply to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 27, 1948 is still defensive in tone; it reiterates the Yugoslav conviction that the Soviet charges are unjustified. It is interesting to note that throughout this early stage of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute the Yugoslav Communist Party offered no challenge to Soviet dogma as such. It defended itself against such charges as Trotskyism and Menshevism and indicated that heresy was equally abhorrent in Belgrade and Moscow. This position of meticulous orthodoxy was one the Yugoslavs were to maintain for a considerable period even after the breach of June 28, 1948.

Perhaps the most striking feature of this note is its embryonic statement of what later became known as "the Yugoslav road to Socialism." Under such labels as "own roads" or "national Communism" (a term still anathema not only in Moscow, but in Warsaw and Belgrade as well) the concept was to create severe tensions throughout Eastern Europe some years later.

Without, as yet, giving any programmatic content to the concept, the Yugoslavs defined it by stating that:

"We are developing Socialism in our country in somewhat different forms. In the present period under the specific conditions which exist in our country . . . we are attempting to apply the best forms of work in the realization of Socialism.

"We do not do this in order to prove that our road is better than that taken by the Soviet Union, that we are inventing something new, but because this is forced upon us by our daily life."

The statement that existing conditions may force a Party's leadership to adopt different tactics is neither unreasonable nor—on the record—novel. The point had been made years earlier by Lenin and thus presumably was sound doctrine. It did not, however, suit Soviet policy in Stalin's last years, unalterably opposed as he was to manifestations of independence in either thought or action on the part of any Communist Party. In these circumstances it was found expedient to ignore Lenin's dictum and to insist on the primacy of the Soviet Party.

The second noteworthy feature of this Yugoslav letter is that, for the first time since the opening of the interchange, the Yugoslavs are moved to present their bill of particulars against the Soviet Union. Specifically, their resentments center on the manifold operations of the Soviet intelligence network within their country and the implicit affront to Yugoslav sovereignty. The note also throws a flood of light on Soviet attitudes toward satellite Party members. It appears that it was then taken as a matter of course—at least in Moscow—that a Communist's loyalty was primarily toward the Soviet Union and the Soviet Party, and only secondarily to his own Party or government. This is a view of allegiances which cannot, of course, be tolerated by a sovereign state—Communist or not—and the Yugoslavs were prompt to make the point.

Nonetheless, the Yugoslav letter is still conciliatory; it ends with "comradely greetings."

In answering your letter of March 27, 1948, we must first of all emphasize that we were terribly surprised by its tone and contents. We feel that the reason for its contents, that is, for the accusations and attitudes on individual questions, is insufficient knowledge of the situation here. We cannot explain your conclusions otherwise than by the fact that the government of the USSR is

obtaining inaccurate and tendentious information from its representatives, who, because of lack of knowledge, must obtain such information from various people, either from known anti-Party elements or from various dissatisfied persons. . . . We cannot understand why the representatives of the USSR have not insisted on confirming such information with responsible people in our country, that is, on verifying such information with the CC of the CPY or the government. We regard the issuing of such information as anti-Party work and anti-state because it spoils the relations between our two countries.

No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his own country less, which also is developing Socialism—in this concrete case the FPRY—for which so many thousands of its most progressive people fell. We know very well that this is similarly understood in the Soviet Union.

It particularly surprises us that none of this was mentioned when Kardelj, Djilas, and Bakaric¹³ were in Moscow as delegates of our Party and government. As can be seen from your letter, your government had the information in question, and similar information, prior to the arrival of our delegation in Moscow. It appears to us that at that time the question of relations with military and civilian experts, as well as other questions, could have been presented to our delegation.

We maintain that it was necessary to inform our government through this delegation, if not even earlier, that the Soviet government was not satisfied with the behavior of our people toward the Soviet experts, and that the situation should be cleared up in one way or another. What happened was that the government of the USSR, by its decision to withdraw military experts without any official notification, confronted us with a *fait accompli*, and in this way created unnecessary difficulties for us.

As for the withdrawal of Soviet military experts, we see no other reason for it than that we decided to reduce their number to the necessary minimum because of financial difficulties. In 1946 Premier of the federal government Tito officially informed the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Lavrentiev, that, for many reasons, it was almost impossible for us to pay such high wages to the Soviet

¹³ Vladimir Bakaric—member of the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists; at the time Prime Minister of Croatia.

military experts and begged him to inform the USSR of this and our desire that it moderate the conditions for paying the experts. Ambassador Lavrentiev received an answer from the USSR that the salaries could not be decreased and we could do as we pleased. Tito immediately told Lavrentiev that because of this we would have to reduce the number of experts as soon as it was possible to do so without creating great difficulties in the building up of our army. The wages of the Soviet experts were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our federal ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant general or a colonel general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant colonel, colonel and general, had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our federal ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month. It is understandable that we felt this to be not only a financial burden but also politically incorrect because it led to misunderstanding among our men. Therefore, our decision to decrease the number of Soviet military experts was made for the reasons mentioned and for no other. On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility that some of our men made untimely remarks. In these cases it is necessary to present us with the relevant information, duly substantiated, and without a doubt we would see that it did not happen again. Here we must mention that some of the Soviet experts did not always behave as they should and this caused dissatisfaction as a result of which, and against our will, various remarks came to be made which were later twisted and in this twisted version passed on to the command of the Soviet army. However, we consider these matters too insignificant to be allowed to play any part in straining relations between our states.

We were especially surprised by the part of the letter containing old matters about Djilas. The letter states: "In the light of these facts we can understand the insulting statement made by Djilas about the Soviet army, at a session of the CC of the CPY, namely that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army." Djilas never made such a statement in such a form. Tito explained this orally and in writing in 1945. Comrade Stalin and the other members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU were satisfied then with this explanation. We cannot understand why you again repeat, as an argument, a charge which was proved to be distorted and inaccurate. We again empha-

size that neither Djilas nor any one of our leading people has such an opinion of Soviet officers. Only a person who is not only an enemy of the USSR but also an enemy of Yugoslavia can have such an opinion. . . .

The allegations in your letter that UDBa¹⁴ follows Soviet specialists and other Soviet people are not true. No one has ever issued a decision of this sort, and it is not true that Soviet citizens are followed. This is someone's fabricated information. It is even less accurate that the representatives of the Soviet government and Comrade Yudin of the Cominform were followed.

We cannot understand for whom such slander, which led the government of the USSR into error, was necessary. In this case as well we would again like to be given concrete facts.

Your letter of March 27 states that we are making anti-Soviet criticisms and criticisms of the CPSU. It states that this criticism is being made among the leaders of the CPY. It further states that this criticism is being carried on behind the backs of the mass of the Party members; that this criticism is dishonorable, underhanded, hypocritical, etc. The names of Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, and Rankovic are mentioned, and it is said that there are some others. Thus, the letter mentions the names of some of the best known and most popular leaders of New Yugoslavia, who have proved themselves in many difficult situations faced by our Party.

It is very difficult for us to understand how such serious accusations can be advanced without mentioning their source. It is even more amazing to compare statements by our leaders with the one-time statements of Trotsky. The letter quotes parts of alleged statements, for example, "the CPSU is degenerate," "the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically," "great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR," "the Cominform is a means for control of the other Parties by the CPSU." Further "these anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as 'Socialism in the USSR has ceased to be revolutionary,' that only Yugoslavia is the true exponent of 'revolutionary Socialism.' "

On the basis of this and similar information, gathered over a long period from various suspicious sources, tendentiously attributed to the leading men of the new Yugoslavia as if it were theirs, and thus presented to the leaders of the USSR, it is without doubt pos-

¹⁴ UDBa—Initials of the State Security Department, the Yugoslav Secret Police.

sible to draw wrong conclusions and describe them as anti-Soviet statements. However, we feel that on the basis of unidentified persons and suspicious information, it is incorrect to draw conclusions and make accusations like those brought in the letter against men who have performed invaluable services in popularizing the USSR in Yugoslavia and won priceless renown in the war of liberation. Is it possible to believe that people who spent six, eight, ten and more years in prison—among other things because of their work in popularizing the USSR—can be such as shown in your letter of March 27? No. But these are the majority of the present high-ranking leaders of the new Yugoslavia, who on March 27, 1941, led the masses through the streets against the anti-popular regime of Cvetkovic-Macek, which signed the anti-Comintern pact and desired to harness Yugoslavia to the Fascist Axis wagon. They are the same people who in 1941 organized the uprising against the Fascist invader, deeply believing in the Soviet Union. They are the same people who, at the head of the insurgent Yugoslav people, with gun in hand, fought under the most difficult conditions on the side of the Soviet Union as the only true ally, believing in the victory of the USSR in the darkest days, just because they believed and believe today in the Soviet system, in Socialism.

Such people cannot work “to blacken the Soviet system” because that would mean betraying their convictions, their past. We feel that these people should not be judged on the basis of dubious information but on the basis of their long revolutionary activity.

To call such people two-faced because, in front of the masses they praise the CPSU “to the skies”—as stated in the letter—is really terrible and insulting. In the letter it further states: “We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism, as alien and hostile, if they knew about it.” Yes, we believe that too, if it were as shown in the letter. “We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.” There could, however, be no concealment from the masses for the simple reason that there was not and could not be any such criticism of the Soviet Union or the CPSU.

To oppose the leadership to the masses is incorrect. It is incorrect because the present leaders of Yugoslavia and the masses are one; because they are inseparably tied by their struggle during the great war of liberation, and today by the great working efforts for the development of the country and the realization of Socialism.

Among many Soviet people there exists the mistaken idea that the sympathy of the broad masses in Yugoslavia toward the USSR came of itself, on the basis of some traditions which go back to the time of Tsarist Russia. This is not so. Love for the USSR did not come of itself. It was stubbornly inculcated into the masses of the Party and the people in general by the present leaders of the new Yugoslavia, including, in the first rank, those so seriously accused in the letter. The present leaders of the new Yugoslavia are the same who, long before the war, sparing neither efforts nor sacrifices, persistently revealed to the masses the truth about the Soviet Union and planted among the masses of Yugoslavia love for the land of Socialism. . . .

What is the basis for the allegation in the letter that there is no democracy in our Party? Perhaps information from Lavrentiev? Where did he get this information? We consider that he, as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business. This information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU from the CC of the CPY.

The fact that the Organization Secretary in the CPY is also Minister of State Security in no case interferes with the initiative of Party organizations. The Party is not under the control of UDBa; control is exercised through the CC of the CPY, of which the Minister of State Security is a member. Besides this, we must add that the chief of the Administration of Cadres under the CC of CPY is Zekovic and not Rankovic.

It is not true that there is no freedom of criticism in our Party. Freedom of criticism and self-criticism exists in our Party and is carried out at regular Party meetings and conferences of the *aktiv*. Therefore, someone must have thought up this falsehood and passed it on as information to the CC of the CPSU.

The allegation that the policy of class struggle is not realized in the CPY, and that capitalist elements in the villages and cities are being strengthened, etc., is completely inaccurate. Where did this information come from, when the entire world knows that since the October Revolution, nowhere in the world have there been such firm, consistent social changes as in Yugoslavia? These are facts which no one can dispute with us. Therefore, it is not understandable how anyone can speak of Bernstein, Vollmar, Bukharin and rotten opportunism in connection with our Party. We cannot do other than defend ourselves against such inaccuracies and insults to our Party.

The letter further mentions the report of Tito to the Second Congress of the People's Front in Yugoslavia. A small extract is made from this report and a comparison is drawn with the Mensheviks' attempt to break up the Social Democratic Party forty years ago.

First, that was forty years ago under Tsarism, and today we in Yugoslavia have power in our hands. That is, the CPY has the leading role in the government. In watching social development in process, it is inevitable that organizational forms must be changed somewhat, methods of work changed, as well as forms of the leadership of the masses, in order to achieve specific ends more easily.

Second, the People's Front of Yugoslavia, by virtue of its quality, is not only the equal of some other Communist Parties, which accept anyone into their ranks, but is even better in its organization and activity. Not everyone can be a member of the People's Front of Yugoslavia, even though it has approximately 7,000,000 members.

Third, the CPY has a completely assured leadership in the People's Front because the CPY is the nucleus of the People's Front. Therefore, there is no danger of its dissolving into the People's Front—as is said in the letter. Through the People's Front the CPY gradually realizes its program, which the People's Front voluntarily adopts, considering it as its own program. This is the basis of Tito's statement that the CPY has no other program. . . .

We cannot believe that the CC of the CPSU can dispute the services and results achieved by our Party to date because we remember that such acknowledgement was given us many times by many Soviet leaders and by Comrade Stalin himself. We are also of the opinion that there are many specific aspects in the social transformation of Yugoslavia which can be of benefit to revolutionary development in other countries and are already being used. This does not mean that we place the role of the CPSU and the social system of the USSR in the background. On the contrary, we study and take as an example the Soviet system, but we are developing Socialism in our country in somewhat different forms. In the present period under the specific conditions which exist in our country, in consideration of the international conditions which were created after the war of liberation, we are attempting to apply the best forms of work in the realization of Socialism. We do not do this in order to prove that our road is better than that taken by the Soviet Union,

that we are inventing something new, but because this is forced upon us by our daily life. . . .

If you were to ask us if there were anything with which we were not satisfied on your part then we should openly say there are many reasons why we are dissatisfied. What are these reasons? It is impossible to mention all these reasons in this letter but we will mention a few. First, we regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence service to recruit in our country, which is going toward Socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and UDBa have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include officers, various leaders, and those who are negatively disposed toward the new Yugoslavia.

We have proof that certain agents of the Soviet intelligence service in recruiting our Party members cast doubt on our leaders, sought to ruin their reputation, showed them as inefficient and unreliable. For example, Colonel Stepanov did not hesitate in 1945, when recruiting one of our good comrades who was working in the central division of coding and decoding in UDBa, to blacken and cast doubts on all our leaders, stating "for the present Marshal Tito works as he should." Such cases are still occurring today. This also means that such recruiting is not done for the purpose of struggling against some sort of capitalist country, hence we must inevitably come to the conclusion that this recruiting is destroying our internal unity, that it kills confidence in the leadership, demoralizes people, leads to the compromising of leading people, and becomes a channel for collecting false information day by day. This work by the agents of the Soviet intelligence service cannot be called loyal and friendly toward our country, which is going toward Socialism and which is the most faithful ally of the USSR.

We cannot allow the Soviet intelligence service to spread its net in our country. We have our state security and our intelligence service for the struggle against various foreign capitalist elements and class enemies within the country, and if the Soviet intelligence agents need information or assistance in this direction they can obtain it whenever they want to; on our part, this has been done until now.

These and similar matters with which we are not satisfied are numerous. However, can this be the reason for the straining of our

mutual relations? No. These are questions which can be eliminated and explained.

It is evident that it is in the vital interests of the USSR and Yugoslavia to be firmly tied. However, absolute mutual confidence is necessary for this; without it enduring and firm relations between our two countries cannot exist. The Soviet people, and above all their leaders, should believe the fact that the new Yugoslavia, under its present leadership, is unwaveringly going toward Socialism.

Further, they must believe that the USSR has in the present Yugoslavia under its present leadership, a most faithful friend and ally prepared to share good and evil with the people of the USSR in case of severe trial.

Finally, even though we know that the USSR has tremendous difficulties with the reconstruction of devastated lands, we rightfully expect the assistance of the USSR in the development of our country and the realization of the Five Year Plan without material deprivation to the people of the USSR, because we feel it is to the interest of the USSR for the new Yugoslavia to be stronger, since it is face to face with the capitalist world which is endangering not only its peaceful development but the development of other countries of people's democracy and even the development of the USSR.

On the basis of everything set out above, the plenary session of the CC of the CPY cannot accept as justified the criticisms in your letter about the work of our Party and its leaders. We are deeply convinced that this is the result of a grave misunderstanding, which should not have happened and which must rapidly be liquidated in the interest of matters concerning our Parties.

Our only desire is to eliminate every doubt and disbelief in the purity of the comradely and brotherly feeling of loyalty of our CC of the CPY to the CPSU, to whom we will always remain thankful for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which has led us until now and will lead us in the future—loyalty to the Soviet Union which has served and will continue to serve us as a great example and whose assistance to our people we so highly appreciate.

We are convinced that this disagreement can be liquidated only by full mutual explanation between our two Central Committees on the spot, that is, here.

Therefore, we propose that the CC of the CPSU send one or more of its members, who will have every opportunity here of studying every question thoroughly.

In the hope that you will accept our proposal we send our comradely greetings.

By order of the CC of the CPY

Tito
Kardelj

Belgrade,
April 13, 1948

“ . . . Tito . . . does not recognize any difference between the USSR and the imperialist states.”

4. LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, MAY 4, 1948.

On May 4, 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent the Yugoslav Party a long letter refuting the Yugoslav communication of April 13. Only excerpts from this document are reprinted here; the letter is essentially an elaboration of points raised earlier. The only new point raised in the communication is the flat denial of Soviet espionage activities in Yugoslavia. On all other points the Soviets maintain that their behavior is justified, and contrast the Yugoslav leaders' "arrogance" to the "comradely" behavior of other Communist Parties. The letter catalogues allegations of Yugoslav conceit and treats the Yugoslav Party as if it were an unruly child. (It is pointed out that their achievements are infinitesimal compared with those of other nations. Even the Partisan war against the Germans is dismissed as an invention of the Spaniards more than a century earlier.) The tone of the communication is threatening and the repetition of earlier charges, particularly the parallels drawn between the Yugoslav leaders and Trotsky, reaffirms the Soviet view that the Yugoslavs are

criminals to be formally judged by a court of Communist Parties, namely the Cominform.

Your answer and the announcement of the decision of the plenum of the CC of the CPY of April 13, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received.

Unfortunately, these documents, and especially the document signed by Tito and Kardelj, do not improve on the earlier Yugoslav documents; on the contrary, they further complicate matters and sharpen the conflict.

Our attention is drawn to the tone of the documents, which can only be described as exaggeratedly ambitious. In the documents one does not see any desire to establish the truth, honestly to admit errors, nor to recognize the necessity of eliminating those errors. The Yugoslav comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner, but in a bourgeois manner, i.e., they regard it as an insult to the prestige of the CC of the CPY and as detrimental to the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

So, in order to extricate themselves from the difficult situation for which they are themselves to blame, the Yugoslav leaders are using a "new" method, a method of complete denial of their errors regardless of their obvious existence. The facts and the documents mentioned in the letter of the CC of the CPSU of March 27, 1948 are denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it seems, do not understand that this childish method of groundless denial of facts and documents can never be convincing, but only laughable.

1. The Withdrawal of Soviet Military Advisers From Yugoslavia

In its letter of March 27 the CC of the CPSU stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet military advisers, and said that the information of the CC of the CPSU was based on the complaints of these advisers of the unfriendly attitude of responsible Yugoslav officials toward the Soviet army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj denounce these complaints as unsubstantiated. Why should the CC of the CPSU believe the unfounded statements of Tito and Kardelj rather than the numerous complaints of the Soviet military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has its military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We must emphasize that now we

have yet to have any complaints from our advisers in these countries. This explains why we have had no misunderstandings in these countries arising from the work of the Soviet military advisers. Complaints and misunderstandings, in this field, exist only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this can be explained only by the special unfriendly atmosphere which has been created in Yugoslavia around these military advisers?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenses in connection with the salaries of the Soviet military advisers, emphasizing that the Soviet generals receive three to four times as much, in dinars, as Yugoslav generals, and that such conditions may give rise to discontent on the part of Yugoslav military personnel. But the Yugoslav generals, apart from drawing salaries, are provided with apartments, servants, food, etc. Secondly, the pay of the Soviet generals in Yugoslavia corresponds to the pay of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not consider reducing the salaries of Soviet generals who are in Yugoslavia on official duty.

Perhaps the expense of the Soviet generals was too great a burden for the Yugoslav budget. In that case the Yugoslav government should have approached the Soviet government and proposed that it take over part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet government would have done this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course; instead of solving this question in an amicable manner, they began to abuse our military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army. Only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers did the Yugoslav government approach the Soviet government. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not accept this situation.

2. Concerning the Soviet Civilian Specialists in Yugoslavia

In its letter of March 27 the CC of the CPSU stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In the given case the CC of the CPSU relied on the complaints of the civilian specialists and on the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. From these statements it can be seen that the Soviet civilian specialists, as well as the representative of the CPSU in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin, were placed under the supervision of the UDBa.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj in their letter deny the truth of these complaints and reports, stating that the UDBa does not supervise Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU believe the unfounded assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj and not the complaints of Soviet men, among them Comrade Yudin?

The Soviet government has many of the civilian specialists in all the countries of people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints from them and there are no disagreements with the governments of these countries. Why have these disagreements and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Is it not because the Yugoslav government has created a special unfriendly atmosphere around the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, among them Comrade Yudin himself?

It is understandable that the Soviet government could not tolerate such a situation and was forced to withdraw its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. . . .

3. Concerning the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia and the Soviet State

In their letter of April 13, 1948 Tito and Kardelj wrote: "We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business."

We feel that this statement by Tito and Kardelj is essentially incorrect and anti-Soviet. They identify the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist who represents the Communist government of the USSR, with an ordinary bourgeois ambassador, a simple official of a bourgeois state, who is called upon to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav state. It is difficult to understand how Tito and Kardelj could sink so low. Do these comrades understand that such an attitude toward the Soviet Ambassador means the negation of all friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do these comrades understand that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist, who represents a friendly power which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, not only has the right but is obliged, from time to time, to discuss with the Communists in Yugoslavia all questions which interest them? How can they be suspicious of these simple elementary matters if they intend to remain on friendly terms with the Soviet Union?

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it is necessary to mention that, unlike the Yugoslavs, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not treat him as a mere bourgeois ambassador and we do not deny his "right to seek information about the work of our Party from anyone he chooses." Because he became an ambassador, he did not stop being a Communist. We consider him as a comrade and a high-ranking Communist. He has friends and acquaintances among the Soviet people. Is he "acquiring" information about the work of our Party? Most likely he is. Let him "acquire" it. We have no reason to hide from comrades the shortcomings in our Party. We expose them ourselves in order to eliminate them.

We consider that this attitude of the Yugoslav comrades toward the Soviet Ambassador cannot be regarded as accidental. It arises from the general attitude of the Yugoslav government, which is also the cause of the inability of the Yugoslav leaders to see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they therefore put the foreign policy of the USSR on a par with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and feel that they should follow the same policy toward the Soviet Union as toward the imperialist states, Great Britain and the United States.

In this respect, the speech by Comrade Tito in Ljubljana in May 1945 is very characteristic. He said:

It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that everyone shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is well known, after a series of territorial concessions for the benefit of Yugoslavia, which the Soviet Union extracted from the Anglo-Americans, the latter, together with the French, rejected the Soviet proposal to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their own forces, which were then in Italy. Since all other means were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia—to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav com-

rades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another. However, this fact caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav leaders, whose attitude was described by Comrade Tito. The statement by Tito in Ljubljana that "Yugoslavia would not pay for others," "would not be used as a bribe," "would not be involved in any policy of spheres of interest," was directed not only against the imperialist states but also against the USSR, and in the given circumstances the relations of Tito toward the USSR are no different from his relations toward the imperialist states, as he does not recognize any difference between the USSR and the imperialist states.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito's, which met no resistance in the Politburo of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY, pursued in the narrow circles of the Yugoslav Party cadres, regarding the "degeneration" of the USSR into an imperialist state, its desire to "dominate Yugoslavia economically," also the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY regarding the "degeneration" of the CPSU and its desire "through the Cominform, to control the other Parties" and the "Socialism in the USSR, which has ceased being revolutionary."

The Soviet government was obliged to draw the attention of the Yugoslav government to the fact that this statement could not be tolerated, and since the explanations given by Tito and Kardelj were unfounded, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, was instructed by the Soviet government to make the following statement to the Yugoslav government, which he did on June 5, 1945:

We regard Comrade Tito's speech as an unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union, and the explanation by Comrade Kardelj as unsatisfactory. Our leaders understood Comrade Tito's speech in this way, and it cannot be understood in any other. Tell Comrade Tito that if he should once again permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open criticism in the press and disavow him.

From this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito to the USSR arises the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders toward the Soviet Ambassador, which puts the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade on a level with bourgeois ambassadors.

It seems that the Yugoslav leaders intend to retain this anti-Soviet attitude in the future. The Yugoslav leaders should bear in mind that retaining this attitude means renouncing all friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and betraying the united Socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people's democratic republics. They should also bear in mind that retaining this attitude means depriving themselves of the right to demand material and any other assistance from the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union can only offer aid to friends.

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, we emphasize that this anti-Soviet attitude toward the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet state is only found in Yugoslavia; in other countries of people's democracy relations were and remain friendly and perfectly correct. . . .

4. Regarding the Anti-Soviet Statement by Comrade Djilas about the Intelligence Service and Trade Negotiations

In our letter of March 27, we mentioned the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas made at a session of the CC of the CPY, in which he said that the Soviet officers, from a moral standpoint, were inferior to the officers in the English army. This statement by Djilas was made in connection with the fact that a few officers of the Soviet army in Yugoslavia indulged in actions of an immoral nature. We described this statement by Djilas as anti-Soviet because in referring to the behavior of Soviet officers this pitiful Marxist, Comrade Djilas, did not recall the main differences between the Socialist Soviet army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose function is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj state that "Djilas never made such a statement in such a form," and that "Tito explained this in writing and orally in 1945" and that "Comrade Stalin and other members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU" accepted this explanation.

We feel it necessary to emphasize that this statement by Tito and Kardelj does not correspond with the facts. This is how Stalin reacted to the statement by Djilas in a telegram to Tito:

I understand the difficulty of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. However, you must know that the Soviet

government, in spite of colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing all in its power and beyond its power to help you. I am surprised at the fact that a few incidents and offenses committed by individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in Yugoslavia are generalized and extended to the whole Red Army. You should not so offend an army which is helping you to get rid of the Germans and which is shedding its blood in the battle against the German invader. It is not difficult to understand that there are black sheep in every family, but it would be strange to condemn the whole family because of one black sheep.

If the soldiers of the Red Army find out that Comrade Djilas, and those who did not challenge him, consider the English officers, from a moral standpoint, superior to the Soviet officers, they would cry out in pain at such undeserved insults. In this anti-Soviet attitude of Djilas, which passed unchallenged among the other members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous campaign conducted by the leaders of the CPY against the representatives of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the withdrawal of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Djilas end? It ended with Comrade Djilas arriving in Moscow, together with the Yugoslav delegation, where he apologized to Stalin and begged that this unpleasant error, which he committed at the session of the CC of the CPY, be forgotten. As can be seen, the matter appears entirely different when presented in the letter of Tito and Kardelj. Unfortunately, Djilas's error was not an accident.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse the Soviet representatives of recruiting Yugoslavs for their intelligence service. They write:

We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence service to recruit, in our country, which is going toward Socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and the UDBa have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include offi-

cers, various leaders, and those who are negatively disposed toward the new Yugoslavia.

We declare that this statement by Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile attacks against the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to the facts.

It would be monstrous to demand that the Soviet people who are working in Yugoslavia should fill their mouths with water and talk with no one. Soviet workers are politically mature people and not simple hired laborers who have no right to be interested in what is happening in Yugoslavia. It is only natural for them to talk with Yugoslav citizens, to ask them questions and to gain information, etc. One would have to be incorrigibly anti-Soviet to consider these talks as attempts to recruit people for the intelligence service, especially people who are "negatively disposed toward the new Yugoslavia." Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union care less for the welfare of the new Yugoslavia than do the members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY.

It must be emphasized that Yugoslav comrades visiting Moscow frequently visit other cities in the USSR, meet our people and freely talk with them. During his last visit to Moscow, Djilas went to Leningrad for a few days to talk with Soviet comrades.

According to the Yugoslav scheme, information about the Party and state work can only be obtained from the leading organs of the CC of the CPY or from the government. Comrade Djilas did not obtain information from these organs in the USSR but from the local organs of the Leningrad organizations. We did not consider it necessary to enquire into what he did there, and what facts he picked up. We think he did not collect material for the Anglo-American or French intelligence service but for the leading organs of Yugoslavia. Since this was correct we did not see any harm in it because this information might have contained instructive material for the Yugoslav comrades. Comrade Djilas cannot say that he met with any restrictions.

It may be asked now: Why should Soviet Communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslavs in the USSR? . . .

If Tito and Kardelj were interested in discovering the truth and if the truth were not painful to them, they should think seriously about the following:

- (a) Why should the CPSU's information about affairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania appear correct, and not cause any misunderstanding with the Communist Parties of those countries, while the information about Yugoslavia appears, according to the Yugoslav comrades, "tendentious and anti-Party" and causes from their side anti-Soviet attacks and unfriendly attitude toward the CPSU?
- (b) Why do friendly relations between the USSR and the countries of people's democracies develop and strengthen while Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorate?
- (c) Why did the CPs of the people's democracies support the CPSU's letter of March 27 and condemn the mistakes of the CPY while the Politburo of the CPY, which would not admit its errors, remained isolated?
Was all this accidental? . . .

We feel that behind the attempts of the Yugoslav leaders to clear themselves of the responsibility for straining Soviet-Yugoslav relations lies a lack of desire by these comrades to admit their mistakes and their intention to continue an unfriendly policy toward the USSR.

Lenin says:

The attitude of a political party toward its mistakes is one of the most important and most significant criteria of the seriousness of the party and the fulfillment of its obligations toward its class and toward the working masses. To admit errors frankly, to discover their cause, to analyze the situation which has been created by these errors, to discuss measures for correcting them—that is the sign of a serious party, that is the fulfillment of its obligations, that is the education of the class and the masses.

Unfortunately, we must state that the leaders of the CPY, who will not admit and correct their errors, are crudely destroying this principal directive of Lenin.

We must also emphasize that, in contrast to the Yugoslav leaders, the leaders of the French and Italian Communist Parties honorably admitted their errors at the conference of nine Parties, conscientiously corrected them and thus enabled their Parties to strengthen their ranks and to educate their cadres.

We feel that underlying the unwillingness of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY honorably to admit their errors and to correct them is the unbounded arrogance of the Yugoslav leaders. Their heads were turned by the successes achieved. They became arrogant and now feel that the depth of the sea reaches only up to their knees. Not only have they become arrogant, but they even preach arrogance, not understanding that arrogance can be their own ruin.

Lenin says: "All revolutionary parties, which have existed in the past, perished because they were arrogant and because they did not see where their strength lay and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We will not perish because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses and we will learn to overcome them."

Unfortunately we must state that the Yugoslav leaders, who do not suffer from undue modesty and who are still intoxicated with their successes, which are not so very great, have forgotten Lenin's teaching.

Tito and Kardelj, in their letter, speak of the merits and successes of the CPY, saying that the CC of the CPSU earlier acknowledged these services and successes, but is now supposedly silent about them. This, naturally, is not true. No one can deny the services and successes of the CPY. There is no doubt about this. However, we must also say that the services of the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the CPY. However, the leaders of these Parties behave modestly and do not boast about their successes, as do the Yugoslav leaders, who have pierced every one's ears with their unlimited self-praise. It is also necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian CPs to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian CPs have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because after the destruction of the Yugoslav Partisan headquarters by German paratroopers, at a moment when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was passing through a serious crisis, the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian CPs. If Comrade Tito and Comrade Kardelj bore this fact

in mind they would be less boastful about their merits and successes and would behave with greater propriety and modesty.

The conceit of the Yugoslav leaders goes so far that they even attribute to themselves such merits as can in no way be justified. Take, for example, the question of military science. The Yugoslav leaders claim that they have improved on the Marxist science of war with a new theory according to which war is regarded as a combined operation by regular troops, Partisan units and popular insurrections. However, this so-called theory is as old as the world and is not new to Marxism. As is known, the Bolsheviks applied combined action of regular troops, Partisan units and popular insurrections for the entire period of the civil war in Russia (1918-21), and applied it on a much wider scale than was done in Yugoslavia. However, the Bolsheviks did not say that by applying this method of military activity, they produced anything new in the science of war, because the same method was successfully applied long before the Bolsheviks by Field Marshal Kutuzov in the war against Napoleon's troops in Russia in 1812.

However, even Field Marshal Kutuzov did not claim to be the innovator in applying this method because the Spaniards in 1808 applied it in the war against Napoleon's troops. It thus appears that this science of war is actually 140 years old and what they claim as their own contribution is actually the contribution of the Spaniards.

Besides this, we should bear in mind that the services of any leader in the past do not exclude the possibility of his committing serious errors later. We must not close our eyes to present errors because of past services. In his time Trotsky also rendered revolutionary services, but this does not mean that the CPSU could close its eyes to his crude opportunist mistakes which followed later, making him an enemy of the Soviet Union.

Tito and Kardelj in their letter proposed that the CPSU should send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. We feel this course would be incorrect, since it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of differences of principle.

As is known, the question of Soviet-Yugoslav differences has already become the property of the CC of the nine Communist Parties who have their Cominform. It would be highly irregular to

exclude them from this matter. Therefore, we propose that this question be discussed at the next session of the Cominform.

CC of the CPSU

Moscow,
May 4, 1948.

"We do not flee from criticism. . . ."

5. LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, MAY 17, 1948.

By mid-May 1948 it was clear that the Yugoslav hope of reconciliation was largely illusory. The Soviet posture was unbending; Stalin had acted to widen the dispute, publicizing the controversy within the leaderships of the East European satellite Parties. This brief rejoinder to the Soviet note of May 4 is thus quite hopeless in tone. Tito and his colleagues stand as before on the issue of principle, but, as much for the record as in genuine expectation of rapprochement, they close on a note of loyalty to the USSR.

The document is quoted in full.

We received your letter of May 4, 1948. It would be superfluous to write of the discouraging impression created on us by this letter. It has convinced us of the fact that all our explanations, though supported by facts showing that all the accusations against us were the result of wrong information, are in vain.

We do not flee from criticism about questions of principle, but in this matter we feel at such a disadvantage that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Cominform. Even before we were informed, the nine Parties received your first letter and took their stand in resolutions. The contents of your letter did not remain an internal matter for individual Parties but were carried outside the permissible circle, and the results are that today, in some countries such as Czechoslovakia

and Hungary, not only our Party but our country as a whole is being insulted, as was the case with our parliamentary delegation in Prague.

The results of all this have been very serious for our country.

We desire that the matter be liquidated in such manner that we prove, by deeds, that the accusations against us are unjust. That is, we will resolutely construct Socialism and remain loyal to the Soviet Union; remain loyal to the doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The future will show, as did the past, that we will realize all that we promise you.

By order of the CC of the CPY

J. B. Tito

E. Kardelj

Belgrade,
May 17, 1948

"... an attitude of nationalism which is hostile to the cause of the working class."

6. LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, MAY 22, 1948.

In this document reference is made to a letter from the Yugoslavs to the Soviet Communist Party dated May 20, 1948, which was never published. It can be inferred from the Soviet reply that Belgrade has refused to attend the projected Cominform meeting, challenging that body's right to pass judgment upon the Yugoslav Communist Party.

The Soviet government curtly states that demands for independence of the Cominform are unacceptable and further elaborates its charges against the Yugoslav Communists. The document is reproduced in full.

Your letters of May 17, 1948, and May 20, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received. The CPSU considers that in these letters the leaders of the CPY have gone a step further in aggravating their crude mistakes in matters of principle, the harmfulness and danger of which the CPSU indicated in its letter of May 4, 1948.

1. Comrades Tito and Kardelj write that they feel "so at a disadvantage that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Informburo." Further, they allowed themselves the allusion that the Yugoslav leaders had allegedly been placed in that position by the CPSU. The CC of the CPSU considers that there is not a scrap of truth in this assertion. There is no inequality for the Yugoslav Communist Party nor can there be in the Informburo of nine Communist Parties. All know that at the time of the organization of the Informburo of nine Communist Parties, all Communist Parties started from the indisputable position that every Party should submit a report to the Informburo, just as every Party has the right to criticize other Parties. The conference of nine Parties started from this point when, at its meetings in September 1947, it listened to the reports of the Central Committees of all Parties without exception. The conference of nine Communist Parties initiated the principle that each Party has the right to criticize any other Party. The Italian and French comrades did not dispute the right of other Parties to criticize their mistakes, and they accepted harshness of criticism in a Bolshevik manner.

It is a known fact that the Italian and French comrades did not oppose the right of other Parties to criticize their mistakes. They have, on the contrary, borne the brunt of Bolshevik criticism and benefited from its conclusions. Moreover, the Yugoslav comrades took advantage of the opportunity to criticize the mistakes of the Italian and French comrades and did not consider that by so doing they were infringing on the equality of those Parties.

Why are the Yugoslav comrades making this radical change, and demanding the liquidation of precedents already established in the Informburo? Because they believe that the Yugoslav Party and its leadership ought to be placed in a privileged position, and that the statute of the Informburo does not apply to them; that, having the privilege of criticizing other Parties, they should not themselves submit to the criticism of other Parties. However, if we may say so,

beliefs of that kind have nothing in common with equality. In fact this is nothing but a request from the Yugoslav leaders for a privileged position for the CPY in the Cominform, a position which does not exist and cannot exist for any Party. We have taken and continue to take this stand, for without it the work of the Informburo could not continue. Each Communist Party is obliged to submit reports to the Informburo, each Communist Party has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. The refusal of the Yugoslavs to submit reports on their actions to the Cominform, and to hear criticism from other Communist Parties, means a violation of the equality of Communist Parties.

2. In their letter of May 17, Comrades Tito and Kardelj repeat the claim made in their previous letter, alleging that the CPSU's criticism of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership is based on incorrect information.

But the Yugoslav comrades do not produce any evidence to prove this statement. The statement remains without substantiation and the CPSU's criticism remains unanswered, even though Comrades Tito and Kardelj state in their letter that they do not seek to avoid criticism on questions of principle. Perhaps the Yugoslav leaders simply have nothing to say to justify themselves?

The issue reduces itself to two things: either the Politburo of the CPY, deep in its soul, is aware of the seriousness of the mistakes committed, but wishing to conceal this from the CPY and to deceive it, declares that the mistakes do not exist, in the meantime laying the blame on innocent men, who were supposed to have misinformed the CPSU; or it really does not understand that by its mistakes it is deviating from Marxism-Leninism. However, in that case it must be admitted that the Politburo's ignorance of the principles of Marxism is extremely great.

3. Although they refuse to answer the direct questions of the CPSU and aggravate their mistakes by their stubborn unwillingness to admit and correct them. Comrades Tito and Kardelj assure us with words that they will show with deeds that they will remain true to the Soviet Union and the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. After what has happened we have no reason to believe in these verbal assurances. Comrades Tito and Kardelj have on many occasions given promises to the CPSU which have not been fulfilled. From their letters and especially from their last letter we are becom-

ing ever more certain of this. The Politburo of the CPY, and especially Comrade Tito, should understand that the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy which they have recently pursued in their everyday work has done all that was needed to undermine faith in them on the part of the CPSU and the government of the USSR.

4. Comrades Tito and Kardelj complain that they have gotten into a difficult position and that the consequences of this are very serious for Yugoslavia. This of course is true, but the blame for this lies exclusively with Comrades Tito and Kardelj and with other members of the Politburo of the CPY, who have put their own prestige and ambition above the interests of the Yugoslav people, and, instead of admitting and correcting their mistakes in the interests of the people, have stubbornly denied their mistakes, which are fatal for the Yugoslav people.

5. Comrades Tito and Kardelj claim that the CC of the CPY refuses to attend the meeting of the Informburo to discuss the question of the Yugoslav Communist Party. If this is their final decision, then it means that they have nothing to tell the Informburo in their defense, and that they are tacitly admitting their guilt and are afraid to appear before their fraternal Communist Parties. Moreover, refusal to report to the Informburo means that the CPY has taken the path of cutting itself off from the united Socialist people's front of people's democracies headed by the Soviet Union, and that it is now preparing the Yugoslav Party and people for betrayal of the united front of people's democracies and the USSR. Since the Informburo is the basic Party organization of the united front, such a policy leads to the betrayal of the work done for the international solidarity of workers and to the adoption of an attitude of nationalism which is hostile to the cause of the working class.

Irrespective of whether the representatives of the CC of the CPY attend the meeting of the Informburo, the CPSU insists upon discussion of the situation in the CPY at the next meeting of the Informburo.

In view of the request of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian comrades that the meeting of the Informburo take place in the second half of June, the CPSU expresses its agreement with this proposal.

CC of the CPSU

Moscow,
May 22, 1948.

“ . . . their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.”

7. RESOLUTION OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA, JUNE 28, 1948.

The resolution of the Cominform which is excerpted here is in effect the final Soviet act of excommunication. It follows a Yugoslav letter to the Cominform, dated June 20, 1948, reiterating Belgrade's position. Briefly, the Yugoslavs stated that they were unjustly accused, that no attempt had been made to understand their explanations. Although their note ended with protestations of solidarity and loyalty, Tito and his colleagues in effect again challenged the competence of the Cominform to act in this matter. Their letter was thus a final refusal to submit to authority.

The Cominform communiqué, which was the first document to bring the dispute to the attention of the non-Communist world, endorses the Soviet Communist Party's criticism of the Yugoslavs, and sums up the charges leveled by the CPSU throughout the earlier correspondence. The Yugoslav Party is charged with:

- 1. A deviationist domestic and foreign policy;*
- 2. Determined hostility toward the Soviet Union;*
- 3. A faulty agricultural policy;*
- 4. A non-Marxist-Leninist conception of the role of the Party;*
- 5. Refusal to accept criticism;*
- 6. Arrogant behavior toward fraternal parties and claims to privilege.*

Having detailed these charges, the Cominform, in effect, expels the Yugoslav heretics from its ranks, and openly appeals to the rank and file of the Yugoslav Party to oust its leadership.

The Information Bureau, composed of the representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Rumanian Workers' Party, Hungarian Workers' Party, Polish Workers' Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, after discussing the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and announcing that the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had refused to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, unanimously reached the following conclusions:

1. The Information Bureau notes that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has recently pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of domestic and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the Information Bureau approves the action of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic.

2. The Information Bureau declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU. An undignified policy, defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union, has been carried out in Yugoslavia. A special regime was instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, whereby they were under surveillance of Yugoslav state security organs and were continually followed. The representative of the CPSU in the Information Bureau, Comrade Yudin, and a number of official representatives of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia, were followed and kept under observation by Yugoslav state security organs.

All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave toward bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the "degeneration" of the CPSU, about the "degeneration" of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau denounces this anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as being incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and only appropriate to nationalists.

3. In domestic policy, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are departing from the position of the working class and are breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. They deny that there is a growth of capitalist elements in their country, and consequently, a sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside. This denial is the direct result of the opportunist tenet that the class struggle does not become sharper during the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism, as Marxism-Leninism teaches, but dies down, as was affirmed by opportunists of the Bukharin type, who propagated the theory of the peaceful growth of capitalism into Socialism.

The Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation in the countryside and by regarding the individual peasantry as a single entity, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, contrary to Lenin's well-known thesis that small individual farming gives birth continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale to capitalism and the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the political situation in the Yugoslav countryside gives no grounds for smugness and complacency. In the conditions obtaining in Yugoslavia, where individual peasant farming predominates, where the land is not nationalized, where there is private property in land, where land can be bought and sold, where much of the land is concentrated in the hands of kulaks, and where hired labor is employed, there can be no question of educating the Party in the spirit of glossing over the class struggle and of reconciling class contradictions without by so doing disarming the Party itself in face of the difficulties connected with the construction of Socialism.

On the question of the leading role of the working class, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, by affirming that the peasantry is the "most stable foundation of the Yugoslav state," are departing from the Marxist-Leninist path and are taking the path of a populist, kulak party. Lenin taught that the proletariat as the "only class in contemporary society which is revolutionary to the end . . . must be the leader in the struggle of the entire people for a

thorough democratic transformation, in the struggle of all working people and the exploited against the oppressors and exploiters."

The Yugoslav leaders are violating this thesis of Marxism-Leninism.

As far as the peasantry is concerned it may be that the majority, that is, the poor and medium peasants, are already in alliance with the working class, with the working class having the leading role in this alliance.

The attitude of the Yugoslav leaders disregards these theses of Marxism-Leninism.

As can be seen, this attitude reflects views appropriate to petty-bourgeois nationalism, but not to Marxist-Leninists.

4. The Information Bureau considers that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is revising Marxist-Leninist teachings about the Party. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Party is the principal guiding and leading force in the country, which has its own, specific program, and does not dissolve itself among the non-Party masses. The Party is the highest form of organization and the most important weapon of the working class. . . .

5. The Information Bureau considers that the criticism made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) and the Central Committees of the other Communist Parties who in this way rendered fraternal assistance to the Yugoslav Communist Party, of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, provides the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with all the conditions necessary to speedily correct the mistakes committed.

However, instead of honestly accepting this criticism and taking the Bolshevik path of correcting these mistakes, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, suffering from boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit, met this criticism with belligerence and hostility. They took the anti-Party path of indiscriminately denying all their mistakes, violated the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism regarding the attitude of a political party to its mistakes and thus aggravated their anti-Party mistakes. . . .

6. Taking into account the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and seeking to show the leaders of the Party the

way out of this situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, suggested that the matter of the Yugoslav Communist Party be discussed at a meeting of the Information Bureau, on the same, normal party footing as that on which the activities of other Communist Parties were discussed at the first meeting of the Information Bureau.

However, the Yugoslav leaders rejected the repeated suggestions of the fraternal Communist Parties to discuss the situation in the Yugoslav Party at a meeting of the Information Bureau.

Attempting to avoid the just criticism of the fraternal Parties in the Information Bureau, the Yugoslav leaders invented the fable of their allegedly "unequal position." There is not a grain of truth in this story. It is generally known that when the Information Bureau was set up, the Communist Parties based their work on the indisputable principle that any Party could report to the Information Bureau in the same way that any Party had the right to criticize other Parties.

At the first meeting of the nine Communist Parties, the Yugoslav Communist Party took full advantage of this right.

The refusal of the Yugoslav Party to report to the Information Bureau on its actions and to listen to criticism by other Communist Parties means, in practice, a violation of the equality of the Communist Parties and is, in fact, tantamount to a demand for a privileged position for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Information Bureau.

8. In view of this, the Information Bureau expresses complete agreement with the appraisal of the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party, with the criticism of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Party, and with the political analysis of these mistakes contained in letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between March and May 1948.

The Information Bureau unanimously concludes that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated with the Information Bureau, have taken the path

of seceding from the united Socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism.

The Information Bureau condemns this anti-Party policy and attitude of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau considers that, in view of all this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

The Information Bureau considers that the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that consequently the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party has broken with the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and has taken the road to nationalism.

Considerably overestimating the internal, national forces within Yugoslavia and their influence, the Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build Socialism without the support of the people's democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union. They think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the help of these revolutionary forces.

Showing their poor understanding of the international situation and their intimidation by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders think that by making concessions they can curry favor with the imperialist states. They think they will be able to bargain with them for Yugoslavia's independence and, gradually, get the people of Yugoslavia oriented toward these states, that is, toward capitalism. In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that "capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union."

The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only

lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are enough healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united Socialist front.

Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united front against imperialism.

Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfill this honorable task.

II. THE ROAD TO BRIONI

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the Yugoslav Communist Party, meeting in plenary session on June 29, 1948, issued a rejoinder to the Cominform communiqué of the preceding day which had, in effect, expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist camp. The Yugoslav statement was a point by point refutation of the charges which the Soviet Union had advanced during the preceding three months, and a reaffirmation of Belgrade's position.

The Yugoslav Party still insisted that it had been misunderstood, had been given no opportunity to defend itself, and was the victim of Cominform error. The tone of the Yugoslav communiqué was neither aggressive nor polemical; nonetheless, it constituted official acknowledgement of the break. Tito and his associates still implied that they had not wished for a rupture with Moscow and were still hoping that relations might improve; but they also signified that they were reconciled to the facts. The Central Committee resolution marked the end of Belgrade-Moscow communications for nearly a decade.

It is interesting that, as time passed, Yugoslavia did not proceed to mount a counterattack against her accusers. Although the Cominform nations assumed a posture of extreme hostility and offered every provocation for retaliatory action, the Yugoslav government refrained from entering into a campaign of invective. Such denunciations as did come from the Yugoslav side were directed at the satellites and not at the Soviet Union itself. Clearly, Tito wished to avoid an irrevocable breach, even while his opponents exercised

no such restraint. Thus Stalin's name was chanted at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in July 1948, and his ritual ikons were displayed in the May Day parade of 1949. Similarly, when the Committee for Mutual Economic Cooperation—Comecon—was formed by the USSR in 1949, Yugoslavia duly applied for membership even while suspecting that the application would be studiously ignored.

Yugoslavia's ambiguous position was in large measure the result of the prevailing international situation. Belgrade's relations with the Western powers were then no better than those of the orthodox Soviet bloc. If anything, they were even more strained because of the nagging issue of Trieste, half of which was occupied by Yugoslav troops, the other by an American-British force. The break with the Cominform had cost Tito his allies in the East, without, for a long time, gaining him support in the West. Perhaps, this situation was in part at least a matter of deliberate choice for Belgrade: the habits of suspicion of the "capitalist" West were too deep to be quickly forgotten. As a result, the Yugoslavs embarked on a distinctive policy of "neutrality," which to greater or lesser degree they have since maintained.

Moscow, on the other hand, was unimpressed by Tito's studious neutrality. Instead, the Kremlin still hoped to bring about Belgrade's capitulation to superior force. Having failed to achieve this end by fomenting a revolution within the Yugoslav Communist Party, which remained by and large loyal to Tito, the Soviet Union resorted to external pressures. Beginning in mid-1948 and for some years thereafter, almost all possible means short of full-scale war were employed. Soviet and satellite radio and press campaigns were launched against Belgrade. A "loyal" Yugoslav Party-in-exile was hastily organized. Ominous concentrations of satellite and Soviet military forces were stationed on the Yugoslav frontiers and numerous "border incidents" ensued.

Finally, a tight economic blockade was imposed on Yugoslavia, as a result of which trade between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc fell from roughly half of Yugoslavia's foreign trade to absolute zero in little more than a year. Credits previously granted were withdrawn. The Yugoslav economy was brought to the verge of collapse.

In these circumstances the policy of neutrality initially envisaged by Tito became virtually untenable. In a state of quasi-war with his former Communist allies, his only way to avert catastrophe was to turn to the West.

Thus, by 1950 Yugoslavia had obtained the first of a series of loans from the United States, France and Great Britain which, over the years to come, were to bolster her crippled economy and build up her military potential. Moreover, in February 1953, Marshal Tito's government became a party to a defensive alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey which became known as the Balkan Pact. No formal connection was ever established between Yugoslavia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but this, of course, from the Soviet viewpoint, was a distinction without a difference. An official Soviet diplomatic note, presented on August 30, 1949, had stated that Moscow regarded "the government of Yugoslavia, not as a friend or an ally, but as a foe and enemy." Consequently, Yugoslav-Soviet relations after 1948, insofar as they existed at all, were confined to formal inter-governmental contacts which were difficult at best. The association of "fraternal" Parties was definitely at an end. For many years, all references to Marshal Tito and his government appearing in the Soviet and satellite press were abusive in the extreme, and included such epithets as "Fascist tyrant," "hireling, spy and murderer," "Balkan dwarf," and others of equal pungency.

This state of affairs lasted well beyond Stalin's death, though statements emanating from the Soviet Union grew noticeably milder during the year 1954. Meanwhile, relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet satellites remained, if anything, worse than those with Moscow. In some instances, notably those of Hungary and Albania, they continued so even after Tito and Khrushchev had made their apparent peace in 1955.

The satellites had, of course, been compelled to follow Moscow's lead in the 1948 rupture. As subsequent events revealed, the issue of "Titoism" was to prove a more serious one in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union itself. Manifestations of local independence in the USSR were a remote possibility indeed, but such tendencies in the satellite states of Eastern Europe were less improbable.

As a consequence, Moscow was moved to take every precaution. Yugoslav-satellite relations were severely restricted and the ensuing quarantine rigidly enforced. Prominent leaders of the satellite Parties suspected of deviation were purged, though it is impossible to say how many of them harbored a genuine desire to emulate Tito and how many merely fell victim to inner Party struggles.¹⁵ Nor was the Kremlin much inclined to encourage a resumption of normal Party and government relations between the people's democracies and Yugoslavia, even while the Soviet Union itself was cautiously preparing the ground for a rapprochement with Belgrade.

The latter trend began slowly and cautiously during 1954 with a gradual increase in embassy staffs at Moscow and Belgrade, as *chargés d'affaires* were replaced by ambassadors. The trend gathered momentum when the tone of Soviet statements about Yugoslavia grew less vituperative, and it culminated in 1955 with the dramatic announcement that Soviet Party Secretary Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin contemplated a state visit to Belgrade.

The composition of the Soviet delegation, as well as the glaring fact that the leaders of the Soviet state and Party were themselves traveling to the seat of heresy, all served to underscore the bankruptcy of the anti-Yugoslav policies which had been followed with such zeal since 1948. By 1955, these policies had assumed the proportions of an international scandal, and they appeared as an impossible flaw in the Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive among the Afro-Asian nations. Likewise, a posture of implacable hostility toward a "Socialist" state emerged as a hopeless anomaly at a time when the USSR was seeking a meeting at the summit and preparing the ground for propaganda exploitation of the "Geneva spirit." In the circumstances, the Soviet leaders badly needed a reconciliation and were willing to go to unprecedented lengths to achieve it.

The projected visit actually took place on May 26, 1955 and marked a *de facto* capitulation to Yugoslav claims. Speaking at

¹⁵ Ironically, many of those purged for "Titoist" crimes were, like Slansky of Czechoslovakia and Kostov of Bulgaria, signatories of the June 1948 Cominform Resolution.

the Belgrade airport, Khrushchev confessed to errors on the Soviet side, but blamed the 1948 break on the intrigues of Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet secret police chief from 1938 to 1953. The Yugoslavs received this transparent fiction as well as Khrushchev's other remarks in silence: there is not the slightest evidence that Beria had had anything whatever to do with the issue.

The later stages of the Soviet visit, however, were more successful, and a joint policy statement of June 2, 1955, which became known as the "Belgrade Declaration," defined the terms of rapprochement. On their part, the Yugoslavs refused to return to the old system of "cooperation" between Communist Parties. Then as before, they did not wish to abdicate their freedom of action or to bow to collective decisions. By contrast, they asked for and obtained what was at least ostensible Soviet approval of "separate roads to Socialism," thus winning apparent recognition of the idea that, in the process of constructing Communist institutions in Eastern Europe, states and Parties could employ a variety of methods and develop characteristic national features.

"For our part, we are ready to do everything necessary . . ."

8. STATEMENT BY SOVIET FIRST PARTY SECRETARY NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV ON ARRIVAL AT BELGRADE AIRPORT, MAY 26, 1955.

The speech is noteworthy for its cordial tone and the admission that the USSR was at fault in the 1948 break. In effect, the statement was not only an apology—an unprecedented act in the history of relations between the CPSU and foreign Communist Parties—but also an endorsement of Yugoslav policy. It gave Moscow's blessing to those very acts which had brought about the earlier ex-communication. A nation's right to choose its own "road to Socialism," and to be master in its own house—arch-heresies in 1948—were now accepted with apparent good grace. The significance of this shift was not long in being

understood by Moscow's satellites and proved far-reaching. If it was not, perhaps, immediately appreciated in the Kremlin, the impact in Eastern Europe was certainly very great. It is probably no exaggeration to say, in retrospect, that Polish defiance of Moscow, as well as the Hungarian revolt, were in large measure the result of this fateful visit.

Dear Comrade Tito, members of the government and leaders of the Yugoslav Communist League, dear comrades and citizens:

In the name of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and in the name of the Soviet people, I cordially greet you and the workers of the glorious capital of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, and all the brotherly peoples of Yugoslavia.

The Soviet delegation has come to your country to determine, together with the Yugoslav government delegation, the roads for further development and consolidation of friendship and cooperation between our peoples, to consider our joint task in the struggle of our countries for prosperity, for reduction of tension, for strengthening peace in general and the security of peoples.

The peoples of our countries are linked by ties of long brotherly friendship and joint struggle against the enemy. This friendship and militant collaboration were particularly strengthened during the time of difficult trials in the struggle against the Fascist invaders during the Second World War. During these difficult years all the Soviet people followed with great feeling the heroic struggle of their Yugoslav brothers, headed by the Communists, and hailed with all their hearts the courageous feats in battle of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Marshal Tito.

Our peoples will always remember that Yugoslav and Soviet soldiers joining forces in the battle for Belgrade, hit the enemy hard and liberated this ancient Slav city from the Hitlerite invaders. The peoples of the Soviet Union ardently welcomed the creation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

As we know, the best relations developed during those years between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, between our states and our Parties. However, later these good relations were destroyed.

We sincerely regret what happened and resolutely reject the things that occurred, one after the other, during that period. On our part, we ascribe without hesitation the aggravations to the provocative role that Beria, Abakumov and others—recently exposed enemies of the people—played in the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

We studied assiduously the materials on which the serious accusations and offenses directed at that time against the leaders of Yugoslavia had been based. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by enemies of the people, detestable agents of imperialism who by deceptive methods pushed their way into the ranks of our Party.

We are profoundly convinced that this period of the deterioration of our relations has been left behind us. For our part we are ready to do everything necessary to eliminate all obstacles standing in the way of complete normalization of relations between our states, of the consolidation of friendly relations between our peoples.

Today, when certain results have already been achieved in the field of normalization of our relations, the Soviet delegation expresses the conviction that the forthcoming negotiations will lead to the development and consolidation of political, economic and cultural cooperation among our peoples. All the conditions exist for such cooperation—centuries-old historic friendship between the peoples of our countries, the glorious traditions of the revolutionary movement, the indispensable economic base and joint ideals in the struggle for peaceful advancement and happiness of the working people.

Following the teachings of the creator of the Soviet state, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the government of the Soviet Union bases its relations with other countries, large and small, on the principles of peaceful coexistence of states, on principles of equality, non-intervention and respect for sovereignty and national independence, on principles of non-aggression and recognition of the impermissibility of states' encroaching upon the territorial integrity of others.

We hope that the relations between our countries will continue to develop on these principles for the good of our peoples. This will be a new and important contribution to the cause of reduction of international tension, the cause of preservation and consolidation of general peace in the world.

The desire of Yugoslavia to maintain relations with all states both in the West and in the East has met with complete understanding on our part. We consider that the strengthening of friendship and ties between our countries will contribute to consolidation of peace in general.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the government of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union decided to send our delegation to discuss with you in a fraternal fashion all problems that are ripe for discussion.

As representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Party created by the great Lenin, we consider it desirable to have mutual confidence established between our Parties. The strongest ties are created among the peoples of those countries where the leading forces are Parties that base their activities on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Parties governed by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism achieve complete mutual understanding because the struggle for the interests of the working class, the working peasantry, the working people is their only aim. The best sons and daughters of these nations have spilt their blood for the final victory of Socialism and, fighting against internal and foreign enemies, have thrown off the yoke of capitalism, winning their freedom and independence. Going along new Socialist roads, the peoples of these countries are consolidating their forces under conditions of real and firm friendship.

We would not be doing our duty to our peoples and the working people of the whole world if we did not do everything possible to establish mutual understanding between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Communist League, on the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

The interests of the workers and peasants, the interests of the international working class movement and the joint aims of the struggle for consolidation of peace, for a better future for mankind, require that the leaders of Communist and labor Parties establish mutual confidence between these Parties on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Long live lasting peace among nations!

Long live fraternal friendship and close cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia!

Long live the peoples of Yugoslavia!

“Compliance with the principle of mutual respect . . . and non-interference in internal affairs . . .”

9. JOINT SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DECLARATION, BELGRADE, JUNE 2, 1955.

The Belgrade Declaration, product of a series of meetings between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders, marked the final “normalization” of relations between the two countries. Henceforth, Yugoslavia was once again a friend rather than a foe of the Soviet Union and the “Socialist camp.” Furthermore, the relationship between Communist states envisaged by this Declaration differed radically from the demands put forth by the Soviet Union in 1948. Yugoslavia was not asked to rejoin the “Socialist camp” in any formal sense. There was no question of resuming membership in the Cominform which, probably at Yugoslavia’s request, was shortly to be dissolved. Most striking of all, the Declaration made no reference whatever to inter-Party cooperation.

In this document, two governments rather than two Parties simply state their joint belief in a set of common aims and policies, including peaceful coexistence, the reunification of Germany, China’s membership in the United Nations, and opposition to economic blockades. From the Yugoslav viewpoint, the most important of these principles was that of “mutual respect for, and non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because questions of internal organization, or difference in social systems, and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of the individual countries.”

This was a total vindication of the position held by the Yugoslavs since 1948 and a major personal victory

for Tito. From the Soviet viewpoint, it is true that an embarrassing breach in relations had been healed; but this was achieved at the price of a substantial loss of face on the part of the Soviet leaders and a number of unilateral concessions. The USSR had gained little of tangible nature at the Brioni meeting: Yugoslavia did not join the Warsaw Pact, retained its position of neutrality and continued to cultivate cordial relations with the NATO powers.

The delegation of the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia composed of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Republic; Edvard Kardelj, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council; Alexander Rankovic, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council; Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council; Mijalko Todorovic, member of the Federal Executive Council; Koca Popovic, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic; Veljko Micunovic, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and the delegation of the government of the USSR, composed of N. S. Khrushchev, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR; N. A. Bulganin, President of the Council of Ministers; A. I. Mikoyan, First Deputy of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; D. T. Shepilov, Chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Pravda*; A. A. Gromyko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; P. M. Kумыkin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade of the USSR; conducted talks in Belgrade and Brioni from May 27 to June 2, 1955.

In the course of the talks, which were conducted in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, an exchange of opinions took place on international problems of interest to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union as well as a comprehensive review of questions relating to the political, economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

The talks had as their starting point the mutual desire of both governments that, in the interests of the peaceful solution

of international questions and strengthening of cooperation among peoples and states, the method of negotiation should be applied.

The peoples of both countries and their armed forces have, in particular, developed friendship and fighting cooperation in the years of the war which they waged, alongside other freedom-loving nations, against the Fascist invaders.

They have agreed to take further steps toward normalization of their relations and the promotion of cooperation between the two countries, convinced that this is in the interest of the peoples of the two countries and is a contribution both to the decrease of international tension and the strengthening of peace in the world.

In the course of the negotiations, the governments of the two countries made a sincere endeavor to further the development of cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in all fields, which is fully in conformity with the interest of the two countries, as well as those of peace and Socialism, and for which objective conditions exist today.

In their consideration of questions dealt with in the course of the talks and with a view to the strengthening of confidence and cooperation among nations, the two governments have started from the following principles:

The indivisibility of peace upon which collective security can alone rest; respect for the sovereignty, independence, integrity and for equality among states in their mutual relations and in their relations with other states.

Recognition and development of peaceful co-existence among nations, regardless of ideological differences or differences of social order which presuppose the cooperation of all states in the field of international relations in general, and more particularly in the field of economic and cultural relations.

Compliance with the principle of mutual respect for, and non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because questions of internal organization, or difference in social systems and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of the individual countries.

The furtherance of mutual and international economic cooperation, and the removal of all those factors in economic relations which impede the exchange of goods and hamper the develop-

ment of productive forces, both in the world and within the national economies.

Assistance through appropriate United Nations bodies, as well as in other forms which are in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, both to the national economies and the economically under-developed areas in the interest of the peoples of these areas and of the development of the world economy.

The elimination of every form of propaganda and misinformation, as well as of other forms of conduct which create distrust or in any other way impede the establishment of an atmosphere conducive to constructive international cooperation and to the peaceful co-existence of nations.

Condemnation of all aggression and of all attempts to subject other countries to political and economic domination.

The recognition that the policy of military blocs increases international tension, undermines confidence among nations and augments the danger of war.

Both governments have based their policy on the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and are in agreement that further efforts should be made to strengthen the role and the authority of the United Nations. This would, in particular, be solidified by giving the People's Republic of China the representation to which it is entitled in the United Nations.

The admission to membership in the organization of all the other countries which meet requirements of the United Nations Charter would also be of significance.

Both governments are agreed that all nations should make further efforts to achieve positive results and agreements in negotiations so vital for the peace of the world as the reduction and limitation of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of a general system of collective security, including a system of collective security in Europe based on a treaty, and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Through such efforts, an atmosphere would be created which would at the same time make possible a solution by peaceful means of such urgent problems of prime importance as that of an agreed settlement of the German question on a democratic basis in conformity both with the wishes and interests of the German people and in the interest of general security and the satisfaction of the

legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China with regard to Formosa.

Both governments welcome the results of the Bandung conference [of Asian-Africa countries] as a significant contribution to the idea of international cooperation, as support of the efforts of the peoples of Asia and Africa toward the strengthening of their political and economic independence, and consider that all this contributes to the strengthening of world peace.

Full attention was given to an analysis of the relations between the two countries up to the present and to the prospects of their further development. Bearing in mind that in recent years their mutual relations have been greatly disturbed and that this has been detrimental, both to the parties involved and to international cooperation, and firmly resolved to conduct their future relations in a spirit of friendly cooperation and on the basis of the principles set forth in the present declaration, the governments of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the USSR have agreed to the following:

With regard to the need for strengthening economic ties and expanding economic cooperation between the two countries:

With this aim in view, the two governments have agreed to take the measures necessary to do away with the consequences arising from the disruption of a normal treaty basis in the economic relations between the two countries.

They have also agreed to proceed with the conclusion of the necessary arrangements designed to regulate and facilitate the development of economic relations in the same direction.

For the purpose of furthering cultural relations, the two governments have expressed their readiness to sign a convention on cultural cooperation.

Attaching great importance to the public being informed of the development of friendly cooperation among nations and desiring public opinion to be accurately and objectively informed, the two governments have agreed to the necessity of signing a convention concerning information services in the spirit of United Nations decisions and on a basis of reciprocity with regard to the position and privileges of the officials of these services on the territories of each of the contracting parties.

To take all necessary measures for the establishment of normal treaty conditions which will provide a base for regulating and securing the normal development of relations, with the aim of extending the cooperation between the two countries in all the fields in which the two countries are interested.

Endorsing the recommendations of the United Nations concerning the promotion of cooperation among all countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is of vital significance for the strengthening of peace and for progress in the world, the two governments have agreed to establish mutual cooperation in this field.

The two governments have agreed to take measures for the conclusion of a treaty for the purpose of settling questions of citizenship, and with regard to the repatriation of nationals of one contracting party residing in the territory of the other party.

Both governments have agreed that such treaties should be based on respect for humanitarian principles as well as on the universally accepted principle of the free decision of the persons concerned.

The two governments have also agreed with regard to safeguarding the rights and protecting the nationals of the other party in their territory, including the right of the said nationals to keep the citizenship which they possessed prior to their arrival in the territory of the other contracting party.

In the spirit of the peace-loving principles set forth in the present declaration and in order to make it possible for the peoples of their countries to become better acquainted and achieve better mutual understanding, the two governments have agreed to assist and facilitate cooperation among the social organizations of the two countries through the establishment of contacts, the exchange of Socialist experiences and a free exchange of opinions.

The two governments have agreed to make every effort toward carrying out the tasks and decisions set forth in the present declaration in the interest of further development of mutual relations and in that of the furtherance of international cooperation and the strengthening of peace in the world.

III. THE YUGOSLAV ROAD TO SOCIALISM AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT

IN THE MONTHS following the Tito-Khrushchev meeting at Brioni, much was made of the new amity between Moscow and Belgrade. Traffic between the two countries increased rapidly. Official and semi-official delegations of all types traveled in both directions. Trade negotiations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc were resumed. Commercial and cultural connections, which had all but vanished during the 1949-1953 blockade, were re-established. By way of climax to all this activity, Marshall Tito paid a much publicized return visit to Moscow in June 1956.

From the Yugoslav viewpoint, this trip must have seemed as gratifying as was the meeting of the previous year. It was preceded by the demotion of Vyacheslav Molotov from the post of Soviet Foreign Minister and thus by the removal from high authority of the last of those Soviet leaders who had spearheaded the anti-Tito campaign of 1948. It also underscored the fact that while relations with Moscow were warmer than with the satellites, Yugoslavia was still avoiding too close an identification with the Soviet bloc. The official communiqué issued at the close of the visit restated the main points of the Belgrade Declaration, but again omitted any suggestion that Tito and his associates had made concessions likely to impair their freedom of judgment and action.

Belgrade and Moscow shared a number of common aims which made for rapprochement and neither side felt that much could be gained by the continuation of the dispute. The Soviet Union had

found enmity toward Tito an embarrassing liability at a time when Stalin's heirs were proclaiming their interest in the relaxation of world tensions and seeking to enhance Soviet prestige in the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa. Furthermore, events had shown that the anti-Yugoslav campaign was not only sterile but also a failure. Hence even a somewhat humiliating reconciliation seemed to be better than the continued existence of a hostile Communist state which defied the Soviet Union with impunity. Finally, of course, the Soviet Union also hoped, and indeed expected, to draw Yugoslavia back into the "Socialist camp" and was certainly willing to pay a high price.

Yugoslavia, on the other hand, also stood to gain from a reconciliation. Prolongation of the dispute could only strain what the Yugoslavs conceived as their "neutral position." Belgrade realized that a rapprochement with Moscow was bound somewhat to strain its relations with the United States, but the Yugoslav leaders probably felt that this result would be politically salutary for a nation which claimed to be not only neutral, but Communist as well. Furthermore, Tito, a Communist, had little to gain by divorcing himself totally from the USSR. Throughout the years since 1948 he had seemed unwilling either to assume the ideological leadership of a new form of Communism, or to come closer to the non-Communist Socialist International. Presumably the alternative was continued ideological isolation. A rapprochement was therefore not unwelcome to the Yugoslav Communists, especially on as favorable terms as Moscow seemed to offer.

Yet there remained a number of problems which mere protestations of friendship could not solve. In the main, these arose from a fundamental divergence in the ultimate policy objectives of the two Parties and governments which made a long range settlement virtually impossible. Moscow's ultimate intention obviously was the reconstitution of an ideologically homogeneous bloc of Parties and governments subservient to Soviet leadership. This would have required Yugoslavia's eventual political as well as ideological submission both as a Party and a state. The Soviet leadership appeared perfectly willing to achieve this goal through persuasion rather than coercion; but its policy interests required that, sooner or later, the

Yugoslav state again become a part of the "Socialist camp" and that the Yugoslav Communists align their program and ideology with that of the Soviet Party.

Yugoslavia's aims, on the other hand, were entirely different. As a state, its own interests demanded that it maintain and, wherever possible, reaffirm the position of neutrality which it claimed as uniquely its own. Thus, while Tito clearly did not desire too deep an involvement with the Western democracies on the one side, neither could he afford to become re-absorbed into the "Socialist camp." The years of independence since 1948 precluded a new loss of identity which would inevitably result from again becoming another—and quite possibly minor—Soviet satellite. Likewise, if Yugoslavia's position as a distinct Communist society was to have any rationale at all, it was necessary to stress its one major ideological tenet, that of "separate roads to Socialism."

These underlying differences of interest and purpose could not really be resolved either by the Belgrade Declaration or by subsequent professions of friendship. At times the community of interests between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union did indeed appear so strong as to suggest that Tito had once again fully aligned himself with the Kremlin. Even then, however, a fundamental divergence on basic issues did remain, leading eventually to the resumption of a dispute which had been proclaimed forever ended in 1955.

A decline in Soviet-Yugoslav relations did in fact follow the high point of amity which was reached in the summer of 1956. In part, this was due precisely to those fundamental divergencies of interest which had necessarily survived the attempted reconciliation. A more immediate cause, however, which made the decline all the more pronounced, was the course taken by events in Eastern Europe during 1955 and 1956.

Pressures for reform, emanating from the intelligentsia, some state and Party bureaucrats, as well as elements of the population at large, had been mounting throughout the Soviet orbit since the death of Stalin. This phenomenon received its initial impetus from the concessionary "New Course" policies which were introduced during late 1953 and 1954 in order to mitigate, at least in some small degree, the austerities and tensions of the postwar years. It

received further encouragement from the officially inspired attacks on the "cult of personality" and the experiment in "collective leadership" which followed in the wake of the dictator's death. The publication of the Belgrade Declaration, and the apparent endorsement which it gave to heterodoxy within the Communist camp, acted to swell the volume of debate and criticism and to encourage public rejection both of the men and the institutional forms which had been imposed on the people's democracies in the preceding decade. Finally, the trend toward disillusion and disenchantment with established dogma was climaxed by Nikita Khrushchev's sensational attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956.

What had happened, in effect, was that Communist intellectuals and some Party leaders were increasingly dissatisfied with the results of slavish imitation and adherence to Soviet models. Estranged from their own populations, confused and demoralized by the introduction and later reversal of the New Course, they had come to feel that some measure of national initiative was indispensable if the existing system was to function and survive. Moreover, this conviction was eloquently supported by economic difficulties, often acute, which all the countries of Eastern Europe were experiencing. These, it was seen, were largely the result of having followed the Soviet "road to Socialism" on orders from a man and along policy lines which the current Soviet leadership was in process of disavowing.

The combination of these factors led the East European Parties and governments to make growing concessions. In some instances, these were economic in nature, including the reduction of consumer goods prices, the modification of compulsory delivery schedules, and a more liberal attitude toward private artisans. But they also involved, if not actual encouragement, then passive acceptance of greater freedom of discussion in the press, at meetings of national writers' associations and at less formal gatherings of such groups as the Hungarian Petofi Circle.

The resulting situation, particularly as it developed after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, was fraught with increasing danger, as on the one hand the popular demand for change continued to

sweil at the same time as official self-assurance and trust in established dogma continued to decline.

Whether the explosive nature of such interaction between growing rebelliousness among the masses and deepening uncertainty among Party and government leaders was fully appreciated in Belgrade is uncertain. If the initial Yugoslav reaction to the Poznan riots—much harsher than that of the Poles themselves—is any indication, then it probably was not. Nevertheless, no secret was ever made of the fact that since the rapprochement at Brioni, Yugoslavia had supported the so-called “liberal” elements in the Communist Parties of the people’s democracies. Such encouragement did not, of course, imply that Tito and his principal advisers were necessarily sympathetic to everything which the “liberals” advocated. Inside Yugoslavia, for instance, much less freedom was granted to writers and newspaper editors than was the case in Poland. What it did mean was that the principle of “own roads to Socialism” was essentially Titoist and as such deserved Belgrade’s support. It also meant that a loosening of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe was welcomed by the Yugoslavs because it helped to reduce the extent of their isolation in the Communist world and because it provided an occasion to settle long-standing disputes, particularly with Matyas Rakosi¹⁶ and his “Stalinist” associates in Hungary. Finally, it meant that Yugoslav criticism of lagging reforms in the satellite states was intended to underscore the fact that they had been right in their evaluation of Stalin’s system some eight years before and that Belgrade now hoped to receive at least marginal support in the event of new difficulties with Moscow.

The course taken by events in the latter part of 1956 was such, however, that Tito could no longer remain aloof. He had encouraged “revisionism” and “liberalization” abroad without permitting the development of similar tendencies at home, and had done this precisely at a time when his relations with Moscow were more than cordial. Now, the rapid course of events forced him to decide and

¹⁶ Matayas Rakosi, First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party until July 1956, when he resigned in response to reformist pressure generated in his Party by Soviet condemnation of Stalin, with whom he was closely identified, and by national discontent.

to align himself with the forces of the "thaw" and against the Soviet Union once more. Belgrade had assumed that the application of the "own roads to Socialism" thesis in the satellite states would follow the pattern set by Yugoslavia; that, in fact, the loosening of Moscow's authority would proceed without, at the time, undermining the very foundations of governmental and Party power in the people's democracies. As events were to show, this proved to be a major miscalculation in one crucial instance at least.

The immediate cause for the renewal of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was the Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolt. Soviet troops first became involved on October 23-24, acting on the request of the Gero-Hegedus government.¹⁷ They intervened again in the early hours of November 4 when a full-scale offensive was launched to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy.¹⁸

In respect of these actions, the Yugoslavs adopted the view that, while the second intervention was justified by a genuine threat to Socialist institutions, the first was quite definitely without justification and ought never to have occurred. In their view, the Hungarian revolt was not anti-Socialist in its initial stages. Instead, Belgrade believed that it was a legitimate expression of popular resentment against individuals and practices held over from the Stalinist era. President Tito went so far as to characterize the October events as a "justified revolt and uprising against a clique," and blamed the premature Soviet military intervention for turning it into a "revolt of the entire people against Socialism."

This interpretation which, in effect, placed the entire blame for the course of events in Hungary on the Soviet Union, was

¹⁷ Erno Gero, a close colleague of Rakosi's and First Secretary of the Hungarian Party from the latter's resignation in July 1956 until forced out on October 25 by the revolt. Andras Hegedus held the post of Premier of the government after Imre Nagy's removal in April 1955 and relinquished it again to Nagy on October 24, 1956. In the confusion of these first days of the revolution, it appeared that Nagy had asked for Soviet military assistance but it was subsequently established that the request was made before he replaced Hegedus.

¹⁸ Imre Nagy, Premier of the Hungarian government during the "New Course" period in 1953-54, and again Premier of the three different governments formed in rapid succession during the revolutionary turmoil from October 24 to November 4, 1956.

unlikely to be ignored or accepted in Moscow. Moreover, the tense situation created on October 23 and 24 by the activities of the Red Army was soon to be exacerbated further when, after the collapse of Hungarian resistance, the legitimate Premier, Imre Nagy, and some of his associates, sought refuge at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. Some weeks later, formal negotiations between the Yugoslav government and the regime of Janos Kadar¹⁹ had apparently culminated in an agreement to accord Imre Nagy and his group a safe conduct to return to their homes without molestation or the fear of reprisal. As a result of this seeming accord, the deposed Premier and his friends left the asylum, which they had sought, only to be arrested at the next street corner by Soviet military authorities for deportation to Rumania. Rightly, the Yugoslavs felt that this diplomatic incident was a flagrant violation of a promise which had been given them by Kadar and implicitly also by the Soviet authorities.

The resulting breach between Moscow and Belgrade was slow in healing. The Yugoslavs continued to maintain that the first Soviet intervention had been a grave error and that the revolution had been caused primarily by the erroneous policies of the "Rakosi clique." They rejected the Hungarian and Soviet charges that Imre Nagy had been a willing tool of "Fascist reaction." They continued to remind the Soviet Union of its flagrant display of bad faith in the matter of Nagy's safe conduct. The USSR, on the other hand, began to suggest that the Yugoslavs had been guilty of encouraging the Hungarian revolutionaries and that Belgrade was, to some extent, responsible for the "reactionary-Fascist" uprising.

¹⁹ Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the reorganized Communist Party from October 25, 1956, was installed also as Premier of the government on November 4, 1956, when the Nagy government was removed by Soviet military intervention.

**“ . . . Our tragedy—the tragedy of all of us—
is that Socialism has received a terrible blow.
It has been compromised . . . ”**

10. MARSHAL TITO'S SPEECH AT PULA, NOVEMBER 11, 1956.

This speech, not published until the 15th of November, attacks “certain elements” in the CPSU who refuse to abandon Stalinist traditions and ways of thinking, and accuses them of wanting to precipitate a new ideological offensive against Yugoslavia. Tito's attempt to single out a certain faction within the CPSU is reminiscent in some ways of the Cominform's attempts in 1948 to differentiate between the “Party” and “certain leaders” in Yugoslavia.

The crux of this speech, however, was clearly about the Hungarian revolution. In essence Tito charged that the initial Soviet intervention in a “justified revolt” of “an entire people” against the Gero regime was unwarranted and harmful to the cause of Socialism. His reading of events differed sharply from the official Soviet version according to which the revolt had been an anti-Socialist, counter-revolutionary movement from its inception. It is true that the Yugoslavs did agree that the revolution had in the end become anti-Socialist in character, but while blaming the Hungarian government and Soviet intervention for this turn of events, Tito's justification even of the November 4, 1956 attack remained lukewarm and essentially reluctant. While the Russians held that intervention was legitimate and fraternal assistance, the Yugoslavs implied that it was the regrettably unavoidable consequence of a basically misguided policy of many years' standing.

. . . First, I would like to say a few words about the events today in Hungary and in Poland, in order that we might have a correct impression of these events which are very complex, especially in

Hungary, where quite a large part of the working class and progressive people fought in the streets with arms in their hands against the Soviet armed forces. When the Hungarian workers and progressive elements began demonstrating and resisting Rakosi's methods and the continuation of his course, by armed force, I am deeply convinced that one could not talk about counter-revolutionary tendencies. It can be said that it is, rather, a sad and tragic fact that the reactionaries should have found there a very fertile ground and that they should have been able gradually to take the situation into their hands, exploiting, for their aims, the justified revolt which took place in Hungary.

In general you know the causes of these events in Hungary. We must return to the year 1948 when Yugoslavia first gave a firm answer to Stalin and said that she wished to be independent, that she wished to build her own life and that Socialism in our country does not permit anyone to interfere in our internal affairs. . . .

When the truth about our country prevailed and when a period of normalization of relations began with those countries which had broken their relations with us following the infamous resolution, the leaders of the eastern countries expressed the desire that what had been done to us should not be mentioned any more, that we should forget what had happened. We accepted this in order to improve relations with these countries. However, you will see later on that it is indeed necessary for some people to be reminded—people who, today, are again beginning to slander our country, and who are leaders of some Communist Parties in eastern countries and even in certain western countries—of what they did to Yugoslavia in the course of these four or five years, and even more, when Yugoslavia stood all alone facing an enormous propaganda machine, when we had to fight on all sides to safeguard the results of our people's revolution, to safeguard everything we had started building—the basis of Socialism—in one word, to erase the dishonor which they intended to bring about through various slanders, and to show them the truth. . . .

It is not only a question of the cult of personality, but that of a system which rendered the emergence of the cult of personality possible. We have normalized our relations with the Soviet Union, at the latter's initiative and wish. When Stalin died the new Soviet leaders saw that the Soviet Union had, owing to Stalin's follies, found itself in a very difficult situation, in an impasse both as

regards its foreign and internal policies, and through its ascendancy and the imposition of its methods in the countries of the people's democracies also. They understood where the main cause of all these difficulties lay and, at the Twentieth Congress, they condemned Stalin's actions and policies. However, they erroneously presented the whole matter as a question of the cult of personality, and not as a question of the prevailing system. In actual fact, the cult of personality is the product of a system. They did not fight against that system, or, if they did wage a struggle against it, they did it tacitly, saying that, on the whole, everything was well, but that Stalin had begun in his later years, because he had grown old, to commit foolish acts and make various mistakes. From the very beginning we have been saying that we are not faced here only with a question of the cult of personality, but with a system which had made the emergence of such a cult possible, that it is there that the roots of the evil lie and that the blows should be incessantly and consistently directed in that direction. . . . Where are these roots? They are to be found in the bureaucratic apparatus, in the methods of leadership and in the so-called one man rule, the ignoring of the role and wishes of the working masses, and among the various leaders of western and eastern Parties, who are opposing democratization and the decisions of the Twentieth Congress, who had greatly contributed to the consolidation of Stalin's system and who are today striving to resurrect it again and make it prevail. Here lie the roots and this should be corrected. The Moscow Declaration²⁰ is directed to a broader circle of countries than Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. . . .

We warned that the tendencies which had previously provoked such a powerful resistance in Yugoslavia existed in all the countries and might one day find expression in these countries also, and that, therefore, it would be much more difficult to handle the situation! . . . The Soviet leaders had a different attitude toward the other countries, holding somewhat erroneous and defective views concerning relations with these countries, with Poland, Hungary and the others. But we did not take this so tragically, because we saw that this was not the attitude of the entire Soviet leadership, but only of a part of the leadership which had succeeded, to a certain extent, in imposing it upon the other part. We realized that this attitude had been imposed by those who had adopted, and

²⁰ On the occasion of Tito's visit to the USSR in June 1956.

are still adopting, Stalinist positions. However, we believed that there was a possibility for the elements favoring a more energetic and rapid development in the direction of democratization and the creation of new relations among Socialist countries to get, through internal evolution, the upper hand in the leadership of the Soviet Union, and that the same development would take place in the field of foreign policy also. From certain signs, as well as from conversations, we concluded that these elements are not weak, that they are strong, but that this internal process of development in a progressive direction, in the direction of abandoning Stalinist methods, is being impeded by certain Western countries which, by their propaganda and their incessant repetition of the necessity to "liberate" these countries, are interfering with the internal affairs of these countries and are hampering a rapid development and improvement of relations among them. . . . The Soviet leaders are afraid that reactionary forces might become victorious in those countries in such a case. In other words, it means that they do not have sufficient confidence in the internal revolutionary forces of these countries. In my opinion this is erroneous, and the root of all the later mistakes lies in the insufficient degree of confidence in the Socialist forces of these peoples. . . .

When we were in Moscow we talked, of course, also about Poland and Hungary and the other countries. We said that Rakosi's regime and Rakosi himself were completely incapable of leading the Hungarian State and bringing about internal unity, and that, on the contrary, they could bring about only very grave consequences. Unfortunately, the Soviet comrades did not believe us. They said that Rakosi is an old revolutionary, that he is honest, etc. That he is old—is exact, but that is not enough. That he is honest—I could not vouch for it, as far as I know him, particularly after Rajk's trial and other developments. For me these are the most dishonest people in the world! The Soviet comrades said that he is intelligent, that he would succeed and that they did not know anybody else on whom they could rely in that country. . . . When dissatisfaction began to grow to an ever-increasing extent among the Communists themselves, and when the latter demanded that Rakosi should go, the Soviet comrades realized that matters could not be left as they were and agreed to Rakosi's elimination. However, they made the mistake of not allowing the elimination of Gero and other followers of Rakosi, who were compromised in the eyes of the people. Their

condition for agreeing to Rakosi's departure was that Gero should stay. This was a mistake because Gero was not at all different from Rakosi. He pursued the same policy and was guilty to the same extent as Rakosi. What could we do, comrades? We realized that events were not developing favorably. When we were in the Crimea Gero happened to be there by "chance," and we met him by "chance." We spoke with him. Gero condemned the earlier policy and said that it had been erroneous—that they had slandered Yugoslavia. In other words, he was covering himself with ashes and asking to establish good relations, promising that all the former mistakes would be corrected and that there would be no return to the former state of affairs. We wanted to show that we were not vengeful and narrow-minded and, therefore, we agreed to conduct talks with Gero and a delegation of the Hungarian Workers Party which would come to Yugoslavia. We wanted to establish relations with the Hungarian Workers Party because we hoped that in such a way—without isolating the Hungarian Party—it would be easier to influence its correct internal development. However, matters had already gone too far. We had no notion of it, but Gero's arrival in Yugoslavia and our joint declaration could not help any more. People in Hungary were absolutely opposed to the Stalinist elements still in power. They demanded their elimination and a transition to the road towards democratization. When the Hungarian delegation headed by Gero returned to its country, Gero—who found himself in a difficult situation—again showed his real face. He applied the term of "mob" to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, who were only demonstrating at that time, and thus virtually insulted the whole people. Imagine how blind he was and what a leader he was! In such a critical moment, when everything was seething and when the whole people was dissatisfied, he dared to call these people a "mob," at a moment when the Communists and the youth constituted an enormous part and the majority of the demonstrators. It was enough to set fire to the powder-keg and to make it explode.

A conflict broke out. It is not the time now to find out who fired the first shot. The army was called in by Gero. It was a fatal error to call the Soviet army at a time when the demonstrations were still taking place. It was a great mistake to call the army of another country to give a lesson to the people of the country, even if there had been some shooting.

It embittered the people even more and led to a spontaneous

uprising in which the Communists, even against their will, found themselves in the company of various reactionary elements. . . .

The reactionary forces showed their real face very *rapidly* after two or three days. When in the face of the people's revolt against everything that had been done in the past, the leadership then in power failed to show a wish to eliminate those elements which had provoked the Hungarian people, and failed to embark upon a genuinely Hungarian road to Socialism with all its internal specific features, matters took another turn very soon and reactionary forces began to dominate more and more. This justified revolt and uprising against a clique was transformed into a rebellion of the whole people against Socialism and the Soviet Union, and the Communists who were in the ranks of the rebels found themselves—willy-nilly—in a fight not for Socialism, but for the return of the old order. As soon as the reaction took control, the Communists found themselves, even against their wishes, in this position. . . .

Now, the following question is asked with regard to Soviet intervention in Hungary: Was Soviet intervention necessary? The first intervention was not necessary. The first intervention which was brought about by Gero's call was absolutely erroneous. The second mistake was that responsible leaders, instead of waiting for the second intervention, did not immediately do what they did later when the second Soviet intervention occurred, *viz.*, set up a new government and publish a declaration. Had they established a new government earlier and published such a declaration, the working-class and Communist elements would probably have been separated from the reactionary one, and it would have been easier to extricate oneself from such a critical situation. . . .

Many people are now asking the question: Why did the second Soviet intervention take place? It is clear, we have said it and we will always say it, that we are against interference and against the use of foreign military forces. Now, what is the lesser evil: chaos, a civil war, a counterrevolution and a new world war, or the intervention of the Soviet troops which were there? The first would have been a catastrophe, and the second was a mistake. Of course, if this saves Socialism in Hungary, then we will be able to say, comrades, that—despite our objections to interference—Soviet intervention was necessary. However, had they undertaken everything that was needed before, there would have been no military intervention. This mistake is due to the fact that they,

unfortunately, still believe that military power solves everything, whereas it does not solve everything. . . .

I am deeply convinced that the blood which was shed in Hungary, and all the terrible sacrifices made by the Hungarian people will have a positive effect and that the comrades in the Soviet Union will have a clearer vision and see that this cannot go on any more. This cannot go on. Our tragedy—the tragedy of all of us—is that Socialism has received a terrible blow. It has been compromised, and you will remember that we, comrades, very often said that such methods could only compromise Socialism. That is what we said. We should not brag about this, and enjoy it and say, we told you so. The events in Hungary will probably be the last tragedy. In this connection I would like to say one thing; that these irresponsible elements in various Communist Parties who are still in power through Stalinist methods are a very bad support for the Soviet Union if they advise the Soviet Union to act according to their methods. I think that in all these Communist Parties there are honest Communists who see much further than these various Stalinists. They see much further, and if they wish the situation to improve not as in Hungary but in a peaceful, Communist way, then they should criticize the negative things and listen to the voice of the people, the voice of the members of the Party and of the nation. Because, if these prophets and advisers continue to act so destructively and find it necessary to slander our country and throw mud at us, then Socialism will certainly go through new hard times. . . .

In certain countries and Parties of Eastern Europe, some leaders say that this will not happen in their country, that they have a very strong organization, a strong army and powerful police, that their members are informed about everything and that they will keep the situation in control. Gero said the same. Rakosi also. But did it help them? No. This means nothing if the methods previously used are not changed, and if the people one day revolt.

What they have sown since 1948, they are reaping now. They sowed a wind and they are harvesting the whirlwind. . . .

"All the more astonishing . . . are certain propositions in Tito's speech which by no means assist . . . the current tasks of the world Communist movement . . ."

11. PRAVDA ARTICLE OF NOVEMBER 23, 1956, IN REPLY TO
TITO'S SPEECH AT PULA.

This article was one of the strongest anti-Yugoslav statements to come from the USSR in the wake of the Hungarian revolt. Its temperate tone is indicative of the restraint with which this phase of the quarrel was publicly conducted. It is also interesting as one of the most liberal interpretations of the Hungarian events and of Nagy's role ever published in the Soviet Union after the intervention of November 4th. Nagy is denounced,²¹ but more as a helpless tool of counterrevolution than as the conscious traitor who was depicted in later Soviet accusations.

The contrast between this article and those of 1948 and 1958 on the subject of the progress of Socialism in Yugoslavia is noteworthy. Although it does not refrain from a few passing sneers, particularly at the notion of "building Socialism" with American aid, the principle of varying "roads" is explicitly endorsed and there are even a few kind words about the Yugoslav experiment with workers' councils.

The burden of its message is a point which all Soviet media stressed heavily after the explosions of October 1956 as they had done following the Yugoslav rift with the Cominform in 1948: That the success of world Communism requires complete unity and solidarity of all Socialist countries, demands the "elimination" of ideological differences, and is definitely not advanced by the type of

²¹ The article appeared just after his disappearance following the departure from the Yugoslav embassy.

public criticism of fellow Communists in which Tito had indulged.

The events in Hungary, where the counterrevolution succeeded in becoming active and mounting an attack on Socialist achievements and the people's democratic system, have called forth a deep response in the minds and hearts of all people to whom the interests of Socialism are dear. . . .

The developments in Hungary show that reaction tried to exploit for its anti-popular purposes the accumulated discontent of the working masses, who were rightly demanding an improvement in the leadership of the country and a rise in the people's standard of living. . . .

To stop the activities of these anti-popular elements and to restore order in Budapest as quickly as possible, the Hungarian government asked the government of the USSR for the help of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact. The entry of Soviet troops and their participation in the restoration of order curbed the activity of the reaction and forced it into retreat.

However, as soon as the Soviet government, at the request of the Imre Nagy government, ordered its troops to leave Budapest, the counterrevolutionary forces began to take brutal reprisals against Communists, public and political figures and supporters of the people's democratic system. . . .

Failing to meet strong opposition from the Imre Nagy government, the counterrevolutionary forces seized weapons, formed armed bands which received aid from imperialist states, and dictated terms to the Imre Nagy government. This government had virtually no authority in the country. It sat in the parliament building and communicated with the population by microphone. Meanwhile, Fascist-Horthyite bands were wreaking violence on whomever they wanted, seizing progressives in the streets, hanging them and cutting off their heads.

Imre Nagy's government changed its composition several times in seven or eight days and each day it slid further and further to the right. Imre Nagy's government became a screen for the activities of counterrevolutionary elements. . . .

In these circumstances, the best people, such as Comrade Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich²² and Imre Horvarth²³ who at first had been members of Imre Nagy's cabinet, broke with that government.

The newly organized government—the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government of Janos Kadar—undertook to put an end to the bloodshed and to rebuff the reactionary Fascist elements, and it turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Union's decision to come to the aid of Hungary's revolutionary forces was the only correct one. A Socialist state could not remain an indifferent spectator to the bloody violence of the Fascist reactionaries in people's democratic Hungary. When everything calms down in Hungary, when life returns to normal, the Hungarian working class, the peasants and intelligentsia will doubtless understand our action better and judge it correctly. We regard our aid to the Hungarian working class in the struggle against the intrigues of the counterrevolution as the fulfillment of our international duty. We have made sacrifices in this struggle only to block the path to Fascism in Hungary and to save the Socialist achievements of the Hungarian working class and the working people, so that they might further develop these achievements, lead their own life and build their own independent and sovereign Socialist state. . . .

Among the foreign responses to the events in Hungary, Comrade Tito's recent speech at Pula invites notice. It devotes a great deal of attention to the events in Hungary and correctly points out

²² Ferenc Munnich was ambassador to Belgrade at the time of the revolt and returned to Hungary to take the post of Minister of the Interior in the new government constituted under Nagy on October 27, 1956. He was not, however, included in the Nagy cabinet reorganizations on October 30 and November 3. In the Kadar government, established by Soviet intervention on November 4, he was given the portfolio of Armed Forces and Public Security. Munnich rose to First Deputy Premier in February 1957 and replaced Kadar as Premier on January 28, 1958.

²³ Imre Horvath was Hungary's representative at the United Nations during and after the revolt and was instrumental in preventing United Nations intervention. Although appointed Foreign Minister in the first Nagy cabinet, he was not included in the cabinet after October 30. He resumed the post of Foreign Minister with the establishment of Kadar's government on November 4, 1956 and died in office February 2, 1958.

that counterrevolutionary forces played a provocative role in them. . . .

The events in Hungary, as Tito noted, assumed such proportions that it became evident that a terrible slaughter, a terrible civil war, would take place there, with the result that Socialism might be completely wiped out and the events end in a third world war. Although we are against intervention, Tito declared, the Soviet intervention was necessary. This, of course, is the correct evaluation of the Hungarian events. But in the same speech, Tito calls the assistance of Soviet troops to the Hungarian government a "mistake" and says: "We never advised them to resort to the army's help." Such a position cannot be called consistent and true to reality. It is now completely clear to everyone that without this assistance the counterrevolution would have gained the upper hand in Hungary and a Fascist-Horthyite regime would have been established. Consequently the assistance of Soviet troops was a necessary and unavoidable step. . . .

The events in Hungary were the first large-scale venture of Fascism in the whole postwar period, a venture which demonstrated that the threat of Fascism has not yet passed. Under the circumstances, ideological solidarity, intense vigilance, and deep adherence to principle in treating questions related to the Hungarian events are incumbent on all supporters of Socialism.

All the more astonishing, therefore, are certain propositions in Tito's speech which by no means assist either the consolidation of all supporters of Socialism or correct understanding on a number of important problems of the international situation and of the current tasks of the world Communist movement.

To begin with, Tito's speech contains, along with correct judgments on the Hungarian events, judgments which cannot but evoke legitimate objections. . . . Speaking of the Hungarian events, Comrade Tito also made a number of critical remarks about the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Particular note should be taken of these remarks. We are not, of course, opposed to criticism. The Moscow Declaration states as the consensus of the CPSU and the Yugoslav League of Communists that our cooperation will be based on friendly criticism and on comradely exchange of opinions on issues contended between our two Parties. We have no reason to retract this decision. Comrade Tito's critical remarks,

however, arrest our attention because they were made in a tone that had nearly disappeared in the recent period.

Let us take the major proposition set forth by Tito with regard to the Soviet system. He persistently emphasized that the "cult of the individual leader was essentially the product of a specific system." He said that it is necessary to speak of the "system that gave rise to the creation of the cult of the individual." However, in reality, the cult of the individual was a blatant contradiction of our entire Soviet Socialist system. It was by proceeding from our political and economic system that we were able to conduct the struggle against the cult of the individual and to achieve in a short time great success in eliminating its results.

The Soviet Socialist system, created by our working class allied with the peasantry, by all the working people of the Soviet Union and by their Communist Party, has been tested by the experience of history. . . . The glorious achievements of the Soviet people can be seen by all. Recently, hundreds of thousands joined, at the call of the Party, in the great campaign to conquer the virgin lands and achieved enormous results under difficult conditions.

Of course, all this does not mean that we have no shortcomings. We have them, we subject them to sharp and direct criticism, and work systematically to eliminate them. Our shortcomings were disclosed by the Twentieth Party Congress, which also showed the correct way to overcome them. . . .

How, then, can we interpret Tito's remarks about our system except as an attempt to cast a shadow on the Soviet people's system of social life? How can we fail to ask if this is not a repetition of earlier attacks on the Soviet Union, which were fashionable in the past when relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were deteriorating? It is up to the Yugoslav people themselves and the Yugoslav League of Communists to decide what forms and methods they wish to use in building Socialism, but is it right to denigrate the Socialist system of other countries, and to praise one's own experience, publicizing it as universal and the best? One cannot help but see that more and more frequently in the Yugoslav press the idea is appearing that the "Yugoslav road to Socialism" is the most correct or even the only possible road for nearly all the countries of the world. In addition, no mention is made of the good aspects and achievements of Socialist construction in other countries. This

attitude reminds us of the old proverb, "Without us even the sun cannot rise!"

Creative diversity on the single path of Socialist development is governed by concrete, objective conditions in different countries. . . .

In Yugoslavia there are also unique forms of Socialist construction. New methods and techniques of administration and economic management are being put to the test of practice. The workers' councils in Yugoslavia appeared relatively recently. Every year of their existence brings corrections in their functions, but certain virtues of this institution are already apparent. This cannot be said of another innovation, which has had an adverse effect, namely certain measures in the field of planning which have weakened the planned basis of the Yugoslav economy and increased the influence of market relations, a fact about which the Yugoslav press has also written.

There can be no doubt that good experience will always find supporters and followers when it has withstood the test of time and yielded positive results. On the other hand, it is ridiculous to take offense at other countries if a method applied in one country is regarded as unsuitable to another.

What, then, are the advantages of the "Yugoslav road to Socialism" to which Yugoslav writers refer? In answer to this question, the authors of articles in the Yugoslav press usually mention one or another innovation of a political nature. But Socialism—the new social system—presupposes reorganization of the economy, which is the foundation of all social life. This reorganization has started in Yugoslavia but, as the Yugoslav comrades themselves know very well, much yet remains to be done to complete this reorganization. It is well known that agriculture plays a large role in the Yugoslav economy, yet grain production has not yet reached the prewar level, and unfortunately there is still a long way to go to the victory of Socialist relations in the countryside. It is also well known that Yugoslavia has an annual wheat deficit of about 600,000 to 650,000 tons.

It is quite obvious what great importance for the Yugoslav economy aid from capitalist states, above all the USA, has. Because

of the situation that arose, Yugoslavia had for many years an opportunity to exploit the aggravated contradictions between imperialism and the Socialist countries. But if aid from capitalist countries accounts for a substantial part of its economy, it cannot be considered that this road has any particular advantages. After all, all the countries in the Socialist camp cannot rely on such aid; they cannot base their policy on the assumption of aid from the imperialists. Therefore such a path is by no means universally applicable. It is well known that the imperialist circles have not given aid to Yugoslavia because they sympathize with Socialism and Socialist construction in Yugoslavia. The politicians in the camp of imperialism admitted that their plans included the use of any means to sow and encourage discord among the Socialist countries. It cannot for a moment be forgotten that the enemies of Socialism today would still like to sow discord by any possible means in the commonwealth of Socialist countries and to weaken the ties among them.

In his speech Comrade Tito puts forth the slogan of "independence" of Socialist countries and Communist Parties from the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Everyone knows, however, that the Soviet Union does not require the dependence or subordination of anyone. This is stated with the utmost force in the decisions of the Twentieth Party Congress. These principles are reaffirmed in the USSR government's declaration of October 30, 1956, on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States. Our Party and our government are correcting past mistakes on this score with the greatest determination. This is borne out by the experience of our relations with Yugoslavia in recent years. We acted boldly to erase all past errors in our relations with Yugoslavia, disregarding all questions of prestige, and we were the first to offer our hand to the Yugoslav government and to the League of Communists. No one can deny that for its part the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has done and is doing everything needed to improve relations on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism in the interests of strengthening friendship and cooperation with the fraternal people of Yugoslavia and in the interests of the struggle for peace and Socialism.

While making a generally favorable evaluation of the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and of the agreements made

between the USSR and Yugoslavia, Tito rebukes the Soviet leaders for allegedly not wanting to extend the principles set forth in these agreements to other Socialist countries. Tito needed this strange and entirely far-fetched assertion to attribute to the Soviet Union "insufficient trust" in the Socialist forces of the people's democracies.

These assertions are refuted by the facts. . . .

What does Comrade Tito call for in his speech? To go it alone? But it may be asked: What does this path promise? What advantage does it offer for Socialist countries? There are no such advantages. The appeal to break with the other Socialist states, with the whole fraternal family of Socialist countries, cannot have any benefit for the cause of building a Socialist society. Loyalty to the great banner of Socialist internationalism, solidarity and unity of all fighters for Socialism—this is the main prerequisite for success in our great cause.

* * *

In the light of the requirements of Socialist internationalism, one cannot but be astonished at the tone in which Comrade Tito found it possible to speak of the Communist Parties and their leaders. Groundlessly, he lists as "Stalinists" all the leading persons of the fraternal Parties of the West and East who disagree with his point of view, and he attributes the worst characteristics to them. He does not talk of them in any way other than as "inveterate Stalinist elements," "irresponsible elements in various Communist Parties," etc. The entire speech at Pula is rife with such attacks against Communist figures. Having chosen the question of mutual relations among Communist Parties as the subject of his speech, Tito did not, in fact, conduct a comradely discussion, did not debate, but tried to lecture or, rather, abused various leaders of the Communist and workers' Parties. The speech was not delivered in a tone of conversation or debate on an equal basis, with proper respect for difference of opinion. Furthermore, there are no grounds for speaking of "Stalinists" and "Stalinism," since our Party, as well as other Communist Parties, has defended and will defend the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Particularly unacceptable is the disdainful attitude taken in his speech toward a country such as Albania and toward its leaders.

Speaking of the Albanian comrades, Tito used rude and insulting expressions. Meanwhile, it is well known that the Yugoslav leaders have often come out in defense of the thesis of the equality of large and small nations and of the right of each nation to have its own opinion and to defend it. Usually they insist that no one can claim a monopoly in defending truth. But Comrade Enver Hoxha had hardly written an article which displeased the Yugoslav comrades but what they hurled abuse at him. It is possible that the article might have been written differently. But why should not Comrade Hoxha have his own opinion and the same right to criticize that the Yugoslav comrades claim?

In his speech Comrade Tito clearly interfered not only in the affairs of the Albanian Labor Party; he intruded just as unceremoniously in the affairs of the French Communist Party and in the affairs of other Communist Parties, including those of our Party, trying categorically to evaluate the internal situation in these Parties and the actions of their leadership. . . .

After all that has been said, it is not surprising that Comrade Tito's speech was met with jubilation in bourgeois circles abroad. One cannot help recalling here the words of that veteran of the workers' movement August Bebel, who advised that one ponder one's behavior if one is praised by the enemy. Our enemies are now jumping to the conclusion that this speech will cause serious differences between Soviet and Yugoslav Communists and will lead to a deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Who does not see that for the common cause of the Communist Parties it is not permissible to inflame disputes, to indulge in mutual accusations and to return to the atmosphere of disagreement which, through mutual efforts, has dissolved into the past? The highest interests of the cause of the working class and the interests of Socialism consistently require the attainment of mutual understanding and the elimination of everything that has potentially negative consequences for the further solidarity of the forces of Socialism on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. . . .

The CPSU, for its part, will continue to conduct a policy of cooperation between our Parties on a principled Marxist-Leninist basis in the interests of the fraternal peoples of the USSR and Yugoslavia and in the interests of defending peace, democracy and Socialism. We are convinced that disputed questions should be discussed

and clarified in a calm friendly atmosphere by a comradely change of views. . . .

“ . . . a flagrant violation of the agreement . . . ”

12. NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT ON THE REMOVAL OF IMRE NAGY TO RUMANIA. NOVEMBER 24, 1956.

The note is in answer to Soviet and Hungarian assertions that Imre Nagy had voluntarily left Hungary for Rumania. The Yugoslavs contended instead that Soviet authorities had violated solemn pledges, and that it was quite obvious that Nagy had been kidnapped and forcibly deported to Rumania.

The Yugoslav government on November 18 addressed a letter to the Hungarian government concerning the matter of the asylum extended by the Yugoslav government in its embassy in Budapest to the following persons: Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy, Ferenc Donat, Gabor Tancos, Sandor Haraszti, Ferenc Janosi, Gyorgy Fazekas, Janos Szilagyi, Szilard Unhelyi, Miklos Vasarhelyi, Julia Rajk, and to fifteen other women and seventeen children. . . .

The Yugoslav government considered that this question could be settled in one of the following ways: Either by guaranteeing personal security to these persons and enabling them to return freely to their homes, or by enabling these persons to leave Hungary and to avail themselves of asylum in Yugoslavia. . . .

Janos Kadar, with the authorization of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, fully accepted the first of the above-mentioned Yugoslav proposals, which is clearly seen from his letter of November 21 addressed to the Yugoslav government.

“In the interest of settling the matter, the Hungarian government,” states Kadar’s letter, “in conformity with the proposal contained in the letter the Yugoslav government addressed to me on November 18, 1956, page three, paragraph eight, herewith repeats in

writing the statement made verbally on several occasions, that it does not wish to mete punishment to Imre Nagy and to the members of his group for their past activity. We herewith acknowledge that, in this manner, the asylum offered to the group has ceased, that they will leave the Yugoslav embassy, and will freely return to their homes." . . .

On the grounds of the agreement thus reached between the two governments and the guarantees given in regard to Imre Nagy and the other mentioned persons, these, of their free will, left the Yugoslav embassy on November 22, 1956, at 1830 in a bus which was placed at their disposal to take them to their homes by the Hungarian vice premier and minister of armed forces and public security Dr. Ferenc Munnich. . . .

When the mentioned persons boarded the bus Soviet military organs intervened with the request that they should take these persons away by bus. One Soviet military official entered the bus, despite the energetic protest of the Yugoslav minister in Budapest. In consequence, the Yugoslav minister sent diplomatic official Milan Georgijevic and military attaché Milan Drobac with the Imre Nagy group so that they might personally see that the mentioned persons would be taken to their homes. However, the bus was driven to the Soviet Kommandatura of the city where a lieutenant colonel of the Soviet army forced the two Yugoslavs to leave the bus. In reply to the protest of the Yugoslav military attaché, the Soviet lieutenant colonel declared that he was executing the orders of his command. After that, the bus with the mentioned persons, escorted by Soviet armored cars, drove off to an unknown destination. . . .

According to the information of the Yugoslav government, Imre Nagy and the other persons have to this moment not returned to their homes. . . .

The Yugoslav government considers the aforementioned action a flagrant violation of the agreement reached. A particular light on this violation is shed by the very fact that it was made directly after the agreement was reached.

The Yugoslav government can in no way accept the version which states that Imre Nagy and the other mentioned persons have gone to Rumania of their own free will, for it is familiar with the desire of those persons to remain in their country as well

as with the fact that these persons, while in asylum in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, rejected the proposal to go to Rumania.

The Yugoslav government herewith lodges the most energetic protest with the Hungarian government for the violation of the agreement reached on November 21, and requests the Hungarian government immediately to implement this agreement. The Yugoslav government is convinced that a contrary action cannot but negatively effect Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, not to mention the fact that the violation of the agreement is in full contradiction with the generally recognized standards of international law.

“. . . a political system in the name of Socialism in fact became a brake on further Socialist development to such a degree that it provoked the working class . . . to armed resistance because this class could express its will in no other way. . .”

13. VICE-PRESIDENT KARDELJ'S SPEECH TO THE FEDERAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF YUGOSLAVIA, DECEMBER 6, 1956.

In this speech the acknowledged theoretician of Yugoslav Communism presents the official reading of Hungarian events as seen from Belgrade. Its condemnation of the first Soviet intervention, and the assertion that the conduct of Rakosi and Gero was responsible for the October uprising is in line with earlier Yugoslav statements. The novelty in Kardelj's speech lies in the fact that it constitutes a "Marxist analysis" of the origins of the Hungarian revolution, and accordingly is not only an official policy statement but also an ideological platform. Kardelj sees the estrangement of the Hungarian Party from the masses of the Hungarian working class as the main cause of the revolution. He says that, having gained power, the Hungarian Communists became progressively more isol-

ated from the population and ceased to be responsive to popular feeling. The Party thus became a "bureaucratic clique" and the presumption that because "it calls itself Communist [this] guarantees progressive and democratic rule" proved increasingly invalid and indeed meaningless. He even goes so far as to suggest that a Communist Party may "even become a reactionary force."

This criticism was ostensibly directed only against Hungary, but since Hungarian dogma was so closely patterned on the Soviet model, Kardelj's comments were hardly calculated to spare Soviet sensibilities, as evidenced, for instance, by the categorical assertion that the errors of individuals could not alone have brought about the situation in Hungary. This position was indeed difficult to reconcile with the Soviet view which officially attributed past shortcomings in the USSR to the "cult of the individual" and to the errors only of Josef Stalin.

Speaking of the second Soviet intervention, Kardelj was even more equivocal than Tito had been at Pula. He described the Soviet action as "the lesser evil," which could be only grudgingly condoned, since it violated the "right of nations to settle their own internal differences." And, as if this were not enough, Kardelj also took exception to the Soviet and Hungarian view of the Hungary revolutionary workers' councils which had been the center of opposition to the Kadar regime, and which had accordingly been condemned and liquidated. Quoting Lenin to the Russians, Kardelj stressed the traditionally revolutionary role of such councils, and reminded the CPSU of its own soviets, and of the role they played in bringing the Party to power in 1917.

It is, perhaps, no exaggeration to say that this speech was more important and more meaningful in giving definition to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute than the violent polemics of 1948 had ever been. Earlier Soviet-Yugoslav interchanges, while making a pretense of ideological controversy, had in fact used ideological terminology largely

as a vehicle for voicing disagreements arising from relatively prosaic political and economic differences. Kardelj's speech, in contrast, had genuine Marxist content. It defined some of the ideological points in dispute, and offered an important clarification of the Yugoslav position on matters of dogma. The tone of the controversy during 1956 may have seemed relatively moderate. On the other hand it did explicitly raise the issues posed by the "road to Socialism" which Yugoslavia had evolved during the long years of isolation from the Cominform issues which had been pushed aside or entirely ignored during the 1955 rapprochement.

. . . For us, the notion of building Socialism in both essence and form . . . means something appreciably more complicated, which only partly depends upon the subjective will of the leading class. We have been under attack in the past for such beliefs. However, the latest events in Hungary are a further warning to those who are not prepared to accept facts as facts, and who believe that with the victory of the revolution and the assumption of power by a Communist Party, objective social laws cease to be applicable. On the contrary, they will revenge themselves on anyone who tries to ignore them.

The actual leading social role of the Communist Party cannot be decreed by law. The party can indeed be a leading one; that is, it can be the most progressive social factor, but only in cases where it really works according to objective social laws. Since these laws act through men, through social classes, the Communist Party or any other leading organized Socialist force in the transitional period from capitalism to Socialism must be in such a position that the most progressive Socialist tendencies can be expressed through it, as well as through the entire social mechanism, and that it itself changes with the development of Socialist relations.

If a party does not understand this, then I do not know how it can beat its Communist chest and boast of Marxism-Leninism, referring to its leading historical role. On the contrary, it will play the role of a brake on Socialist development.

It can even become a reactionary force if it doggedly continues in this direction. The belief that a party, by the very fact

that it calls itself Communist, assures a progressive and democratic character to its rule is a grave anti-Marxist blunder. This has been clearly shown in Hungary. There, an anti-democratic system of bureaucratic despotism for years pursued the determined and wilful policy of a clique against the will of the working masses. This eventually brought about an armed action in which the main force was the working class, that is, precisely that class which alone can be the agent of Socialist transformation in Hungarian society.

The most important thing is not who exploited this revolt of the working class, or by what slogans it was taken in when it spontaneously rose against something which had become socially unbearable or reactionary. It is much more important to state that a political system in the name of Socialism in fact became a brake on further Socialist development to such a degree that it provoked the working class, the actual force of the Socialist movement, to armed resistance because this class could express its will in no other way.

The Hungarian events are indeed the tragedy of the contemporary Socialist movement. But to an even greater degree they are a lesson and challenge to international Socialism. They are primarily a challenge to all those progressive Socialist tendencies which are expressed in the belief that the political system of a Socialist state in the transitional era must develop in such a way that the most progressive material and spiritual movements of the working masses—whose consciousness is being formulated under the conditions of Socialist ownership of the means of production—can be expressed every day and can work toward continuous changes of outdated forms. This is the meaning of the demand for democratization which is heard today as the main demand in many countries which are on the road of Socialist development.

Revolutionary political limitations may transitionally exist in a country with a complex internal social structure. But they cannot apply to a free movement of Socialist social forces, for then they are transformed into bureaucratic despotism. It goes without saying that to resort to an increasingly stronger affirmation of the state in economic and social affairs in a Socialist country is not the way toward full liberation of the forces of Socialism. It must not be forgotten that there can be no mention of a perfected Socialist system and even less of Communism as long as the state, as an instrument of force, is the main factor in economic relations and movements.

Socialism in the final stage must be liberated from bureaucratic brakes and be able to develop by its internal experience, strengthen itself and grow by the stability and internal force of the social initiative of the broad masses organized on the basis of social ownership of the means of production.

Precisely for this reason there can be no progress of Socialism without a parallel development of specific forms of democracy which correspond to the Socialist economic base. In our country this principle was applied in practice sometimes with more and sometimes with less success, but it was applied on an increasingly wide front.

Stalin's criticism of our Communist Party, that it was being drowned in the People's Front, in the masses, in fact was a criticism of these democratic tendencies in our Socialist development. However, whereas Yugoslav Socialism became stronger, thanks precisely to this development of democracy and at the same time through opposition to the pseudo-democratic forces which want to drag society back to obsolete political forms, the crisis of Hungarian Socialism was caused precisely by the absence of any democratization.

The events in Hungary illustrate how the answer to these questions is important for the further development of Socialism. In addition, these events point to the fact that for us, too, one of the most urgent tasks at present is not only the solution of the burning economic questions of the moment, but also the solution of these questions in such a way as to insure a rapid development of our democratic mechanism.

A discussion is now going on in the Communist press as to whether the individual errors of the earlier government or the political system are responsible for the revolutionary events in Hungary. It is obvious, however, that the appearance of individual errors by themselves would not lead to such resolute reaction by the masses if these masses had opportunities to express their desire for a change of the discredited policy of the leadership, and thus to correct their errors.

When Socialist working masses have no opportunity to express such demands and to correct such errors, it is clear that there exists a determined political system which separates the masses from power. Such a system must sooner or later bring about, first a separation of the leadership from the masses—and the policies

of this leadership must clash with the elementary interests of the working masses—and then an action of these masses against this political system, which prevents them from influencing the direction of basic social relations.

It is therefore completely clear that when we speak of the political system we do not mean Socialism nor the Leninist Soviet system which was built so that the masses could influence the policy of the state and the Party. By the political system, we mean in this instance the complex of all those political forms and methods which separate the Socialist working masses from direct influence on authority and which strengthen bureaucratic elements in the Party and the state, taking over step by step the various levels of authority, which thus must degenerate to something other than the rule of the working class.

Exactly such a process brought about the isolation of the Communist Party from the masses and the inevitable despotism of a bureaucratic clique which had lost the habit of heeding the aspirations and desires of its own working class and, in that way, of its own people. The thing we Marxists must never forget is that bureaucracy grows, and that economic technocracy—simply by its inner forms, during the transition period—inevitably drives society back toward that sort of political system, to a bureaucratic political system. And when such a process, unless inner political forces stand up against it, becomes powerful, it starts to give birth not only to Stalinism but also to the Hungarian events.

Today the international relations of social forces are such that the fate of Socialism is no longer so much directed by defense of the results achieved, because Socialism is no longer an isolated island, they are directed instead primarily by its own development, by the further development of Socialism itself.

Socialism nowadays does not need empty eulogies of what has been done in a Socialist country and among Socialist countries. On the contrary, modern Socialism needs a healthy, democratic, critical attitude to its own results. It needs an inextinguishable and keen desire for ever better solutions, primarily for better solutions with regard to relations among people. The entire political system of modern Socialism must be so organized as to make it possible for that tendency and desire to manifest itself, and only the eternal movement of the masses can result in such progressive aspirations.

Therefore, democracy must be an unconditional factor and element of Socialism. Socialism needs discussion and an open and Marxist analysis of the Hungarian events. There are two interpretations of the armed revolt in Hungary to be heard in the Socialist movement, which are, however, in my opinion equally wrong and harmful to the further development of Socialism in the world.

Some say that this was counterrevolution organized beforehand, with specific mistakes committed by the former political leadership causing the sentiments of the working masses to shift to the side of the revolt. Others maintain that this was a revolution for freedom and national independence, both of these notions being unclear and hazy. In the end, they were reduced to interpreting freedom as the multi-party system of classical bourgeois democracy, and independence as a return to the old positions of Hungarian nationalism.

The conclusion drawn from the first analysis is that the revolution should have been suppressed, the specific mistakes of the past corrected, and the problem solved, that is, by making it possible to revert to the old, well-tried course. Such an opinion is not only a great mistake, but also a great illusion.

Such a conclusion may serve to put Socialist consciences at ease, but it is far from understanding the real cause as well as the right solution. Such convictions do not even take into account the fact that after the revolt of the Hungarian working class, the starting point for the further development of Hungarian Socialism is totally different from that of 1945. Such an approach does not solve anything, but multiplies and makes more critical the causes which brought about the Hungarian tragedy. Whoever really wants to find a solution to the present Hungarian crisis must discover and bring to light the real cause.

Too many serious Socialist issues are involved to make it permissible for those who are genuinely loyal to the Socialist cause to shut their eyes to facts. If the leading forces in Socialist countries do not find sufficient strength in themselves to secure the evolutionary process of transformation of definite political forms and relations in a society which is on the way to Socialism, then political crises will follow.

On the basis of the first analysis, a few essentially practical questions have to be put to impartial Marxist analysis. First of all,

if it is a question of specific mistakes of the Rakosi-Gero clique alone, not of the bureaucratic system which began to play a reactionary role with regard to Socialist development, why then did the Hungarian working masses have to resort to the use of force and arms to stand up against the policy responsible for these mistakes?

Why is it that the attitude of the Hungarian working class could not be expressed in a more normal way through various representative organs of the Hungarian Workers' Party, which was said to be the most progressive force of the working class but which was shown to have lost all connections with it? Finally, what consolation is it to the Socialist conscience to contend that the working class, eleven years after its own victory, was taken in by the counterrevolution? Even if this were true, the question must be asked: should the stick be broken on the head of the working class or the political system which put the working class in the absurd position of allegedly fighting its own historic interests?

Such logic can only lead to the absurd conclusion, which has no connection with Socialism let alone with Marxism, that a party or state can build Socialism without the working class or even against its will. In fact, the Hungarian working class has spontaneously acted in a Socialist way and only in a Socialist way. However, it has, with regard to conceptions of the state system, democracy, and political and Party relations, been very much under the influence of various petty bourgeois abstract imperialist ideas, yet at the same time, it has stood firmly for ownership of the means of production.

What is more, it further developed its successes by setting up workers' councils, transforming . . . [the means of production] from state property to consistent social ownership, that is, ownership under direct democratic management of the community of producers. It is also characteristic that workers' masses declared themselves for united workers' councils and for the higher association of the councils, so that they would exercise a direct influence on the central state authority. This in itself shows that the Hungarian working class, despite the ideological confusion into which it was led, nevertheless spontaneously found the essentially right way to power.

Of course, it is difficult to say whether in the further course of the struggle for power the Hungarian working class could succeed in holding these positions in factories. There is no doubt that the

vampire-like, bourgeois-reactionary forces, which would have undoubtedly received increasing support from abroad, might have tried to bring their victory to a conclusion.

Their course in this regard was clear: in the first stage, these reactionary forces tried to exploit the ideological and political disorientation of the working class to become a factor of power in the country. At this stage, these reactionary forces, particularly because they were weak, were satisfied with general phrases about freedom and democracy. Once they had gained power, however, they would logically abolish social ownership of the means of production at least in part, and, in any event, limit and gradually liquidate the workers' councils.

Any party monopoly in a country, be it of one or of many parties, is incompatible with a really decisive role of the working masses through workers' councils in factories and communes. Accordingly, there was no doubt that the new multi-party system in Hungary would soon clash with the workers' councils, precisely as would now happen if any attempt were made to reimpose the old monopoly of one bureaucratized party.

It would be a great mistake and illusion to believe that in the final form of Nagy's government, as it existed before November 4, the revolutionary clashes in Hungary took their normal course. On the contrary, the battle for the final social and political form in Hungary had then only begun, and no honest person could guess where it would end.

It was, of course, probable that Socialist forces would have succeeded in preserving the Socialist economic basis of Hungarian society. In any case, the working class would have had to shed much more blood and live through many more disappointments before it could, through struggle and defeat, gain the experience which would enable it empirically to create a new democratic mechanism of the Socialist social system.

However, a serious defeat of the working class and Socialism could not be excluded. Thus Hungary could have become the cause of a very dangerous international clash. It was in this light that we viewed the second Soviet intervention in Hungary. We are, of course, in principle against any foreign intervention regardless of its source, not only because of the right of nations to settle their internal differences themselves, but also because intervention, when it is a matter of a social crisis, never solves prob-

lems. It can only postpone settlement for a limited time and simultaneously intensify problems.

In this sense, Soviet intervention in Hungary in itself can do nothing to settle internal differences. Moreover, it will certainly increase tensions and result in more serious consequences if it acts as a brake on the settlement of the problems of the internal political system, which must definitely be settled if the healthy development of Socialism in Hungary is to be achieved.

However, we also believed it possible that Soviet intervention in the situation peculiar to Hungary would be the lesser evil, that is, if it could reduce the likelihood of further bloodshed and allow a government and a policy to be set up in Hungary which would, on the basis of a changed political system, gather together all Socialist forces and insure the working class, through workers' councils and other similar working class organs, influence in state politics which it lacked in the past. Only such positive consequences could have justified Soviet intervention. If these results do not appear, the very act of intervention will be historically condemned.

This attitude of ours is now under fire from two sides. In the name of proletarian internationalism, some reproach us for not supporting Soviet intervention without reserve. Others, on the basis of noninterference in internal affairs and democracy, reproach us for failing to oppose this intervention categorically.

However, we believe that now, when Hungarian society is involved in such a deep internal crisis, Soviet intervention does not play any decisive role whatsoever. This intervention is not the cause of the evil. It is its consequence. Therefore, in itself it cannot extricate Hungarian Socialism from the crisis, but can only point all the more to the untenability of the Hungarian political forms of the Rakosi-Gero period. . . .

Whether the process is called revolution or counterrevolution, the fact remains that the working class rose against the authority which proclaimed itself to be Socialist, and it rose in a majority, for if it had not done so, nothing would have come of the uprising. Likewise, it is true that the working class today rejects what it believes intervention to bring with it—restoration of the old system and of old methods.

These facts certainly throw clear light on the social character of the Rakosi-Gero political system, as on problems which today are

...for the development of Socialism in East Europe.
Accordingly, the cardinal question of present-day Hungary is to be found precisely in that fact which is most determinedly denied in some Communist Parties. This is the main question which must be discussed today. What is at issue is the need for radical changes in the political system, and not a change of people and the correcting of individual errors. Only when this is achieved will it be possible to reduce the negative consequences to Socialism of Soviet intervention.

We deduced from all these premises that it was absolutely necessary to give political support to the Kadar government, expecting or hoping this government to be capable of and willing to follow precisely the course of linking itself with the working class, in other words, with the workers' councils as well as with other genuinely democratic and Socialist currents in Hungary, including elements from the former Imre Nagy government.

Under these conditions the Janos Kadar government could become a starting point for a concentration of Socialist democratic forces leaning primarily on workers' councils, and thus lead to the formation of an independent and sufficiently strong democratic but indispensably Socialist internal force which would establish peace and which could gain the confidence of the people, as well as insure conditions for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and for the maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Only under these conditions will Janos Kadar's government be able to be a progressive subjective factor in the settlement of the internal social differences in Hungary. In the opposite case—that is, if this government deviates from such an orientation, and certain recent events, such as the violation of the Yugoslav-Hungarian agreement on the asylum of the Imre Nagy group and the deportation of this group to Rumania, give cause for serious concern that such tendencies could prevail in Hungary—in that case the only possible approach would be destroyed, and Socialism in Hungary would be dealt another blow.

Such a development, however, would bring bourgeois nationalism to the fore as the main ideological force and the working masses would be thrown even more to the right. These, then, according to our opinion, rather than the question of the Soviet intervention itself, are the questions which today determine the fate of Socialism in Hungary.

What surprises us most in the recent Hungarian events is the attitude of Communists toward the workers' councils. Lenin in his time had the courage to put forth the slogan "All power to the *soviets*" although the Bolsheviks did not have a majority in the *soviets*. As a Marxist, however, Lenin correctly expected that when the working masses undertake the responsibility of government they have to work in their own interest, in other words, socialistically.

He was not mistaken. In Hungary nobody had the courage to put forth such a demand, not even the workers' councils themselves, which were too much under the influence of petty bourgeois abstract liberal slogans. Whatever they were like, these workers' councils nevertheless were the only real Socialist force likely to oppose foreign anti-Socialist influences, and to assume the responsibility for authority in factories, in autonomous local communities, and in the capital.

Since the Communists did not approach, and are not approaching workers' councils in this way in Hungary, but are constantly demanding only that work be resumed without talking about power, they themselves push them in fact more and more under the influence of petty bourgeois and nationalistic pseudo-democratic elements and parties.

These are the facts. To close one's eyes to them and keep silent about them is not to the benefit of Socialism nor of the unity of Socialist forces. Accordingly, the appraisal of the Hungarian events as an organized counterrevolution may perhaps serve some as an artificial means to calm their Socialist conscience. But such an appraisal cannot solve the internal problems of a political system which in Hungary brought about a bloody tragedy. . . .

The tragedy of the Hungarian revolution is precisely that by the force of circumstances ideologically barren elements became the political leadership because there was no other leadership. It is, however, even more catastrophic that no other forces and centers of Socialist consciousness were found in Hungary which could offer to the Hungarian working class some alternative other than the return to positions of the bourgeois political system or to Stalinism.

The working class in these circumstances worked spontaneously and yet it was the only one which worked in a Socialist and really democratic way by forming workers' councils and pressing to join

them into a united national system. Thus, the Hungarian working class did everything it could do in the framework of immediate circumstances.

In this more or less spontaneous action the tendency was nevertheless clearly expressed for the working class to be organized as a state in the form of workers' councils and their associations. These tendencies had a spontaneous source both in the immediate interests of workers and in the division of Hungarian society based on the social means of production.

This in fact was the only Socialist way out of the internal crisis of Hungarian society. Alas, this process did not develop to its end. The main reason for this was that it lacked an obvious orientation and a clear goal. There was no conception of the renaissance of Hungarian Socialism through the handing over of political power to workers' councils, and by isolating reactionary political factors, both Stalinist and bourgeois, who gathered behind the back of petty bourgeois anarchism and pseudo-liberalism.

In addition strong political, material, and ideological pressure was exerted on the healthy Socialist mechanism of the working class both by the bearers of bourgeois democratic illusions (which were obstructed by the workers' councils as a political form which insures a leading role of the working class and Socialist forces), and by Stalinist elements and dogmas to which the workers' councils were a limitation of the monopoly of the ruling Party.

It can therefore be said without exaggeration that the main characteristic of the revolt of the working masses in Hungary was the absence of any influential revolutionary and realistic Socialist subjective factor which could move the working class on the platform of Socialism and Socialist democracy in the struggle for power through workers' councils and other organs of self-management of the working masses.

The question arises: How was it possible that such a grave ideological rift could occur in Hungarian Socialism? The Hungarian revolution was in fact the first major case of a forceful settling of accounts with the obstacles to the further development of Socialism. These obstacles are the product of an entrenched bureaucratic political system, and in given conditions are the lawful social phenomenon in the transitional period from capitalism to Socialism. . .

Where unchecked forces prevail in revolutionary events, illusions will reign at the same time that practical activities pull back

toward some old and known forms which are once again being idealized. In other words: people who in the moment of confusion cannot find a path forward in the forest first start to turn back and then to run back, regardless of the fact that they drag to catastrophe the cause they have begun.

This occurred in Hungary. The former Rakosi-Gero regime and the ruling Stalinist dogmas in general not only piled up a mass of social antagonism but also left behind desolation in the heads of fighters for Socialism. In this bureaucratic system the great mass of sincere revolutionaries and Socialist fighters were educated in the belief that after the victory of the revolution nothing else remained for the subjective factor but to construct factories, to make investments constantly, to secure state deliveries, to agitate for government measures, to extract the largest possible amount of funds from the economy so that as much as possible could again be invested, and that plan figures, as large as possible, would be reached.

In such a system every state and Party functionary had to know by heart at any time all sorts of data about the state of economy—data which is often of very little value—but nobody was able or felt the need to be able to see, to explain, what was happening among the people, what social processes were going on, what new social forces were born, what forces were dying, what antagonisms appeared and in what forms they appeared, where the tendencies of degeneration appeared, where the abolition of the old was demanded by Socialist progress, and so forth, so that economic policy could then be adjusted to them.

In such a system people knew much more about chickens and about varieties of potatoes and corn than they knew about relations among men. Politics disappeared. There remained only discussions about the production of steel and machines, about potatoes and corn, about the manner of feeding cattle, and so forth.

I am, of course, far from denying the necessity of such discussions, especially among experts. But when it remains the only thing, then this is a symptom that things are not going well. It is not and it cannot be the task of central social and political organs of a Socialist country to prescribe to the people how to feed cattle.

It goes without saying that they must insure the existence of expert organizations which would at any time be able to offer to those interested all possible expert technical and material aid. The main task of these central organs, however, certainly must be

to insure, through the political, economic, and organizational mechanism of society at all times, maximum material and moral stimulation of every individual at his Socialist working place so that he will produce most and best, as well as to insure his sufficient individuality so that he will be able to develop his creative energies and initiatives in all fields. This must be our main aim in building the social mechanism if we speak about Socialist building, and if we want to insure that the Socialist social system in its development depends on the free action of Socialist working people and not on state power.

We have always stressed that building Socialism—if we use this inexact and propagandistic term “building Socialism” to describe a conscious action of people in the direction of developing Socialist relations—that building Socialism in this sense is not the same process as building a house.

This is not a task which can be managed and led from a bureaucratic office. Building Socialism is an organic social process in which the leading social force needs to struggle to free the road for Socialist forces and to protect these forces from the intervention of various factors of the past.

Various social forces are at work in this process, starting from the remnants of the past up to transitional new creations such as bureaucracy which can become a very serious social force. The working class itself changes in the process of Socialist development. The internal relations in which it lives change and so does its consciousness.

To regard the process of Socialist development exclusively through the prism of the starting point of the Socialist revolution—in other words through the clash between the proletariat and bourgeoisie—is ideologically absurd and politically reactionary. Continuous and automatic praise of everything that exists in the countries where Communist Parties are in power comes from such an outlook—as if all social problems had been solved there forever or as if all those questions can be solved peacefully by decree, and as if everybody could wait without any excitement for an office of the centralized administrative apparatus to consider that the time had come for this or that question to be solved.

According to this idealistic scheme, which, alas, is not only a caricature but also a fact, it appears that during the transitional

period both positive and negative products of social development would not be continuously generated.

It is very incorrect to base a discussion of the problems of social development in the transitional period only on remnants of the overthrown bourgeoisie. After 10 years of development of Socialism in a more or less developed country these remnants should have represented a less significant factor.

The mechanism of a state in the transitional period also generates other factors which are much more significant, and in which historically reactionary forces which oppose the progress of Socialism entrench themselves in a new form. It is primarily, as we all know, bureaucracy which appears both in the Stalinist and in the bourgeois democratic guise. . . .

The absence of any serious analysis of social process in the transitional period, and even more—a ban under the threat of death of any discussion of social relations and other questions which oppose the fiction that a society building Socialism contains no reactionary conservative elements except remnants of the bourgeoisie—this was the characteristic of Rakosi's Hungary.

According to this school, Hungary's development is identical with the policy of the government, and therefore the government must have all power.

According to this view the only task of the people who consciously want to contribute to Socialism is to popularize and to explain government measures. This also is the task of social sciences. Ideological work therefore is stripped of all creative impulses and is reduced to the miserable position of a maid servant without any principled practice.

The question arises: What Socialist cadres could such a system produce? What possibility did it offer to unchecked Socialist forces to correct the policy of the so-called leading forces? And in general: How could a Socialist conscience of the working masses be formed and how could it become the basis of an entire social system?

Of course under the above-mentioned conditions the reply to all these questions can only be completely negative. In fact the very political system and the Party itself, which according to its position should be the most progressive force in the country, prevented the possibility of creating cadres who could express and carry on progressive Socialist tendencies in Hungary.

Thus the split between the masses and the leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party became complete, and the Hungarian working class was ideologically disarmed and exposed to various external ideological influences. Only this explains the abnormal situation where a Petofi Circle with a mixture of various elements of the intelligentsia—ranging from the very progressive and Socialist through the petty bourgeois-anarchist and confused, to the openly reactionary and anti-Socialist elements—could at first become the only valve of the stifled energies of the people's masses, and then later on one of the main ideological and political orientators.

The abnormal political form and the role of this club, as the main ideological force of a Socialist revolt, is indicative of the ideological desolation which the Rakosi-Gero bureaucratic system left behind. The Hungarian workers' councils also developed in this ideological atmosphere. As we have seen, they were opposed both by Rakosi's Stalinist elements and by petty bourgeois liberalism.

They were not understood even by the Communists who denounced the Rakosi-Gero regime and disassociated themselves from it. For some of them, who, still under the influence of old Stalinist dogmas, were not used to believing in the masses, in the Socialist consciousness of the working class and the fact that the working class always works in a Socialist way, it was unthinkable that the working masses could participate in and decide on the system of government directly, rather than only through the Party or through its leadership.

The Hungarian Workers' Party, which for 10 years ruled only with the help of a bureaucratic, political, and economic apparatus, had disappeared, and for this reason it could no longer be a real Socialist factor. Nevertheless they changed—only changed—its name, trying to convince Hungarian workers that the problem had thus been solved.

However, the Hungarian workers rose against the bureaucratic system and not against the name of the Party which built that system. Instead of making fruitless attempts to restore Communist and other political parties, progressive Socialist forces in Hungary should have struggled for the victory of direct democracy in the form of unified workers' councils and autonomous communes as the main types of a new Socialist authority during the revolutionary days, for only in such democratic organizations can Socialist forces them-

selves be reborn and, once reborn, become again the primary factor in these organizations.

The Hungarian Communists, however, were too overburdened by the petrified dogmas of the past to be capable of such a radical change. As paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless correct that Communists decided to change over to the classical bourgeois multiparty system—even though they might thus abandon Hungary to reactionary forces—rather than to renounce the illusion of their own mass Party, which had in fact been abandoned by the masses because this conception of the Party was for them an embodiment of bureaucratic despotism.

In those days Hungary badly needed progressive fighters for Socialism, but not fighters of the Stalinist type organized in the old type of political party under whatever name it appeared. They should have been where the working class was and inside the working class. For this they should have found new forms of organization and methods of work.

Since this idea was foreign to leading Hungarian Communists and since they could in no way disentangle themselves from old schemes, they necessarily split again after the elimination of the staunchest Stalinists. One part was taken in by false libertarian slogans and the idealization of the bourgeois democratic system, and started to build a parallel authority in addition to the workers' councils, and in the last analysis, against the workers' councils, for these two forms cannot be reconciled.

Let us ignore for a moment the fact that under such social antagonisms as prevailed in Hungary, the hope for a classical, peaceful, multiparty democracy was pure illusion. The question still arises as to why Communists for the sake of maintaining the fiction of their own mass party which no longer existed, renounced the real forces of the working class and the Socialism which was embodied in the workers' councils and which could have become the basic pillar of the new political mechanism of Hungarian Socialist democracy, making it a direct democracy.

At that moment, Hungarian workers could probably have understood only that language. They could not understand, however, that they were again recruited into a Party which had gone through a terrific shipwreck simply because the true Marxist Communist idea was not expressed in it.

Why should the workers believe that the old evils would not be repeated? Only because of a change in personnel? Never. It was necessary to change the political system and not only persons and the name of the organization.

The other well-meaning Communists were afraid of a development in which the forces of bourgeois restoration were indeed assuming increasing scope. The same fear also paralyzed and sterilized the major part of the working class, which saw no prospects for itself in Nagy's government and at the same time feared a return to the old, Stalinist rule.

Thus it occurred that some of the Communists split with Nagy's government, be it because of sterility of thought or because they asked for the support of the Soviet Army. To these Communists, also, workers' councils were an alien mechanism which allegedly endangered the position of the Communist Party in the mechanism of government and accordingly could not be the starting point for building a new Socialist political system. . . .

IV. THE SCHISM REVIVED

THE SHARP DIFFERENCES of view regarding the Hungarian "events" which were so quick to emerge between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were not only an indication of the superficiality of the reconciliation which had been effected during 1955 and the early part of 1956; they were also a prelude to the resumption of full-scale doctrinal and ideological hostilities.

With the Red Army once again in control of the Hungarian People's Republic and some months after the abduction of Imre Nagy, it appeared to President Tito that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were once again moving "... in the direction they took in 1948."²⁴ Yugoslavia's denial of diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic, since its formal inception in 1955, suddenly became a serious obstacle to trade negotiations with several East European countries. Specifically, it led to the reformulation, early in 1957, of a Soviet-East German offer of credits for the construction of a Yugoslav aluminum combine in terms "... unacceptable to the Yugoslav government."²⁵

Nevertheless, the frequently avowed desire to maintain "fraternal relations" had not spent its force entirely. During the spring and summer of 1957 there was a perceptible relaxation of Soviet-Yugoslav tensions. Underlying disagreements had not been resolved

²⁴ Speech at Mavrovo, May 27, 1957.

²⁵ Speech to the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia by Foreign Minister Popovic, February 26, 1957.

yet. There was even a noteworthy difference in views as to the real meaning and content of rapprochement. In the Soviet view ideological differences were "regrettable" and should be "lessened" and "eliminated" for the sake of consolidating "fraternal relations." The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, regarded such differences as natural and stressed that friendly relations should prosper despite them. Hence, they had little reason to seize the initiative in moves which might exacerbate the existing situation, while, on the Soviet side, there seems to have been a clear desire to live down the international reaction to the Hungarian revolt which precluded the participation of noisy disputes. Belgrade, indeed, had reason to be reassured by the purge in Moscow of an "anti-Party group" during June 1957, which included Molotov and Kaganovich, and by the cordial atmosphere which prevailed during a visit to the USSR by Kardelj and Rankovic. Tito and Khrushchev saw each other again in Rumania during August in what was described as a friendly meeting. At about that time it was announced that the aluminum agreement had once again been renegotiated to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. In October, Yugoslavia reciprocated this concession on the Soviet side by according formal recognition to East Germany.

None of this, however, was enough to remove the existence of important areas of disagreement. This was made abundantly clear when it was announced that "poor health" would prevent Marshal Tito from attending the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and when the Yugoslav delegation which did attend refused to sign the more important of two Communist Party declarations which were issued on that occasion.²⁶ The so-called "Peace Manifesto," committing the 64 Communist Parties which signed it to a general support of international Communist aspirations, received Yugoslav approval, but the "Moscow Declaration" made by the much smaller number of ruling Communist Parties did not. Its endorsement of the Warsaw Pact and references to the Soviet Union as the "leader of the Socialist camp" were apparently more than the Yugoslavs were prepared

²⁶ Both declarations were published November 22, 1957 after two separate and consecutive inter-Party conferences which followed the November 7 celebration. The Yugoslav delegation reportedly participated in both meetings.

to support even though the Declaration was liberal without precedent in its definition of the permissible latitude in ideological matters and national policy.

For the next five months, it appeared that the Yugoslavs had won their point. On the surface, relations between Moscow and Belgrade remained unruffled, while the press of the Soviet bloc confined its efforts to sustained but generalized attacks on "revisionism." Later evidence, however, suggests that this was a period in which the Yugoslav leaders were bracing themselves and waiting for the oncoming storm.²⁷

The occasion for launching an attack presented itself on the eve of the Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists, scheduled for the latter part of April, 1958. As they had done before their Sixth Congress in 1952, the Yugoslavs again prepared a statement of their political and ideological position in the form of a Draft Program intended for submission to and approval by the Congress.

This document was circulated to the world's major Communist Parties for discussion and comment some time during March, and soon became the object of extensive criticism in the Soviet Union. Initially, these strictures were communicated privately through inter-Party channels and did in fact lead the authors of the Draft Program to effect several changes designed to make the document less objectionable to the Soviet Party. As now seems probable, however, the Draft Program had been chosen by Moscow to serve as a *causus belli* with the result that the modifications proved both insufficient in themselves and irrelevant to Moscow's purpose.

Accordingly, it was announced on April 5, 1958 that the Soviet Party would not follow the usual protocol of sending a delegation to the Yugoslav Congress, but would only instruct Soviet diplomatic representatives to attend as observers. Shortly afterward

²⁷ Elie Abel, writing from Belgrade for the *New York Times*, July 15, 1958, and citing "a source of the highest integrity," reported that, at the November meetings, Khrushchev is said to have told Kardelj and Rankovic that Yugoslavia would have to choose between East and West instead of continuing to sit "in two chairs." Upon their refusal to sign the Moscow Declaration, he is reported to have said angrily: "We will attack you!"

similar decisions were taken by the other Parties of the Soviet bloc. On April 19 a long critique of the Draft Program was published in the CPSU's theoretical journal *Kommunist* which, while avoiding outspoken invective, expressed the hope that the Yugoslavs, by "comradely criticism," might be led to recognize their numerous "errors" and to correct them.

On April 22 in his opening address to the Congress, Marshal Tito, while expressing support for his Party's Draft Program, spoke with moderation and made a particular point of endorsing the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its role in the preservation of world peace. On the following day, however, a strongly worded speech by Vice-President Rankovic was countered by an ostentatious walk-out by all Soviet bloc ambassadors except the representative of Poland. Then, as tension continued to increase, matters were made still worse when all the foreign delegates and observers unexpectedly heard some spirited criticism of the Soviet Union inserted by Kardelj into the third major speech of the Congress, but not included in the advance release of his otherwise moderate remarks.

These incidents notwithstanding, the Congress was allowed to run its course and to adopt the Draft Program with minor modifications before any real clash was publicly revealed. The clash came on May 5, 1958 (after a ten-day pause in which the traditional May Day expressions of international proletarian solidarity were duly aired), when the Chinese Communist Party newspaper *Jenmin Jihpao* printed a virulent assault on the League of Yugoslav Communists. In an article couched in extreme language, the entire Yugoslav program was called "anti-Marxist-Leninist" and its authors and supporters characterized as "out-and-out revisionists." Unlike the earlier Soviet critique which had pretended to see the Yugoslav program as an "erroneous" product of a "fraternal Party," the Chinese spokesman hailed the 1948 resolution which had expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform as "basically correct."

Once the signal had been given, events moved rapidly toward a showdown. Obviously forewarned of what was coming, the Soviet Party newspaper *Pravda* reprinted the entire text of the Chinese attack on the following day, May 6. Three days later, the Yugoslavs

retorted in kind by lashing out against Peking's "filthy insinuations" and by recalling the painful fate of most of the signatories of the 1948 resolution. *Komunist*, the principal Yugoslav theoretical journal, in making this reply, likewise made it clear that Yugoslavia had once again found the price of cooperation with the Soviet bloc too high and would refuse to pay it, as it had refused to pay it ten years earlier. On the same day, Moscow made its contribution to the heated debate by uttering a veiled threat of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia which was soon to be substantiated in fact when a Soviet government note of May 27 informed the Yugoslavs that the requirements of the Soviet chemical industry necessitated a five-year postponement in delivery of the credits which had been negotiated during 1956.

Early in June Premier Khrushchev himself entered the lists when he addressed the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sofia and used the opportunity to attack the League of Yugoslav Communists and its leaders as the "Trojan horse" of the Socialist camp, a charge which the Hungarian regime later attempted to "document" in its indictment of Imre Nagy.

The Yugoslavs, meanwhile, have stood firm in the face of this ideological and economic pressure. Their position, as stated by Marshall Tito in mid-June, is that the theoreticians of the Yugoslav League of Communists rather than those of the Soviet Union and China are the rightful contemporary interpreters of Marx and Lenin. Nor have they thought it necessary or expedient to refrain from outspoken comment on the execution of Imre Nagy or to modify their foreign policy for the sake of accomodating their critics in the Soviet bloc.

There can be no doubt that an open breach has once again taken place and that the causes leading to it are deeply rooted. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the extremes of 1948-53 will be repeated. There is at present no economic blockade against Yugoslavia and no evidence of such threatening military gestures as were enacted a decade ago. Trade delegations have continued to travel between both countries and there are no indications that embassy staffs will be reduced. Moreover, the entire Soviet posture toward Yugoslavia today, unlike ten years ago, is probably influenced by con-

siderations arising from Moscow's diplomacy on the Asian and African continents which preclude the use of the most drastic forms of coercion lest the effects prove counterproductive among the uncommitted nations.

Yet the issue in dispute remains very much the same as it was a decade ago, namely, whether fundamental decisions governing the future of Yugoslavia will be made in Belgrade or in Moscow. Nor is that issue, and others which relate to it, likely to be solved unless and until international Communism abandons the use of imperialist practices in relations between the Soviet Union and the smaller members of the "Socialist camp."

"There is only one Socialism, but the roads leading to it vary . . ."

"In the struggle for the victory of Socialism, the working class of one or another country may, for a certain period of time, be the standard-bearer of that struggle, may be its vanguard, or may dispose of greater material power; but that does not entitle it to a monopoly position in the labor movement...."

14. DRAFT PROGRAM OF THE YUGOSLAV LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS, APRIL 1958.

The Draft Program is a political platform. It is a statement of the policy and ideology of the Yugoslav Communists. The document from which excerpts are reproduced here is not the final version adopted by the Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists which met April 22-27, 1958, but the proposed text submitted to the Congress by a drafting committee. As a

general rule, there is little difference between such drafts, which originate at the highest Party levels, and the final programs or Party platforms. In this instance some small changes were in fact made during the Congress, most of them in response to objections raised by the Soviet Union. In any event, this is the version of the Draft Program which provoked Soviet criticism and displeasure and ushered in the latest phase of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute.

The excerpts presented below are from the first two chapters of the program, which deal with the development of modern capitalism, the danger of bureaucratic tendencies in the transitional phase to Socialism, with the concept of different roads to Socialism, and finally with the dangers raised by attempts on the part of one Socialist power to assume a position of hegemony over other Socialist movements in the world.

On each of these points, the Yugoslav Draft Program proved objectionable to the CPSU.

First, the Yugoslavs recognized that capitalist institutions had changed significantly since the classic formulations of Marxism-Leninism were first enunciated. In the Yugoslav view, the growing influence of trade unions, the increasing role played by the state in the economy, in fact, the almost complete disappearance of classic nineteenth century capitalism, had changed the conditions of transition to Socialism and the manner in which the working class would come to power. The Yugoslavs were perfectly aware that this analysis, reminiscent of that made by the Soviet economist Eugene Varga more than a decade earlier, would lay them open to the charge of "revisionism." Hence, they went out of their way to stress the fact that such developments did not render the class struggle obsolete or otherwise invalidate the teachings of Marx and Lenin. The Soviet Party, nevertheless, chose to disregard this rider and to voice strong objections to the Yugoslav analysis (Document 15, below).

The implications for the USSR of the Yugoslav position on the role of the state and bureaucracy were even more serious. It could obviously be read as a thinly veiled criticism of the Soviet Union for maintaining an extensive state apparatus, and for not showing any inclination to reduce it. This had long been a sensitive point in Communist dogma which still proclaims the eventual withering away of the state. At the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU in 1938, Stalin had declared that such a development was not then feasible because of the existence of external enemies, and his successors had adopted a similar view. The Yugoslavs, however, were less concerned with the existence of real or imaginary enemies than they were with the menace of a growing bureaucracy which had already been cited by Kardelj in his analysis of the causes of the Hungarian revolution. This implied censure of the largest and oldest Communist state and the obvious association of the issue of bureaucracy with the Hungarian events could not help but irritate the Soviet Union.

The third major point in the Draft Program is essentially a restatement of the familiar Yugoslav position on "different roads to Socialism." Theoretically, this idea had always enjoyed the highest degree of orthodoxy, having first been endorsed by Lenin and clearly reaffirmed by his successors in the Belgrade Declaration. In actual practice, however, the Soviet Party and its leadership were more inclined to pay lip service to the "different roads" thesis than to take it literally. Hence, with the crises of 1956 well behind them, they grew increasingly impatient with the constant reiteration of the same theme and chose to see in it not only a declaration of political independence by one Party from the rest of the "Socialist camp" but also a direct challenge by the Yugoslavs to "the leading Party" in the Communist world.

Finally, as if to give additional emphasis to the bland rephrasing of the "different roads" thesis, the Draft Program comes to grips with the real point at issue when,

in effect, it accuses the Soviet Union of attempting to dictate the internal policies of other Socialist states and of using its position of "hegemony" to exploit them economically. Though not as sharply worded as similar charges from Belgrade had been during the late 1940's, the substance of the Yugoslav argument remained the same. It suggested that, despite many professions to enlightenment, Soviet practice in its relations with weaker partners was still arbitrary and by no means equally advantageous to all parties concerned.

(Excerpts from Chapter I).

DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

The capitalist system in its classical form is increasingly becoming a thing of the past. . . .

In the course of its development, capitalism powerfully increased the productive forces of society, carried out industrial revolutions in a number of countries, organized production scientifically . . . multiplied productivity of labor, developed national markets and created a world market. With the ever greater division of labor on both a national and an international scale, capitalism expanded the social character of labor, constantly furthering the socialization of production which, however, remained within the limits of private capitalist management and private appropriation of the social product. . . .

The aim and orientation of capitalist production is profit. However, private capitalist ownership of the means of production, private appropriation, profit as the goal of production and anarchy in the development of capitalist economy, increasingly come into conflict with the social character of production, with the organization of production as a whole and with the general needs of society. . . .

New social and economic phenomena, the political events of the last several decades (from the October Revolution, major upheavals such as the great economic crisis of 1929-1932, up to World War II), the new victories of the Socialist forces in a number of countries and the disintegration of the colonial system

led to further major changes in the structure of capitalist society. These changes, in most cases, occurred along the line of reinforcement of state-capitalist tendencies and were the result of numerous social, economic, and political factors. . . .

For all these reasons, state-capitalist tendencies, occurring in line with changes in contemporary capitalism, are the fundamental feature of the industrially developed capitalist countries, and even find expression, though in other forms and through the solution of other problems, in most of the underdeveloped countries as well. . . .

THE GROWING ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY

The indispensable need to modify the production and distribution relationships of the capitalist economy through state intervention leads to a qualitative increase of the role of the state in the operation and development of the economic life of society. The state becomes the indispensable factor in all basic economic activities of society. It increasingly controls the activities of capital, partially restricting the right of private management of capitalist property and depriving the owners of private capital of certain independent functions in the economy and in society.

A fusion of top monopoly circles with the state administration is steadily taking place. In certain fields of activity the top monopoly circles are steadily losing their former completely independent role, while some functions of the monopolies are increasingly being transferred to the state.²⁸

²⁸ In the final version of the program adopted by the Congress, the first two paragraphs of this section were replaced by one which read:

The indispensable need to modify and establish production and distribution relationships under capitalism through more and more state intervention leads to a changing and growing role of the state in the operation and development of the economic life of society. The tendency towards state intervention in the economic life of society becomes ever stronger. The state is compelled to take various measures of control over private capital, which do not affect the essence of the capitalist system, yet partially restrict the right of private management of capitalist property.

The state assumes an important role in the economy, either by developing the system of monetary credit measures and by using the taxation system to regulate economic life, or directly, by nationalizing whole branches of industry and making large-scale capital investments, or finally, by restricting the right to manage capital and by controlling the distribution of profits, by introducing elements of economic planning, and most often by combining all these measures.

As a result of internal development and changes in the capitalist system, and also because of the conscious and spontaneous pressure of the working class in present-day conditions, the role of the state as a regulator in the sphere of labor and property relationships, of social rights and social services and other social relations is also increasing.

The tendency of the workers to exercise their influence in the management of factories and on the economy as a whole—through bodies of the most varied character and differentiated rights—although it is still at an early stage of development, signifies an expansion of the struggle for the democratic rights of the working people and for the leading role of the working class in social and economic life.

The emergence of regional and broader international economic organizations, in which states participate directly, represents new forms of economic cooperation and integration, as distinguished from the earlier exclusive activities of private monopolies in this field, but on the other hand also represents a new instrument of struggle for the establishment of economic and political hegemony of the stronger and more developed countries over the weaker and less developed.

Thus, the bourgeois state takes over economic functions at that level of development of capitalism at which private ownership and capitalist relations of production can no longer provide an adequate framework for the expanded productive forces, and at a level at which society is no longer capable of finding a way out of the crisis on the existing capitalist foundations, nor of carrying forward the reproduction of the means of production and developing productive forces.

In other words, these trends reveal the efforts of the capitalist forces to adjust themselves both economically and politically to

the requirements of the development of productive forces, to the social and political changes of the last few decades, that is to say to the growing influence of Socialism in the world, as well as to the greater role and power of the working class on a national level, while at the same time retaining the most essential elements of capitalist social relations and also the social privileges of the bourgeoisie.

By taking over considerable economic functions, the state and its apparatus acquire an economic foundation of their own upon which the new social role of the state apparatus is built up. The state apparatus in striving to acquire its own independent functions, places itself over and above society, and tends increasingly to restrict both the role of private capital and that of the working class.²⁹

Under such conditions, the bourgeoisie endeavors to maintain and develop the greatest possible control over the entire mechanism of the state and of state capitalism, to establish itself permanently and firmly as its leading and directing political force, in order to preserve capitalist relations and the privileges of the bourgeoisie on the national and international level, and to retard both the process of Socialization of the means of production and the penetration of Socialist tendencies into the system of state capitalism. That is why various reactionary elements within the bourgeoisie and the state-capitalist bureaucracy increasingly try to apply Fascist and other anti-democratic methods in suppressing revolutionary and democratic movements.³⁰

²⁹ In the final version of the program, this paragraph was modified:

A process of merging the summits of the monopolies with the state administration takes place. But by taking over considerable economic functions, the state and its apparatus acquire their own independent economic foundation, upon which the social role of the state apparatus is built. In striving to acquire their own independent functions and to place themselves above society, the bourgeois state and its apparatus tend both to restrict the independent social role of the working class and, without touching the foundations of the capitalist system, to limit the role of private capital.

³⁰ In the final version of the program this paragraph was modified:

Under such conditions, the bourgeoisie and, especially, its monopolistic summit endeavor to maintain and develop the greatest possible control over the state and of state capitalism, to establish itself permanently as its leading and directing political force, so as to preserve

The expanded role of the state also fosters the economic and political power of the bureaucracy, which once it has gained strength tends to establish itself as an independent social and political factor. The greater the balance attained in the political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class for influence and positions in the system of state capitalism, the more will the functions of the bureaucracy become independent, the more will it endeavor to preserve state-capitalist relations. The greater the influence of the bourgeoisie, the more will bureaucracy cooperate with it and assist it in carrying out its reactionary policy. The leading role of the working class alone can deprive bureaucracy of its independent social role and make the state apparatus serve the society. . . .

UNEVENNESS OF SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT

Contemporary Socialism is neither pure and homogenous, nor can it be. Vestiges of the old system intermingle in it, the laws of commodity production continue to operate, interlacing and clashing with new laws and contradictions. Some of the contradictions and antagonisms characteristic of the closing stages of capitalism are carried over into the first stages of the construction of a Socialist society.

The construction of Socialism through the conscious activities of men does not follow a straight line of development. Men do build Socialism consciously; but in different countries, they do so under different conditions, they clash with more or less acute internal contradictions, they operate under different influences generated by spontaneous forces and various social and material factors. Hence in solving concrete problems they arrive at different subjective decisions. There is only one Socialism, but the roads leading to it vary. The peoples of different countries choose one or another road because of diverse objective conditions as well as for subjective reasons. In the development of Socialism, each people relies upon the experience of others, but all of them bring to that

capitalist relations and the privileges of the bourgeoisie on the national and international levels. That is why various bourgeois circles of the capitalist monopolies and of the state-capitalist bureaucracy increasingly try to apply Fascist and other anti-democratic methods in suppressing revolutionary and democratic movements.

common experience their own particular contribution, thus enriching it.

The uneven development of Socialism, the wide diversity of paths leading to it and the different forms it takes, produce a number of internal contradictions in that development, but also provide a powerful incentive for its further advance, toward more progressive and freer forms of Socialist relations. Every attempt at fettering these laws of Socialist development can only produce reactionary results.

The victorious working class, that is, the most progressive Socialist force, in the course of constructing Socialism, encounters the resistance of different social factors upon whose strength and role both the rate of development and concrete forms of Socialist relations will depend.

ROOTS OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Socialist relations depend, primarily, upon the material foundations of society. If the economic foundation is undeveloped, the stabilization of the leading role of the working class and of other Socialist forces will be more difficult, and the construction of Socialism will be a long process. Accordingly, the leading forces turn their attention primarily to the building up of the indispensable economic foundations. Under such circumstances, Socialist forces are often compelled to make compromises with the small-owner elements, and even with the bourgeoisie, and also have to resort temporarily to different forms of state-capitalist relations and methods. The intermingling of all these relations and mutual influences creates a number of contradictions and antagonisms which cannot be surmounted by administrative, pseudo-revolutionary measures, for the simple reason that their roots are embedded in the material foundations of that society. At the same time it is precisely through these contradictions that, under certain circumstances, society can advance most rapidly.

Social development is also influenced by economic and political vestiges of the old society, i.e., by the bourgeoisie, that section of the intelligentsia which was associated with capitalism, selfish small-owners, tendencies towards private ownership among the middle

classes, private ownership of the land, etc. The more backward the country, the stronger will the role of these factors be, and the more will they sharpen internal contradictions and antagonisms. This is the main source of pressure for the restoration of capitalism and capitalist power. As a rule, these bourgeois pressures in themselves have no great political force, because the working people do not want the re-establishment of the system of exploitation. However, they may turn into a real danger if, as a result of objective difficulties or because of the growth of bureaucracy and of other negative manifestations, the relations between the leading political forces of the Socialist state and the working class should be seriously upset.

Another factor of considerable significance with which the most progressive Socialist forces have to grapple is the backward social consciousness of the working people, including large sections of the working class, as well as the influence of this negative consciousness upon social and political bodies. The revolution cannot change existing economic foundations overnight or eliminate want and personal material hardships; nor can it change the social consciousness of men overnight, when this has been formed under conditions of exploitation and poverty. Backward concepts among the working people, the feeling that their needs have not been satisfied, small-owner selfishness and so forth, often join hands with reactionary ideological and political trends, whose origin lies in the remnants of the old society or in other alien influences.

MANIFESTATIONS OF ANARCHY

A frequent manifestation of backward social consciousness is blind destructive anarchism. This phenomenon among the working class primarily reflects a blind, spontaneous reaction either to objective difficulties and problems inherent in the period of transition, i.e., the continuing discrepancy between the needs of the people and material possibilities of society, or to expanded bureaucracy and other distortions and the pressures which these factors exercise upon the whole of society. Hence this negative phenomenon is seen as the consequence of both the objective and subjective weaknesses of Socialist progress and reveals the spontaneous pressure of the working class for the acceleration of the forward movement of society, as well as emerging as a result of an undeveloped Social-

ist consciousness. Among certain sections of society, however, especially among the intellectuals, the middle classes and the petty-bourgeois elements, as well as certain sections of the working class, anarchism often makes its appearance as a reaction to the general difficulties of the period of transition to Socialism and is a retreat from these difficulties, a retreat which is cloaked in a quixotic and abstract pseudo-love of freedom. Taken as such, this destructive petty-bourgeois anarchism and abstract liberalism is not an independent social and ideological political force, but merely the forerunner of other anti-Socialist forces. They pave the way either for the further strengthening of bureaucracy, or for the forces of bourgeois counterrevolution. These forces ride on precisely such waves, as well as on vestiges of small-owner selfishness and similar manifestations of the backward social consciousness of the masses, trying to renew their links with the masses in order to restore at least some of the privileges they have lost.

BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCTATIC STATISM

Socialist development in the period of transition is greatly influenced by bureaucracy and bureaucratic statism.

The victorious working class definitely needs the state for a protracted period of transition to highly developed Socialism, not only as the indispensable instrument to fight the remnants of the old society, but also to establish and consolidate economic relationships based on social ownership of the means of production as the dominant social relationships. In the period of transition, before society has built up its new economic foundations, or has established itself firmly upon them, and at a time when it is still searching for new mechanisms of economic and social management, the Socialist state plays a definitely progressive role in managing the economy and governing society.

Centralized forms of state management of the means of production, based on various aspects of state ownership and on the administrative powers of the state apparatus have, under certain historical conditions, played a positive role in the development of Socialism, and within certain frameworks, play such a role today, as they will in the future. This applies, in particular, to the less developed countries which have entered upon the path of Socialism,

and where the specific interrelation of Socialist, state-capitalist and other elements is both indispensable and progressive for a given period of time. This type of state management of economic relationships is absolutely necessary for Socialist countries until the principal factors of backwardness have been overcome and the centralized and decentralized social democratic mechanisms of management of the social means of production by the producing working people themselves have been established.

In carrying out its functions in the economy, however, the state tends to deprive the economy of its internal motive forces, in an effort to prove that society cannot do without it. If these tendencies increase, the state may turn into a factor of stagnation, into a fetter of social development; it may become a factor which prevents the establishment of the new social mechanisms that secure the further advance of Socialism.

Our experience, as well as the experience of other Socialist countries, has shown that management of the economy and of the whole of social life exclusively through the state apparatus perforce leads to greater centralization of power, to an ever closer merger of the state and Party apparatus, to the further strengthening of each, whereupon, in turn they tend to become independent and impose themselves as a force over and above society.

These are the roots of the specific phenomena of the period of transition: bureaucracy and bureaucratic-statist deformities in the development of Socialist relations. These phenomena issue directly from tendencies generated in the political and economic apparatus of the Socialist state, tendencies which strive to transform the state apparatus into the master of society instead of being its servant and executive agent. These phenomena are especially in evidence where the economic preconditions for Socialism are less favorable and where the actual social role and influence of the working class are weak.

The essence of bureaucracy and bureaucratic statism lies in its effort, as a last echo of old societal relations, to distort the development of Socialist relations, primarily by maintaining, extending or restoring one or another of the forms of state capitalist relations or methods of management in conditions where such relations and methods are no longer tolerated by the productive forces and the workers.

The danger of bureaucracy lies not so much in itself, as in the fact that, like any other disease, it enfeebles the whole organism of Socialist society, and thereby stimulates and fortifies all anti-Socialist forces and tendencies. Bureaucracy, above all, inevitably cuts the ties between the leading political forces and the working class, thus sharpening all internal social contradictions.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM AND OVERCOMING INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS

In the sphere of ideology these tendencies find expression in such phenomena as: conservative dogmatism, statist-pragmatic revision of the basic scientific premises of Socialism, that is to say of Marxism-Leninism, and creation of the "personality cult." Ideological tendencies of this type, which are the reflection of the objective contradictions of Socialist development, appear in one or another way in the whole of the international labor movement, both in its social-democratic part and in its Communist part.⁸¹

Consequently, after the consolidation of the power of the working class and of the working people generally, the question of the gradual withering away of the state is raised as the fundamental and decisive question in the Socialist system of society. In the sphere of economic relations, this process of the withering away of the state also means overcoming the vestiges of state capitalism. How long this process will last depends upon a number of circumstances. As it goes forward, the role of the state decreases perceptibly, its bodies undergo transformation, direct democracy keeps developing, and the functions of various bodies of social self-government increase. The forms under which this process evolves have already been seen to differ and they are unlikely to be similar in the future.

Accordingly, it is obvious that the social forces characteristic of the last stages of capitalism continue to act in the Socialist society of the period of transition, although, of course, under conditions that have altered radically in terms of quality. . . .

The working class and its most progressive forces, consciously and spontaneously resist the diffusion of influences which uphold the

⁸¹ The phrase "both in its social-democratic part and in its Communist part" was deleted from the final version.

interests, conceptions and aspirations of the vestiges of the old order. However, under certain conditions, they themselves come under the influence of various alien interests and ideologies, which perforce creates certain internal contradictions. Under given circumstances these contradictions may lead to, and have actually led to rather serious upheavals and to political crises. Contradictions and antagonisms of this type cannot be eliminated overnight, nor can they be ironed out at one stroke. They can only be solved gradually, through long evolutionary processes, and through the struggle of opinions, in line with the development of the material foundations of Socialist society and with the formation of Socialist social consciousness in men.

The construction of Socialism in the period of transition, therefore, cannot be reduced to a straight line of activity by the leading forces in the Socialist state, free of any and all conflicts. On the contrary, development is an organic social process, which proceeds through its own internal contradictions. In the course of that process, Socialist society gradually eliminates the vestiges of the exploitative regimes and their ideologies, as well as its own transitional and obsolete relationships and forms, its own errors and its own conservatism. Only in this way, can man's striving for better and more progressive results—which is inseparably bound up with Socialism—achieve expression.

LEADING ROLE OF SOCIALIST FORCES AND CONSCIOUS GUIDANCE OF INTERNAL PROCESSES

Communists and leading Socialist forces generally, i.e., those who have at their disposal the ideological weapons of scientific Socialism, and rely upon the planned management of the Socialized means of production and other economic functions, have every opportunity to guide these processes consciously and to solve these contradictions. That, however, does not mean that any of the leading Socialist forces have thereby automatically become capable of discovering all aspects of the movement of society and of judging these aspects progressively at all times. It does not mean that they are immune to spontaneous influences which issue from internal social contradictions, and which often impel these Socialist forces to follow either the course of bureaucracy or that of conservative retention

of obsolete forms of Socialist development, or to follow in the wake of petty-bourgeois anarchism or pseudo-liberalism. In such cases, the leading Socialist forces lose their real leading role in certain sectors, leaving things at the mercy of spontaneous forces or reactionary influences, and thus occasioning transitory or even lasting errors, stagnations and distortions.

Failures and political disturbances are always the first consequence of such errors and distortions. Yet at the same time, they stimulate the quest for more progressive, democratic forms and relationships in a Socialist society.

Contradictions and antagonisms of this type, are the most conspicuous characteristics of the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism and they find expression in the whole of the structure of society. In the Socialist society of the transition period, they may resolve themselves in the course of the process of gradual evolution and steady progress of Socialist relations. Sometimes, however, the difficult objective conditions under which Socialism is being built up in one or another country, or distortions resulting from subjective mistakes committed by leading Socialist forces, or else, obsolete forms of the system itself, may, in certain cases and under given conditions, provoke convulsions or even more serious social and political disturbances. But these transitory crises in the final analysis, only provide an incentive for a more powerful and rapid advance of Socialism, for a more powerful and rapid development of Socialist consciousness. They press for the elimination of all that is outmoded, and encourage a renewed vigor in the leadership of the most progressive Socialist forces. . . .

(Excerpts from Chapter II)

THE MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE

The possibility of a peaceful transition to Socialism, in no sense means that the working class should renounce revolutionary means of struggle for the achievement of Socialism when the sharpness of internal contradictions and other factors call for such revolutionary means, that is, when the policy of the reactionary ruling circles makes them imperative. If the labor movement were to succumb to

such opportunistic views and practices, it would be renouncing not only its own social role, but also all the victories which Socialist revolutions have scored so far, victories which have, in fact, made it possible for the labor movement to use parliamentary and similar methods of struggle more successfully today in its efforts to win a leading role in society. As a revolutionary class, the working class will no doubt also use its revolutionary striking power in the future to break the shackles of capitalism, imperialism and any other oppression, especially when and if reactionary ruling circles should, by resort to violence, attempt to arrest the unrelenting march of history and bar the march of the working class and progressive forces to power. However, it is obvious that Marxists cannot allow any one particular form or method of struggle to turn into a principle and dogma which would prevent the application of those forms of political action that, at a given time and place, are in keeping with the concrete conditions of struggle, of life and of the concepts of the working class and progressive social forces in general.

The development of the struggle for Socialism so far, though brief, is rich and instructive, and shows that the roads leading to power and to Socialism differ. It shows, moreover, that these roads not only differ from one country to another, but also from one period to another, in accordance with the general balance of social forces in the world, with concrete material and general social conditions, historical background and political traditions in each individual country and also according to the strength of the concrete economic and social position and concepts achieved by the working class.

Yet, the struggle for Socialism in any one country cannot be waged in isolation, divorced from the development of international Socialism. The experience gained by the Socialist forces in one country becomes the experience of Socialist forces in all countries. The successes of Socialism in the world generally strengthen the Socialist forces in each individual country and make their own successes easier.

In brief, the basic characteristic of social developments in the world, the basic characteristic of the contemporary struggle for Socialism, is the relative interdependence and mutual aid of all the existing forms of struggle and efforts of the working class and Socialist forces to promote Socialist relationships and emancipate them from manifestations of bureaucracy.

CERTAIN EXPERIENCES OF SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

The existence of Socialist countries and, especially, the further advance of social relationships in those countries exercises a marked influence upon the movement of society as a whole and upon the further development of international relations in the direction of the equality of peoples and their mutual peace-loving assistance, as well as in the direction of further progress and consolidation of world Socialism.

With the experience of Socialist development gained so far, the theory and practice of Socialism as a whole have acquired firmer foundations: more possibilities for drawing conclusions and more elements which make it possible to channel the development of society and to curb anarchy.³²

It is primarily in that respect that the entire course of Socialist development in the Soviet Union, with its successes and its victories—which are also the successes and victories of international Socialism—as well as with its difficulties and shortcomings, represents a most valuable experience for international Socialism.

In the period between the world wars, the Soviet Union was the first and only country in which Socialist forces had come to power and in which Socialist relations were being developed. For that reason the revolutionary working class movement in other countries and the liberation movements in the colonies looked to the Soviet Union as a model for their actions. By virtue of its very existence, the Soviet Union, in the period between the two world wars, was the main stronghold of all the Socialist and progressive movements in the world. The revolutionary labor movement of Yugoslavia, too, received powerful inspiration from the October Revolution and from Socialist construction in the Soviet Union.

The building of Socialist relations in the Soviet Union was carried out under extremely complex conditions involving major difficulties and obstacles.

Productive forces were at a very low level of development and had, in addition, been devastated in the wars. General backwardness

³² In the final draft this paragraph ends:

“...more possibilities for drawing conclusions and more facility for directing the Socialist movement and curbing anarchy.”

was prevalent in a considerable part of this vast country. The Soviet Union, which was only just beginning to establish itself, was the target of the combined efforts of reactionary and imperialistic bourgeois circles in their struggle against Socialism, at a time when imperialism was at the peak of its power.

It was impossible to promote Socialist relations upon the narrow material basis which Socialism had inherited from Tsarist Russia. It became necessary to build up the material basis of the new society at an accelerated pace, especially to build heavy industries, the indispensable industrial base. The international position of the Soviet Union, the intrigues and the actions undertaken by reactionary bourgeois circles against the first country of Socialism, rendered the situation even more acute and imposed the well known course of development.

Under such circumstances, social development in the Soviet Union could follow no other course but that of putting all efforts into the construction of the material foundation needed for the new society and, moreover, of building with its own resources.

That was the only way to prevent the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. This general situation called for all-out efforts and for great renunciations on the part of the whole of the working class and of all the working people of the Soviet Union.

Through utmost endeavors, sacrifices and renunciations by the Soviet working people, the Soviet Union accomplished important results in that direction in the period between the two wars. A strong industrial base was created, capable not only of safeguarding the achievements of the Socialist revolution but also of securing the further development of Socialist relations. Thereby a firm material and political basis and a stronghold for the development of international Socialism was also established. These successes were revealed in the creation of a numerically strong modern working class, intelligentsia, etc., all of which radically altered the internal socio-economic structure of Soviet society and the subjective conditions for the further development of productive forces.

The successes it had achieved provided the basis upon which the Soviet Union, in alliance with the other powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, was able to defeat the bloc of Fascist powers in the course of the Second World War, this being of decisive significance for the further progressive development of contemporary mankind.

In view of the prevailing situation, social development called for an enhanced organizational role of the leading forces of society, of the Communist Party and Soviet state, first in the sphere of economic life and then in the whole of the life of society. This led to a great concentration of power in the state apparatus.

However, manifestations of bureaucratic-statist tendencies, errors and distortions in the development of the political system of the state, as well as a sharper and more convulsive manifestation of many contradictions typical of the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism, started to attend this concentration of power in the state apparatus.

In the long run, this course of activity resulted not only in strengthening of the power of the state, but also led more and more to the rule of one man. The outcome of this was the "personality cult" along with attempts to justify it theoretically and ideologically.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet working people, in the period of Stalin's leadership, succeeded in preserving the achievements of the October Revolution, in consolidating them through successful industrialization and by raising the general cultural and technical level of the country, and in maintaining and developing the Soviet Union as a support to all Socialist and progressive movements, opposing the persistent pressure of the forces of capitalism and imperialism. Stalin, however, for both objective and subjective reasons, did not oppose the bureaucratic-statist tendencies generated by the great concentration of power in the state apparatus, by the merging of the Party and state apparatus, by unilateral centralism. On the contrary, he himself became their political and ideological protagonist.

It was along these lines that a pragmatic revision of certain of the fundamental scientific postulates of Marxism and Leninism was carried out, first in the sphere of the theory of the state and Party, and then also in the sphere of philosophy, political economy, and the social sciences generally. The Marxist-Leninist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the state—as an instrument of the working class struggle in the process of the abolition of the economic foundations of capitalism and the creation of political and material conditions for the free development of new Socialist relations—gradually withering away, was changed into Stalin's theory of the state which does not wither away but keeps growing stronger in all fields of social life. Under that theory an exaggerated role in the

construction of Socialism is attributed to the state apparatus, a role which sooner or later must begin fettering the development of social and economic factors.

After the Second World War, manifestations of this type started to make their appearance in the international sphere as well, i.e., in certain elements of Soviet foreign policy and in the relations between Socialist countries. This was particularly evident in Stalin's anti-Yugoslav action, in which hegemonic aims were obviously placed above the genuine interests of Socialism.³³

In resisting such pressure and fighting for the independence of their country, the Yugoslav Communists and the people of Yugoslavia were not only fighting for their right to pursue free Socialist development, but were also offering their contribution to the indispensable struggle against statist-bureaucratic and hegemonic distortions in the development of Socialism and in the relations between the peoples who had embarked upon the road of Socialism.³⁴ Hence, their resistance was consistently Socialist and progressive and by virtue of that contributed to the progress of Socialism in the world generally.

All these and other negative phenomena and errors, with which the world is familiar, inflicted harm—particularly because some of them were transferred and repeated in certain other Socialist countries—both upon international Socialism and upon Socialist construction in the Soviet Union, especially after the Second War. However, they were not able to distort the development of Socialism in the Soviet Union more seriously, or hamper it more lastingly, because the Socialist forces in that first country of Socialism had grown and become so strong that they were able to break through the barriers of bureaucracy and of the personality cult. It was precisely as a result of this that certain distortions which had been generated under the influence of these negative tendencies began to be eliminated gradually in the Soviet Union, shortly after Stalin's death and

³³ In the final draft this sentence reads:

This was particularly evident in Stalin's anti-Yugoslav campaign, an action unanimously condemned at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as obviously contrary to the real interests of Socialism.

³⁴ In the final draft, the term "hegemonic distortions," used in this sentence, was replaced by "other anti-Socialist distortions."

after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The high level of development of the productive forces in the Soviet Union, the prevailing social influence of the working class and the fact that a numerous intelligentsia closely bound up with the Socialist system exists, together make possible the further successful development of that process whereby fresh incentive is given to the advance of Socialism.

Development to date and the results accomplished so far give Socialist forces the strength to fight with greater consciousness, with more persistence and breadth, for the further promotion of Socialist relations and for the elimination, frustration or isolation of the sources of various distortions of Socialist development. The theory and practice which tend to preserve certain of the transitional forms of Socialist construction and deprive the working class and the whole nation of perspectives, must be criticized, broken and discarded. The leading political forces of the Socialist countries and Socialism generally are being increasingly faced with the need for solving those problems which involve the most vital interests of the working people. These problems are: forms and methods of management of economic and other social functions, democratization and gradual restriction of administrative-centralized management, the constant extension of the participation of the direct producers in the management of the means of production and of the economy generally, the steady expansion of the area of social self-government both horizontally and vertically, the further promotion of the Socialist system of distribution in conformity with the Socialist principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work," steadier improvement of the living standard, the further development of the forms and methods of Socialist democracy in all spheres of social life, the strengthening and further promotion of democratic rights and of the democratic social obligations of every citizen, and other similar questions. All Socialist countries cannot proceed in the same way and at the same rate in settling these and similar problems relating to the development of Socialist relations. The course they will follow, the methods they will use and the rate at which they will proceed depend on the concrete conditions of each individual country, on the relationship of class forces, on the level of economic pre-conditions for Socialism, on the political structure, traditions and social consciousness of the population.

But the unity of these problems as such, make them the common task of international Socialism, and particularly of the Communist Parties and of Socialist forces generally, whether they are in power or whether they have a vital influence upon social developments. To resolve the contradictions of the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism means, in the first place, to solve these problems and thus to secure the uninterrupted development of all aspects of Socialist construction. In following this course even Communists may err, but these errors are not difficult to rectify for they are the errors inherent to every advance. It is incomparably more difficult to rectify those errors which issue from stagnation and conservative attachment to the forms which have outlived their day.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT, ON DOGMATISM AND REVISIONISM

The advance of Socialism does not depend only upon the determination of the labor movement to fight for the development of Socialist relations in practice.³⁵ It also depends upon the subjective abilities of the leading political forces. For this reason constant progress and enrichment of Socialist scientific thought constitute inseparable components of the struggle for Socialism and for its construction.

In that struggle the labor movement has achieved important results indeed, relying upon the great scientific theories and revelations contained in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. However, under the influence of various social factors, Marxist thought in the course of the last few decades has not kept in step with the advance of contemporary society and its subsequent development has not always proceeded consistently from the basic scientific postulates and results of Marxism, these very postulates being frequently subjected to pragmatic revision. As a result of this, many contemporary social problems have not been fully explained from a scientific Marxist point of view nor have the laws and contradictions of the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism been

³⁵ In the final draft, this sentence reads:

The advance of Socialism does not depend only upon the objective conditions of social development and the determination of the labor movement to fight for the development of Socialist relations in practice.

sufficiently illuminated, thereby leaving gaps in the interpretation of contemporary social phenomena. The logic of the further development of Socialism categorically demands that these gaps be eliminated and that scientific Socialist thought be emancipated from the pragmatic pressure of those social factors which retard its development. Only thus will Marxist thought be able to turn to a scientific explanation of the principal social problems of contemporary mankind, to explain the laws of movement of Socialist society in the period of transition, and thus, to pave the way to Socialist practice more successfully than before.

Two social factors, and consequently two ideological trends in the labor movement, have acted as a primary fetter upon Socialist theoretical thought, and led to a revision of certain of the basic scientific postulates of Marxism-Leninism.

The first is the phenomenon of bureaucracy and statism. Closely related to this phenomenon is the striving to achieve ideological monopoly, which, in turn, breeds the attempt to turn Marxist thought—which like any other scientific discovery can keep its vitality and revolutionary character only by being further developed and constantly enriched—into a static body of rigid dogmas and abstract truths, adjusted to meet certain temporary needs. Therein lies the source of contemporary dogmatism and of the attempts to carry out specific statist-pragmatic revisions of definite scientific postulates of Marxism and Leninism. And it is that very dogmatism which, while helping to carry out a profound anti-scientific revision of Marxism and Leninism, proclaims as revisionism every genuine effort toward a real furtherance of Marxist thought in contemporary social conditions.

That the development of Marxist thought lagged behind the development of events was also due to the fact that Stalin had, for several decades within the orbit of the Communist movement, authoritatively and incontrovertibly passed judgment on all contemporary social processes. Some of Stalin's appraisals have proved to be correct, but a number of his theoretical conceptions have been refuted by practice. In his theoretical analyses Stalin made deviations from the materialist dialectical method toward subjectivism and metaphysics. However, irrespective of the character of certain of his theories, it is clear that such an ideological monopoly unavoidably effected the further dogmatization of Marxism and Leninism.

Dogmatism in the Communist movement was followed closely by pseudo-revolutionary sectarianism, by loss of faith in the strength of the working class, by underestimation of, or failure to comprehend the results of Socialist development to date. This situation made it impossible fully to perceive the influence which Socialist revolutions and the results of Socialist experience exercise upon social development in the capitalist countries and upon the policy of the upper ruling circles, which has altered the conditions of the struggle for Socialism to a great extent. Certain Communist Parties were slow to grasp these facts, which further impeded the timely discovery of adequate forms of struggle and weakened the Parties' ties with the people.

The second factor, which, on occasion, had an even more negative effect upon the development of Socialist thought than the first, is the influence of bourgeois ideologies, opportunism, and reformism, *declassé* anarchism and so forth. These influences upon the labor movement give rise to attempts at revising the basic scientific postulates of Socialism, that is, of Marxism and Leninism, along the lines of bourgeois-liberalism and reformism. Revisionism of that type is, in fact, the ideological expression of the abandonment of Socialist positions. It reveals a propensity to re-establish one or another form of bourgeois society. It attacks the revolutionary ideological foundations of the labor movement and, under the cloak of liberal phrases, sacrifices the interests of the working class and Socialism to the interests of reactionary social forces.

In the Communist movement, revisionism of this type thrives on vacillations in the face of difficulties, on disorientations caused by the subjective weaknesses of the movement or by distortions in the construction of Socialism. In Socialist countries, revisionism takes the form of a reactionary obstruction of Socialist development, is a factor in the deformation of the Socialist state in the direction of a bourgeois political system, and tends toward a destructive and anarchistic undermining of the political basis of Socialist society. That kind of revisionism is also one of the sources of bureaucracy because, by abetting reactionary ideologies and the vestiges of the bourgeoisie, and by actually becoming a stronghold of the anti-Socialist forces, this type of revisionism fetters the development of Socialist relations, sharpens internal contradictions and fortifies the role of both the state and state bureaucracy.

If they wish to remain the leading force of the most progressive

and conscious Socialist actions, Communists must be capable of fighting both of these two negative influences upon the development of Socialist thought and Socialist construction. Persistent ideological struggle on two fronts, against the one and the other form of revision of the scientific foundations of Socialism which Marx, Engels and Lenin have provided, and which the entire experience of Socialism so far has confirmed, is one of the essential conditions for the advance of Socialism in the period of transition.

At the same time, Communists must fight all attempts at exploiting or perverting the justified struggle against these two types of revisionism to the advantage either of conservative views and the preservation of obsolete forms of Socialist development or of the maintenance of bourgeois democratic illusions, which thwart the effort to develop the scientific basis of Marxism-Leninism, to provide a scientific, Marxist explanation of the new phenomena which are characteristic of the contemporary world and in keeping with which Communists must determine their practical tasks. . . .

COMMUNIST AND OTHER REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES OF THE WORKING CLASS

The Communist and other revolutionary parties of the working class have played an immense role in the development of Socialism to date. Communists, under the leadership of the great figure of Lenin, were the vanguard of the October Revolution and opened a new epoch in the history of mankind. Communists were the only force capable of leading and channelling the revolutionary energies and aspirations of the vast masses of people in Yugoslavia and China and organizing them for struggle and victory.³⁶ Communists initiated and carried out the revolutionary expropriation of the ruling classes in the many countries of people's democracy. They were as a rule the revolutionary nucleus or the decisive ally of many anti-imperialist movements and uprisings. They were the most militant nucleus of the anti-Fascist movement and the anti-Hitlerite war. In short, Communists were the vanguard in all the events of the last few decades which have given new substance to the whole history of mankind and turned it in a new direction. Rallying the most revolutionary parts of the working people, educating them in the spirit of class consciousness and helping them to understand and grasp the historical role of the working class, the Communist Parties in their day-to-day

³⁶ The final draft names "Yugoslavia, China, and other countries."

struggle, guided by the revolutionary science of Marx, Engels and Lenin, were the active leading force of the revolutionary processes which developed after the October Revolution.

This great historical role can no longer be taken away from the Communists, nor can it be belittled by any slanders on the part of the enemies of Socialism, or by vilifications on the part of opportunists, philistine and petty-bourgeois phrase-mongers; no more can they be deprived of it by the errors they might commit themselves, serious though these errors might be. Had the Communists not played this role, the world would not be what it is today, nor what it will inevitably be tomorrow.

In all these developments, the Communists represented and organized vital revolutionary Socialist activities which the broad sections of the working peoples could grasp, which they had been looking for and which they were prepared to support. That is why they were victorious. And they will be able to win in the future only under such conditions.

However, these victories were also accompanied by certain negative phenomena in the international Communist movement, such as bureaucracy, dogmatism, opportunism cloaked under leftist phrases, sectarianism, an exaggerated feeling of strength, attempts at ideological and political monopoly, etc. As a result of these negative phenomena, certain Communist Parties did not sufficiently realize that the conditions of working class struggle had altered considerably. They failed to perceive the consequences attendant upon the contemporary relations of social forces in the world and were therefore not always capable of laying down their tasks in conformity with actual development. This led to sectarian seclusion and even to the isolation of certain Communist Parties, especially in those countries where objective conditions were unfavorable to the development of the revolutionary labor movement. This isolation, in turn, made certain parts of the Communist government inclined to await the results of international development passively, thus bringing some of the Communist Parties to the brink of ceasing to act as the revolutionary creative factor and motive power of social development in their respective countries.

This isolation also frequently gives rise to a helpless attitude in the face of an opportunistic and reformist mood of a part of the working class. In that respect also the policy of passively awaiting an external event sometimes prevails, in the hope that such an event

will revolutionize the working class. In day to day activity, this takes the form of sectarian revolutionary slogans which conceal an inability to lead actions and in fact reveal futile stagnation.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia considers that success in struggle always requires every Marxist party to be capable of organizing or supporting the struggle of the working class for precisely those political and economic objectives which the working people can understand and fight for in a given situation. Only through such struggle can Communists be linked with the working people and, on the basis of their own experiences, make them capable of further struggles to achieve higher aims. However, many of the demands for which the working class is prepared to fight, or for which it is already fighting, are not given sufficient attention or are regarded in a dogmatic light.

Communist Parties can only establish themselves as the most progressive factor and, consequently, as the leading Socialist factor, if they perceive the Socialist process in its entirety—with all the diversity of its protagonists and of its tendencies—and if they realize that it is inevitable for different factors to find expression in different conditions. This will, to the greatest extent, decide what place they will be able to find for themselves in this overall Socialist process, and to what extent they will be able to act as the motive force of conscious Socialist action. The conception that Communist Parties have a monopoly over every aspect of the movement of society towards Socialism, and that Socialism can only find its representatives in them and move forward through them, is theoretically wrong and practically very harmful.

The fact that certain Communist Parties are today in the process of emancipating themselves from dogma and sectarian isolation, that they are undergoing a regeneration on the basis of a recognition of past experiences and that they are seeking their own path towards Socialism, indicates the need to keep in step with the time, and with current tasks. . . .

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

The Yugoslav Communists do not question forms of cooperation between Communist Parties, or between those Parties and other Socialist and progressive movements, but they question the substance of this cooperation. They are in favor of both bilateral and multi-

lateral cooperation, provided it is always based on full equality, provided neither side attempts to impose its opinions and provided there is no interference in the internal affairs of the Parties involved. Furthermore, this cooperation must be conducive to the interests of peace, of Socialism and of social progress generally. Moreover, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia considers that both bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation are essential elements in bringing unity into the activities of Socialist forces and the *progressive* efforts of mankind. However, if the Yugoslav Communists, under present conditions, attribute primary significance to various forms of bilateral cooperation, that is because the earlier forms of multilateral cooperation between the workers' parties—except those that were suited to specific historical period and hence had a positive aspect—produced negative phenomena which inflicted considerable harm upon the struggle for Socialism and peace and which the labor movement must overcome if it does not wish the democratic principles of Socialist internationalism to be sullied once again.

IDEOLOGICAL MONOPOLY AND POLITICAL HEGEMONY

Most notable among these phenomena are tendencies toward ideological monopoly and political hegemony.³⁷ Tendencies toward ideological monopoly are always an obstacle to the development of Socialist thought and are always a source of dogmatism and opportunist-revisionist reaction. Hegemony, or the striving for an unconditional leading role in the labor movement, had many negative consequences at a time when not a single working class party was in power.³⁸ This hegemony can inflict even greater damage once working class parties have come to power.³⁹ The task of the labor move-

³⁷ In the final draft, the phrase "and political hegemony" was deleted from both the title and first sentence of this section.

³⁸ In the final draft this sentence was revised:

These tendencies gave rise to striving for unconditional leadership in the labor movement, which led to many negative consequences at a time when not a single working class party was in power.

³⁹ In the final draft this sentence was revised:

Tendencies toward ideological monopoly can inflict even greater damage once working class parties have come to power.

ment—and especially of the Communists of the larger, more powerful and more responsible Socialist countries—is to fight for relationships of equality both in theory and in practice. In doing so they should start from the principle that the validity and progressive nature of a given ideology or of given forms of Socialist construction can be measured only in terms of the vitality they are able to demonstrate in life and in the tests to which practice subjects them, and not in terms of the approval they might or might not receive from one international body or another. Any aspect of hegemony which hampers free Socialist development in the Socialist countries also acts as a fetter upon the development of international Socialism generally.⁴⁰ Therefore, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia considers that only those forms of international cooperation which relate to the common practical problems of peace, of the struggle for Socialism and the construction of Socialism, are expedient at present.

The interest of further Socialist development demands free, Socialist, democratic relations between the Parties of the Socialist countries. In the struggle for the victory of Socialism, the working class of one or another country may, for a certain period of time, be the standard-bearer of that struggle, may be its vanguard, or may dispose of greater material power; but that does not entitle it to a monopoly position in the labor movement. . . .

Another characteristic of contemporary development is the advent to power of a number of Communist Parties. As a result of this the question of relations between Communist Parties is raised in yet another, historically new, aspect.

The Communist Parties in power are not responsible for their work to their membership only, but to the entire nation as well. This fact must also find adequate expression in the character of their mutual relations. Communist Parties in power, in their mutual relations, cannot make decisions which belong to electoral bodies, elected by all the citizens. In their international relations, the Communist Parties have often failed to take this into account, whereby the significance and role of these representative bodies was narrowed down.

To proclaim the paths and the forms of Socialist development in any single country as being solely correct is nothing but dogma

⁴⁰ In the final draft the word "hegemony" in this sentence was replaced by "ideological monopoly."

which obstructs the process of the Socialist transformation of the world. The general aims of Socialism are common to all, but the rate and forms of progress of society towards these aims are and must be different, and in keeping with the concrete conditions of different countries and different parts of the world. Accordingly, freedom of internal Socialist development and the absence of any attempt to have specific forms imposed upon others. non-interference in the internal life and internal development of other movements, as well as free and equal exchange of experiences and Socialist theoretical thought, should be the highest goal of the mutual relations between Socialist countries and Socialist movements.

Attempts at branding views on the diversity of Socialist processes as "new" ideological phenomena, as a birth of "national Communism," have no connection whatever with the scientific explanation of contemporary Socialist development. Such theories can only be conceived in the minds of dogmatists, or are deliberately circulated by the representatives of the bourgeoisie with the purpose of creating disorientation and ideological confusion in the labor movement. These attempts should not prevent discovery and elaboration of specific trends nor should they thwart the primary orientation of the working class toward the problems and conditions of its own country.

ON PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

While stressing that it is indispensable for Communists to fight for Socialism and for the construction of Socialism in keeping with the conditions of their respective countries, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia fosters the idea of proletarian internationalism in its ranks and educates the working people of Yugoslavia in this spirit. Proletarian internationalism, throughout its development so far, has always been concrete. This principle includes: first, persistent efforts by the labor movement to develop a consistent struggle for Socialism and for the daily needs of the working people in its own country, to use all forms of work and struggle in order to increase its influence and prepare to take over power, and, after assuming power, to undertake the construction of Socialism in accordance with the interests of the working people throughout the world and the interests of peace and of the general progress of mankind; and second, it includes support of that same struggle in all other countries,

that is, solidarity with the labor movement and the Socialist forces of the whole world in their struggle for the achievement of their immediate economic and political demands, for peace and for Socialism.

During the October Revolution and afterward, when the Soviet Union was still the only Socialist country, the protection of the Soviet Union as the main stronghold of international Socialism was one of the principal measures of proletarian internationalism. Today that criterion is broader. Proletarian internationalism requires proper relationships, support of and solidarity with every Socialist country and every Socialist movement which is genuinely fighting for Socialism, for peace and the achievement of peaceful coexistence between peoples.

The idea of proletarian internationalism also includes the obligation to make steadfast efforts toward the rapprochement of peoples, toward the ever greater unity of the world, toward the abolition of national and racial prejudices and of all forms of inequality, chauvinism and hegemony, toward the strengthening of the independence and equality of peoples, toward mutual peace-loving assistance and comprehensive cooperation between all peoples generally; and for us in Yugoslavia particularly, steadfast efforts toward the constant strengthening of the brotherhood and unity of our peoples, as well as their equality and unimpeded material and cultural development.⁴¹

The great idea of Socialist proletarian internationalism will be the guiding principle of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in all its relations with other Communist, Socialist, progressive and anti-imperialist movements, as well as in all its international relations generally. . . .

⁴¹ In the final draft, this paragraph was revised:

The idea of proletarian internationalism also demands of Communists that they fight staunchly for peace; that they denounce and combat all imperialist action; that they work relentlessly for the mutual acquaintance and knowledge of peoples and their rapprochement; that they struggle for the abolition of national and racial prejudices and of all forms of inequality, chauvinism and hegemony peculiar to the capitalist system; that they fight for the strengthening of the independence and equality of peoples, and for mutual peaceful aid and all-round cooperation among all nations. In our own case, the idea of proletarian internationalism demands of Communists, in addition, special work for the constant strengthening of brotherhood and unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia, for their equality and unimpeded material and cultural progress.

"Under certain conditions, proletarian internationalism demands the subordination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a world-wide scale."

15. KOMMUNIST (MOSCOW) ARTICLE ON THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT PROGRAM, PUBLISHED IN ISSUJ No. 6, 1958; RELEASED APRIL 19, 1958.

Moscow's criticism of the Yugoslav Draft Program appeared in a lengthy article in Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the CPSU. Its argument centered largely on a rebuttal of four major points of the Draft Program. Briefly, Soviet position was that:

- (a) the Yugoslav program is a departure from "the theory of Marxism-Leninism . . . and the practice of the world's Communist movement" and,*
- (b) the Yugoslav allegations are factually incorrect in at least three respects:*
 - (i) the Soviet Party does not attempt to exercise hegemony over anyone;*
 - (ii) the Soviet Union does not and never has exploited anyone;*
 - (iii) the Yugoslav contention that the present state of world tension can be attributed to the existence of "two camps" (i.e., NATO and Warsaw Pact powers) is false, as only NATO represents a threat to world peace.*

Two aspects of the Kommunist article are noteworthy. First, it is evident how much importance the Soviet Party attached to the Yugoslav program. Second, the tone of the article is essentially friendly, although the criticism raised is of a fundamental and very serious nature.

Obviously, the CPSU, while determined to "correct" Yugoslav errors, did not wish to precipitate a break of 1948 proportions.

The Draft Program of the League of Communists, drawn up by the commission of the Central Committee of the League and submitted for consideration of the Seventh Congress which will open on April 22, was published in Yugoslavia in March and is now being discussed. According to the Yugoslav press, in the course of the discussion the Communists of Yugoslavia are voicing numerous comments and suggestions with the aim of helping in the final drafting of the program. Consideration and adoption of a program is a big event in the life of every Communist Party. It is an internal matter for the Party, but naturally it arouses the interest of Communists in other countries as well.

The Draft Program of the League of Communists attracts attention for the additional reason that the questions posed in it extend far beyond the scope of internal Yugoslav problems. This is clearly stated in the introductory part of the draft. The program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia represents an analysis of present-day contradictions in the world and determines the views and stand of Yugoslav Communists regarding general problems concerning social, economic and political relations in the world. The program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia expresses opinions based on principles concerning certain of the most important problems of the contemporary international labor movement and the development of Socialism in the whole world.

A look at the Draft Program of the League of Communists reveals that it includes a number of general principles of Marxism-Leninism and contains quite a few correct generalizations.

But, at the same time, it unfortunately contains many theses that are clearly in contradiction with the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and with the theory and practice of the world Communist movement. This especially refers to such questions as that of a contemporary international development of the two world systems, of the experience of Socialist construction in various countries, the USSR in the first place, of the Socialist state, of proletarian internationalism and relations between Socialist countries and between Communist Parties, and of the conception of modern revisionism and dogmatism.

The fact cannot be overlooked that the appraisal of the present international situation, of the development of the world Socialist system, and of the international labor and Communist movement contained in the Draft Program, in a number of important points is contrary to the appraisal of the declaration and Peace Manifesto adopted by the meeting of representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in November, 1957. The authors of the Draft Program note that at the present stage of the struggle for Socialism, certain differences of opinion exist in some theoretical and practical problems. So the matter is not one of particular problems of principle regarding the theory and practice of Socialism, on which a special conception is put forward in the Draft Program of the League of Communists.

At this moment, when the Draft Program of the League of Communists is being discussed in Yugoslavia, we would like to put forward some comradely comment on a number of questions of principle, in the hope that they will be favorably received and considered by the authors of the draft.

A prominent place in the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is devoted to the question of modern capitalism and the transition to Socialism. The central idea here is that parallel with revolutionary Socialist changes, an evolutionary process of the transformation of capitalism into Socialism is taking place. The attempt to prove that Socialist society may also emerge in an evolutionary manner has entailed a stream of antiscientific, non-Marxist, non-Leninist reasoning regarding the phenomena and processes characteristic of modern capitalism.

In the Draft Program, correct theses concerning monopolistic capitalism are interspersed with incorrect ones, especially in those parts where the subject is the state monopolistic capitalism prevalent today in developed capitalist countries. In this document, prominence is given to political factors in the development of state monopolistic capitalism, to the detriment of an analysis of the internal economic laws inherent in capitalism. While correctly noting the increased role of the bourgeois state in capitalist economy, the authors of the draft, at the same time, present a wrong picture of relations between monopolistic capital and the state.

The state, the Draft Program says, exercises more and more control over capital, partially limiting the right of private manage-

ment of capitalist property and depriving the owners of private capital of certain independent functions in economy and society. . . .

The idea that state interference narrows the basis of the economic might of monopolistic capital has nothing in common with the actual state of affairs in capitalist society. Has the nationalization of individual enterprises or individual industries in Britain, Italy or France narrowed the basis of the economic might of monopolistic capital as a whole? Not in the least. . . .

Do control and adjustment effected by a capitalist state limit the rights of capitalists to earn and dispose of their property? Do they lessen the degree of exploitation of hired labor? Of course not. It is sufficient to pose the Leninist question: Who controls whom? That is, which class controls and which is controlled? It becomes apparent that control and adjustment by a bourgeois state are carried out in the interests of the monopolies against the working class. The growth of state monopolistic capitalism means the further strengthening of monopolies, the further concentration of economic and political power in their hands, and the use of the state by monopolies in their own mercenary interest to the detriment of the interests of the working people.

How far the authors of the Draft Program deviate from Leninism may be seen from their following contention: Insofar as individual economic functions are shifting over more and more from private capital to the state and the rights of private capital are also being limited in other ways, the pressure of new elements in the economy, Socialist in their objective tendencies, is coming to bear more and more on the capitalist mode of production.

To the authors of the Draft Program, the state becomes a super, class organization opposed to both antagonistic classes of capitalist society—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. . . .

But can any more or less substantial facts be cited regarding the bourgeois state coming out against the interests of the bourgeois class, against monopolistic capital? No, they cannot. The bourgeois state may come out, and does come out, against the small and middle capitalists to the benefit of the big ones. It may limit this or that individual stock holding company, but it always and invariably acts in the general interests of the bourgeoisie and in the interests of monopolistic capital. . . .

Under present conditions, when the world system of Socialism is scoring enormous success that inspires popular masses in capitalist

countries, the monopolistic bourgeoisie is forced to certain concessions of a social-economic nature. But this does not in the least mean that the bourgeois state is above classes and acts allegedly in the capacity of an unbiased adjuster in the field of labor and property relations, as contended in the Draft Program of the League of Communists.

Neither does real life bear out the thesis stated in the draft that, allegedly, the greater equilibrium achieved in the political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class for influence and position in the system of state capitalism, the more independent become the functions of bureaucracy. Undoubtedly, in a number of capitalist countries, the strength of the proletariat has grown, but the state machinery continues to remain in the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie and carries out its will. The thesis of the independence of the state in the conditions of contemporary capitalism obliterates the class essence of the bourgeois state and distracts the attention of the proletariat from the historic task of the revolutionary conquest of power. . . .

State monopolistic ownership does not resolve the conflict between the productive forces and production relations, but merely contains the possibility of its being resolved. The nationalization itself of separate industries in capitalist society, important as it may be, cannot lead directly to Socialism.

This is borne out by facts. Thus, for example, the Labor government in Britain did not lead the country to Socialism through its nationalization of certain industries. For Socialism to come it is necessary that the working class establish its political rule, take into its own hands the basic means of production, and effect a Socialist reorganization of society. Socialism exists only in those countries where this has happened. Marxists and Leninists have always maintained that state capitalism does not transcend into Socialism of its own accord but only by means of its Socialist revolution. State monopolistic capitalism merely enhances the material requisites for the emergence of Socialism.

Together with correct theses, the Draft Program of the League of Communists contains many that contradict them and lead to the conclusion that it is possible to arrive at Socialism through a mere increased accumulation of Socialist features, elements, tendencies in capitalism, that is, through the spontaneous growth of Socialism within the system of capitalism. For instance, noting that the transi-

tion to Socialism may be effected only through the conscious political activities of the working class, the authors immediately reduce these activities merely to the struggle for the leading role in the government machinery, that is in the existing bourgeois government. They speak of the penetration of Socialist tendencies into the system of state capitalism. They say that the specific forms of state capitalist relations may represent either the last efforts of capitalism for its preservation or the first step toward Socialism, or they may be both at the same time, and so forth.

One cannot agree to such a posing of the question of the transition from capitalism to Socialism. Marxism-Leninism believes that, as Lenin wrote, capitalism itself creates its own gravedigger, itself creates the elements of the new system and, at the same time, without a jump, these individual elements change nothing in the general manner of things. They do not affect the rule of capital. The authors of the Draft Program consider that the extent of development of the so-called economic democracy depends on the successful struggle for the nationalization of industry, for the participation of workers in management of nationalized and private production. However, the participation of workers in management of capitalist production in itself, isolated from mass political struggle, is not of a revolutionary Socialist nature. Isolated from mass political struggle, such a slogan is nothing else but an appeal for the integration of workers' organizations into the capitalist system, an appeal to reject revolutionary struggle. . . .

Although the Draft Program of the League of Communists makes mention of the contribution of the Communist and Workers' Parties, it says practically nothing of the growth of the international Communist movement at the present stage of the consolidation and cohesion of its ranks. The center of gravity is shifted to unsupported criticism of the shortcomings in the work of the Communist Parties. It seems that the qualities inherent in these Parties are bureaucracy, dogmatism, opportunism, marked by sectarianism, an exaggerated idea of their power, ideological and political monopolism, and so forth.

Need it be stated that such assertions are in discord with facts and have nothing in common with principled comradely criticism—possible among fraternal Communist Parties—the object of which is the enhancement of their ideological and political unity? The world Communist movement is on the great upsurge. The meeting of

representatives of fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow last autumn demonstrated with exceptional force the unity, cohesion, and enormous successes of this movement.

A serious drawback in the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists in describing international relations is that it ignores such a world historic fact as the division of the world into two systems, the Socialist and capitalist. True, the document contains such words as Socialist world, but these imply not the world system of Socialism that usually exists, but something very vague. The draft points out that Yugoslavia is a Socialist country and a component part of the Socialist world, that is, the Socialist and progressive forces of contemporary mankind. The draft does not show with sufficient clarity the main contradiction and struggle between the growing and strengthening world system of Socialism enjoying the support of the working class of the capitalist countries and the popular masses of the underdeveloped countries on the one hand, and the dying capitalist system still holding rather strong positions on the other. The draft deals in effect not with the existence of the two world systems, but with two military, political blocs. Though the draft does note that the League of Communists differentiates between the social, economic and political essence and the role of the existing blocs, yet when a concrete analysis of the reasons for international tension is made, the differences between the two blocs are not indicated.

It is generally known that the problem of war is rooted in the very essence of imperialism. Nevertheless, the authors of the draft see the main reason of international tension not in the aggressive policy of the imperialist states, but in the existence of two military political blocs.

This obviously contradicts the Marxist-Leninist thesis concerning the reasons for international tension. In the Peace Manifesto it is said: "Where does the threat to peace and the security of the peoples come from? The capitalist monopolies who have a vested interest in war, who dream of war, and who have amassed unprecedented riches from the two world wars and the current arms race." The manifesto further said: "Under the pressure of the capitalist monopolies, and especially those of the United States, the ruling circles of some capitalist countries are rejecting proposals for disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and other measures aimed at preventing a new war." At the same time the Peace Manifes-

to points out: "In all Socialist countries there are no longer classes or social groups interested in war. Power in these countries is in the hands of the workers' and peasants, who in all wars have been the greatest sufferers. Is it possible that they could desire another war? The aim of the Communists is to build a society that will insure universal well-being, prosperity for all peoples, and eternal peace among nations. The Socialist countries need a lasting peace to build such a society."

Thus the Peace Manifesto, which incidentally was drawn up and adopted with the participation of the representative of the League of Yugoslav Communists, establishes that the danger to the cause of peace emanates from the capitalist monopolies and that neither the Communist Parties nor the Socialist countries have any motives for unleashing war or launching an armed attack against other Countries. But the Draft Program of the League of Communists sees the existence of blocs as the source of the war menace, thus putting the peaceful policy of the Socialist countries on a level with the aggressive policy of the ruling circles of the imperialist states. . . .

On becoming acquainted with the draft one gets the impression that its criticism is objectively spearheaded against the Socialist countries and Workers' Parties. Under the banner of criticizing blocs, it actually criticizes the unity of the Communist Parties and the Socialist camp. It is common knowledge that it is the imperialists and only the imperialists who are conducting the positions of strength policy; yet the authors of the Draft Program ascribe this policy to the Socialist states as well. "The impossibility of a longer and firmer stabilization in international relations," write the authors of the draft, "results primarily from the fact that the aggravated state of present contradictions still dictates a policy which treats international relations exclusively from the positions of strength of this or that great power or bloc."

All the accusations which the peace-loving peoples justly advance against the imperialist policy of the ruling circles of Western powers, the Draft Program also ascribes without any grounds to the Socialist countries, using the handy word "hegemonism" both for the policy of the imperialist and the Socialist states. Can it be said, for instance, that the USSR is conducting a foreign policy which can be classified as a policy of force? Of course not. The policy of force is a policy of preparation for a world war, when a power wants to establish its domination over the world and impose its

dictates on other countries, when it endeavors to exploit the world and get super profits for the monopolists. The USSR is conducting a peaceful foreign policy. It has no aggressive or predatory aims. The USSR has no economic motives for seizing foreign territories and plundering other nations. The policy of force grows inevitably from the outlook of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, which holds that force can delay or even annul the operation of objective laws of historical development. This is the creed of a dying way. The USSR bases its policy on Marxism-Leninism, which is alien to the bourgeois idealists' theory of force and which proceeds from objective historical laws stipulating that a dying social system be replaced by another more advanced one.

Objections and resolute protests are evoked by the absolutely groundless deliberations in the Draft Program as to the so-called divisions into spheres of influence and spheres of interest in which the world's first Socialist power allegedly participates. The draft states: "The method of division of spheres of interest and other similar political forms appeared as far back as the conferences of heads of Allied States in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and continued in the postwar period." In another part of the draft it is said: "The policy of spheres of interest has poisoned and continues to poison international relations. The peoples of Germany, Korea and Vietnam live in states having two different social systems. They are split by artificial borders and represent smoldering hotbeds of open hostilities."

It is common knowledge that the USSR was not endeavoring to obtain for itself spheres of interest and spheres of influence in Teheran, in Yalta, or in Potsdam. At these conferences the USSR struggled for the national independence and state sovereignty of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe, never for spheres of its own influence. This was one of the conditions which enabled the peoples of a number of countries liberated from the yoke of Fascism to choose the Socialist path of development.

As far the partition of Germany, Korea and Vietnam is concerned, the blame for this falls on the imperialists, who object to the peaceful unification of each of these countries. It is known from official documents that on these questions, for instance on the German question, there was no difference in the positions of the USSR and Yugoslavia. May it be recalled that the joint statement of the government of the USSR and the Federal

People's Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with the visit of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, to the USSR reads in part: "Both governments hold that at present, when on the territory of postwar Germany two sovereign states have been formed, it is necessary for the unification of the country to have negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. They also hold that the other states, and first of all the great powers, should act in the same direction in both the interests of the German people and common interests."

The authors of the Draft Program here again reproach both sides concerning the arms race, the policy of balance of power by means of armaments and utilization of nuclear energy, though it is generally known that the Socialist camp bears no responsibility for the arms race. The countries which comprise this camp do everything in their power to stop the arms race, but it goes without saying that the Socialist countries take all the necessary measures to ensure their own security. This circumstance is also of great significance for ensuring the security of states which are not in the Socialist camp.

A striking feature is that the draft's attacks against the foreign policy of the USSR and other Socialist countries are in contradiction to what was stated by Josip Tito, President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in Belgrade on June 28, 1956, when the Yugoslav government delegation returned from Moscow. "The part of the declaration which is devoted to international problems," he said then, "shows that we have identical views on many major problems concerning the strengthening of peace and international cooperation, concerning the relations between states and peoples, and concerning the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems." Comrade Tito spoke very convincingly of the fact that the peoples of the USSR prize peace more than anything else and that these aspirations of the people are shared by top Soviet leaders. One cannot regard the new interpretation of international relations given in the Draft Program of the League of Communists as being correct, for it places the foreign policy of the Socialist camp on the same level with that of the imperialist camp. . . .

Touching upon the experience of Socialist development in the USSR and other Socialist countries, the authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists acknowledge that this is a valuable experience for international Socialism. The draft stresses the historic

role of the USSR as the first Socialist country, which showed other countries an example of progressive development of society. The draft speaks of the great achievements of the USSR in setting up an industrial base and in the further development of Socialist relations—factors which made it possible for the USSR, in alliance with the other countries of the anti-Fascist bloc, to win a victory in World War II over the Nazi bloc.

Dwelling on the achievements in the field of industrialization, the authors of the draft completely ignore the USSR's experience in what is, as far as the dictatorship of the proletariat is concerned, one of the major and most complicated problems of construction of Socialism: the problem of transferring millions of peasants, individual holders, private and petty estates, onto the Socialist path of development. Does this problem not confront all countries which have embarked upon the path of building Socialism? If anyone undertakes to summarize the experience of Socialist construction, how can one ignore the great experience of development of the collective farm system in the USSR?

It must be said that on the whole, the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists gives a one-sided description of the historic path covered by the USSR. The draft does not give due consideration to the experience of Socialist construction in the CPR and other people's democracies. It is common knowledge that the experience of the USSR and other Socialist countries has fully confirmed the teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory stating that the processes of Socialist revolution and Socialist construction are based on a number of major laws inherent in all countries embarking upon the path of Socialism.

Unfortunately, the Draft Program does not devote any space to the general laws of development of Socialism. On the contrary, it concentrates its main attention on the drawbacks and mistakes which the USSR had in the past. These are represented by the authors of the program as some sort of bureaucratic state tendency.

The implication here is that there is a tendency to turn the state apparatus into a master of society. Under the guise of criticizing alleged attempts at theoretically and ideologically justifying the personality cult, the authors of the draft are accusing Soviet Communists of revising the major points of Marxism-Leninism, primarily in the field of theory of state and law. They write: "The Marxist-Leninist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat as a state which withers

away, and as a means of struggle of the working class for destroying the economic foundations of capitalism and setting up political and material conditions for a free development of new Socialist relations in society, was turned into Stalin's theory of a state which does not wither away, and which should be made ever stronger in all spheres of social life, and to whose apparatus too much importance is attached in the construction of Socialism, an attitude which sooner or later is bound to obstruct the development of Socialist economic and social factors."

One can quite definitely say that all these assertions distort the process of development of social life and theoretical thought in the USSR. It is wrong to say that Stalin maintained that the state does not die away and that it should be continually strengthened in all spheres of life. Stalin's viewpoints on the questions of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat were in conformity with Marxism-Leninism. Stalin, as is proper for a Marxist, regarded the Socialist state in development. He never held that the forms of the Socialist state should remain unchanged and that all its initial functions should be retained in the future. . . .

On the question of the state, as on a number of other questions, the authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists clearly display their inconsistency. The draft correctly states that it is necessary to fight against the tendency of anarchic underrating of the state, that the state is one of the most important and necessary levers for destroying the economic basis of the capitalist system, and creating the basis for building Socialism. It should be noted, however, that recognition of the important role of the Socialist state and warning against anarchic underrating of state power, look more like a reservation, since the thesis of the dying away of the state is given prominence as an immediate and primary task of the present moment. Declaring the necessity of the state up to the advent of Communism as "state pragmatic revision of Marxism," the authors of the draft state: "Accordingly, after the consolidation of the power of the working class and working people in general, the question of the gradual dying away of the state emerges as the main and decisive question of the Socialist social system." Since the authors of the draft fling the charge of revisionism of Marxist-Leninist theory at the state, it is necessary to set forth the ideas of the foundation of scientific Communism on the question of the state, of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The cornerstone of Marxism-Leninism is the recognition of the State right up to the transition of victorious Socialism into complete Communism was necessary for the final withering away of the state. Of late, revisionist elements in a number of countries have expounded, under the flag of criticism of Stalinism, their wrong, false representation of the attitude of Lenin and Leninism toward the dictatorship of the proletarian dictatorship. However, it is known that it was Lenin who extensively elaborated the teaching on class struggle in the transition period from capitalism to Socialism, the teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Historical experience has confirmed the Leninist thesis that in the transition period from capitalism to Socialism, class struggle does not end, but acquires a new form. It is known that the forms of resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes are varied. They include conspiracy, sabotage, anti-Socialist propaganda and slander, coercion of the petty-bourgeoisie, and finally, armed struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat. This resistance comes from both the remnants of the exploiting classes inside the country, and from capitalist and landlord *émigrés* and the forces of international reaction. . . .

In posing the problem of the withering away of the state, the authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists fail to take into account the experience of the development of all the Socialist countries, and the nature of the present international situation. They underestimate the danger of imperialist aggression against the Socialist countries, and also the class contradictions in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism. The draft enumerates a host of contradictions of social development in the transition period but does not give prominence to the main one: the growing forces of Socialism and the obsolete forces of capitalism. . . .

Incidentally, the authors of the draft are wrong when they say that administrative centralist leadership is a contradiction organically inherent in the transition period and in Socialism in general. As is known, administration in Socialist society is based on the principle of democratic centralism which at various stages, depending on the concrete conditions, takes different organizational forms. Distortions of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism are not in any way organically inherent Socialist contradictions. Dialectics teaches us that one must not confuse basic contradictions in phenomena with contradictions that are not basic. If confusion of this kind is made in politics it may undermine the unity of the working people, the

alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and thus do a service to the enemies of Socialism. The experience of history shows that the withering away of the state cannot be posed as a practical problem in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism when exploiting classes and the small property element still exist. Even after the exploiting classes have been done away with the state still remains, although the function of suppressing the exploiters has already ceased. In his *The State and Revolution*, Lenin said: "The essence of Marxist doctrine of the state is assimilated only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a single class is necessary, not only for class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but for the entire historical period between capitalism and classless society—Communism."

Why can't the state wither away immediately after the destruction of the exploiting classes? First, the state is needed to defend the country against intrigues and military attacks by the imperialists, who do not weaken, but increase their undermining activity against the Socialist countries. The Socialist state stands for peaceful co-existence of and competition between the two opposed social and political systems, but aggressive and imperialist circles don't give up their intentions of forcibly restoring the bourgeois landlord system in the Socialist countries, their intentions of abolishing the Socialist order. The Socialist countries would find themselves unarmed in the face of international imperialism if they were to follow a policy of curtailing and doing away with such a major function of the state as defense of the country.

Second, under Socialism too there still remains a distinction between the friendly classes of workers and peasants; substantial distinctions between mental and physical labor have not yet been overcome, an abundance of articles of consumption has not yet been attained and distribution is carried out in conformity with the work performed. From this follows the need for scrupulous control by society, by the state, over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption. "The state," Lenin wrote, "will be able to wither away completely when society can apply the rule: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs; that is when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social life and when their labor is so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their ability."

Third, national distinctions remain for a long time after the victory of the Socialist revolution. Far from withering away, national sovereignty is really assured and strengthened. But it is clear to everybody that national sovereignty is connected with the question of state frontiers. In considering the destinies of states, one must not abstract oneself from the question of defending their frontiers. Leninism teaches us that victorious Socialism, carrying out all-round democratization, cannot reject democratic demarcation of the frontiers of states. If the state does not exist, neither does the question of its frontiers. "Moreover, there will be no republic either," Lenin said, "when the state withers away." The authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists speak about the consolidation of state independence and at the same time proclaim the withering away of the state as a practical task. To be consistent they would also have to pose the question of the withering away of state frontiers, but has the question of the withering away of state frontiers already matured in any Socialist country? . . .

The authors of the Draft Program apparently fail to take notice of the question of the fundamental prerequisite for the withering away of the state. Proceeding evidently from the fact that some functions of the state are already withering away, they approach the matter from the purely quantitative point of view, assuming that a quantitative reduction in state functions means complete withering away of the state. But it is not correct to confuse the alteration and disappearance of separate functions of the state with the withering away of the state entirely as a definitive social and political phenomenon. The Socialist state has not at all outlived itself so that the task of its earliest withering away could be presented. The Socialist state is a vast arena for the development of Socialist democracy. It cannot be thought that complete withering away of the state can be accelerated by any administrative measure, by decrees.

Complete withering away of the state, as has already been noted, is a matter of the complete disappearance of classes and class distinctions, a matter of further rapprochement and merger of nations. Politics is the relationship between classes, between nations. It is these relations that are the sphere of the state organization. State institutions may be renamed, their functions may be transferred to public organizations, but this does not stop either the institutions or the functions from being political in essence. Social functions lose their political nature and turn into purely administrative functions of

observance of the social interests only under true Communism, that is, together with disappearance of classes; together with the elimination of the substantial distinction between mental and physical labor; together with the further rapprochement and merger of nations. . . .

Reading the Draft Program of the League of Communists, one gets the impression that its authors proceeded from an incorrect idea that the state and democracy are incompatible under Socialism. They evidently believe that the development of Socialist democracy is impossible unless the state is abolished and withers away. But that point of view does not correspond to the views of Marxist-Leninism or to the course of social development. One cannot oppose Socialist democracy to the Socialist state and assume that the development of democracy is possible only at the expense of the weakening and withering away of state power. The classics of Marxism-Leninism did not oppose Socialist democracy to the dictatorship of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, held that the dictatorship of the proletariat is precisely the highest form of democracy. It is not by accident that two concepts—to raise the proletariat to the position of a ruling class, and to win the battle of democracy—stand side by side in the manifesto of the Communist Party. This presentation of the question very aptly described the relations between the state and democracy in the period of transition from capitalism to Communism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an ordinary state, not a machine for the suppression of the majority by the minority, as was the case under the dictatorship of the exploiting classes. The classics of Marxism-Leninism said more than once that the dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer a state in the proper meaning of the word, for here the power belongs to the majority of the society, to all the working people. The founders of Marxism saw one of the most important features of the working class state to lie in that it would be a truly democratic state. Emphasizing the inseparable bond of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the popular masses, Marx wrote that this is the transfer of power to the popular masses themselves, which in place of the organized force of their oppression, create their own force. . . .

In the Draft Program, democracy and the battle against bureaucracy are linked up with the withering away of the state. But, of course, it is incorrect to think that the overcoming of bureaucracy and the development of democracy are conceivable only

when the state withers away. Lenin was implacable in combating bureaucracy and worked resolutely to root out that evil, but he cautioned against speculating on the struggle with bureaucracy. When during the discussion of the trade unions, certain leaders advanced the slogan: Let us put an end to the bureaucracy of the state and the bureaucracy of the national economy, he said that it was demagoguery. "We wrote in our program in 1919 that bureaucracy exists in our country," Lenin said. "Any one who proposes to you to put an end to bureaucracy is a demagogue. If speakers come out before you and say: Let us put an end to bureaucracy, that is nonsense. We will fight bureaucracy for long years, and anyone who thinks otherwise is acting like a charlatan and demagogue because hundreds of measures are needed to get the better of bureaucracy; total literacy is needed, total culture, total participation in the workers' and peasants' inspection." . . .

The role of the ideas of proletarian internationalism has grown enormously in connection with the deep and rapid changes that have occurred in the world in the last decade. The Marxist-Leninist Parties are devoting great attention to consolidating the international solidarity of the working people and to combining correctly the national and international programs. The Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia devotes a good deal of attention to the consideration of these questions. It says that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is developing the idea of proletarian internationalism in its ranks, that it is educating the Yugoslav working masses in this spirit. The draft contains a number of incontestable propositions.

However, the characteristic of the essence of proletarian internationalism in relations among the Socialist countries given in the draft, as well as the aims and objectives the effectuation of which according to the authors the Communist Parties must strive for in their mutual relations between the Socialist states, is one-sided and in contradiction with the views as published in the world Communist movement. Lenin wrote: "There is one and only one kind of internationalism in deed: Working wholeheartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own country and supporting by propaganda, sympathy and material aid, such and only such a struggle and such a line in every country without exception."

What concrete expression does proletarian internationalism

assume today, when there is a world Socialist system, when the international workers' and Communists movement has grown and has become consolidated, when the national liberation movement of the peoples has acquired a tremendous scope? It finds its expression in the support of the world system of Socialism, in the support of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the other Socialist countries, by the workers' movement in the capitalist world, and in the support of this movement by the working people of the Socialist countries in the unity and consolidation of the Communist Parties of all countries, and in solidarity with the peoples fighting for their national independence and against imperialism. The new developments in the theory and practice of the proletarian internationalism of our time show that while it retains all the significance of the principle of the international workers' movement, it constitutes at the same time the basis for the relations among the countries that have broken the fetters of capitalism and are building a Socialist society. These countries have established equal political, economic and cultural relations, imbued them with comradeship and mutual aid, in exchanges of experience in production, science and engineering. . . .

The essence of the difference between the point of view of the authors of the draft and the point of view recognized in the international Communist and workers' movement is not in whether or not the principles of equality must be strictly observed. The essence of the difference lies in the fact that in the draft of the program proletarian internationalism is reduced exclusively to the principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and that the necessity for strengthening the unity and cooperation of the Socialist countries and the Marxist-Leninist Parties is buried in oblivion.

The demand for recognition of the equality of nations is also characteristic of petty-bourgeois nationalism. This nationalism, as Lenin pointed out, declares as internationalism only the recognition of the equality of nations, and purely verbal at that, while it retains national egoism untouched. Lenin explained that when the dictatorship of the proletariat is established in several countries and becomes capable of exerting a decisive influence on the world's politics, the struggle against the deep-rooted petty-bourgeois nationalist prejudices will assume a particularly sharp and burning character. Under certain conditions, proletarian internationalism demands the sub-

ordination of the interest of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a worldwide scale.

Meanwhile, the draft of the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia speaks only about the facts that the relations between the Socialist countries must be based on principles of independence, complete equality and respect for the peculiarities of each individual country. The struggle for the affirmation of these principles in the relations between Socialist countries and proletarian Parties is put forward essentially as the only problem of internationalism, as the supreme aim in relations between the Socialist countries and Socialist movement.

A well-founded question arises: Can the principles of equality and non-interference express the entire essence of relations between the Socialist countries? No, they cannot. The countries in which power is in the hands of the working people, and whose fates are closely interconnected by the community of their social and state systems, interests and aims, build their relations with a strict observance of the principles of equality on the basis of fraternal mutual aid, support and cooperation. Each of them strives to extend all possible aid and support to the fraternal countries in the building of a Socialist society and, at the same time, relies on their help and support. In this, the principle of equality is not violated. Socialist mutual aid essentially excludes the possibility of an advantageous position of some countries at the expense of others. On the contrary, it contributes to the common development, to the fullest possible unfolding of the material and spiritual forces for each people forming part of the Socialist community, and to the consolidation of the power of this community as a whole.

The authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia are trying to back up their one-sided understanding of proletarian internationalism by reference to a presumable violation of Socialist principles in the relations between the Socialist countries. "In practice," they write, "it has turned out that, either because of strong international political positions or because of the different degrees of economic development, it is possible that one Socialist country maintains by various means its unequal relations with another or several other Socialist countries."

There are no grounds for such an assertion. It is disproved precisely by the practice of the relations between the Socialist countries, the practice to which the authors of the Draft Program

refer. This practice testifies to the fact that under Socialism, because of its very nature, cooperation between the peoples does not lead to a violation of equality and independence. The Socialist countries are truly sovereign and independent. . . .

However, referring to the past mistakes and shortcomings in relations between Socialist countries, the authors of the Draft Program represent the entire experience of these relations essentially negatively, ignoring what is basic and decisive in them, the internationalist nature, the fraternal mutual aid and cooperation. The terms "ideological monopolism" and "political hegemonism" used in the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia are essentially directed against the general principles, the general laws, governing Socialist revolution and Socialist construction and, consequently, against the ideological and political unity of the international Communist movement. The program commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, by the entire content of its draft tries to disprove the practice-confirmed Marxist-Leninist premise pertaining to the general laws governing the development of all countries toward Socialism, with each country deciding the concrete problems of Socialist transformation by taking into account its own historical and national peculiarities.

From the point of view expressed in the draft, each country must move toward Socialism in its own special way and proceed entirely from its own specific conditions paying no attention to that which is common for, and characteristic of, all the countries building Socialism.

The draft actually defends national Communism which, as is well known, lays emphasis on the special national features in the building of Socialism, and rejects that which is most important and universally significant that has been revealed by the experience of all Socialist countries. The criticism of the ideas of national Communism is declared in this document to be a result of dogmatic or chauvinistic egoistic conceptions or a result of ideological influences or intrigues of the bourgeoisie.

On the basic problems of Socialist revolution and construction of Socialism there is a collective Marxist-Leninist point of view expressed in the declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist countries and shared by the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries. The authors of the Draft Program of the League

of Communists of Yugoslavia are making vain attempts to oppose their far-fetched conception to this point of view which generalizes the entire experience of modern social development. Who is striving for ideological monopolism then? If the fraternal Parties adhere to a single ideology, the question of ideological monopolism of any one of them falls away.

Does the ideological unity of Marxist-Leninist Parties belittle the independence of each of them? No, it does not belittle it to the slightest degree. The ideological unity and mutual support of fraternal Parties serve as the most important condition for each of them fulfilling their national and international tasks, their duty to the working class, to the people. That Party which would decide to take a stand on ideological positions differing from those of the world Communist movement runs the risk of faltering from the true course, of separating itself from this movement, of isolating itself.

In the published declaration of the meeting of representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist countries, emphatic stress is laid on the importance of strengthening the unity of Marxist-Leninist Parties which bear an especially serious historic responsibility for the fate of the world Socialist system and international Communist movement. There is no doubt whatever, the declaration states, that to bring about real solidarity of the working class, of all working people and the whole of progressive mankind, of the freedom-loving and peace-loving forces of the world, it is necessary above all to promote the unity of the Communist and Workers' Parties, to strengthen the solidarity among the Communist and Workers' Parties of all countries. It is the main guarantee of the victory of the cause of the working class. And further, the Communist and Workers' Parties represented at the meeting declared that they will tirelessly strengthen their unity and comradely cooperation with a view to further consolidating the commonwealth of Socialist states and in the interests of the international working class movement and of peace and Socialism. . . .

As to the deliberations of the authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the so-called hegemonism in the labor movement, it is also necessary to note the following: Marxism-Leninism does not refute the possibility of one or another Communist Party of a Socialist country playing the leading role during a definite historic period. But what Party, what country, heads the international working class movement? This

depends not on someone's subjective desires, but on the objective conditions. This is determined concretely by the location of the center of the world revolutionary movement where the urgent problems of the revolutionary transformation of society are in the first place being solved.

Thus in the middle of the nineteenth century, the center of the revolutionary movement was in Germany and at that time the leading role was played by German social democracy. And the leaders of the German working class, Marx and Engels, were the leaders of the world proletariat, the founders of scientific Communism.

By the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the center of the world revolution shifted to Russia and hence the very course of historic development advanced to the fore of the international labor movement, the Russian working class, our Communist Party. Its founder and leader, Lenin, was the generally recognized leader of the proletariat of the entire world, the continuator of the teaching and the cause of Marx and Engels. The participants in the meeting of representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist countries which was held in November 1957 noted in the adopted declaration that the invincible camp of Socialist states is headed by the Soviet Union. The historically-formed leading role of the Soviet Union in the struggle for the cause of social progress, for the freedom of the peoples and peace, is reflected in these words.

The Soviet Union is the first country of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat; it is the country which blazed the trail to Socialism and which at present is solving the task of completing the building of a Socialist society and the gradual transition to Communism. Every objective person cannot but see that the USSR sustains the main blows of international imperialism, which are directed against all the countries of Socialism.

Let us recall the first postwar years. At that time imperialist powers exerted monstrous pressure on the young, not yet consolidated people's democracies, and attempted to interfere in their internal affairs in order to support the exploiting classes and to suppress the will of the peoples for a new Socialist life. Only thanks to the might of the Soviet Union and its decisive rebuffs to the aggressive policy of imperialism, thanks to the close alliance of all countries which fell away from the capitalist system, were the historic gains of the

peoples of these countries protected and peaceful conditions for their creative work insured.

In autumn of 1956, the Soviet Union, at the request of the Hungarian government, rendered fraternal aid to the people of this country in routing the counterrevolutionary revolt raised by the Horthyite agents of imperialism. To call the disinterested aid of the Soviet Union to other countries in consolidating their independence, in strengthening and developing the gains of Socialism, "hegemonism," means to break with proletarian internationalism. The fulfilment of the role of the leading force of the camp of Socialism, the vanguard of the entire world revolutionary movement, has nothing in common with "hegemonism." . . .

The Draft Program of the League of Communists does not point out that Socialism has created a new type of international relations which is of world historic significance. Moreover, the authors of the draft actually concealed this fact by ascribing to Socialism certain features of the relations between countries that develop under the rule of the exploiting classes.

The theoretical reasoning of the authors of the draft on the possibility of certain Socialist countries exploiting other Socialist countries sounds strange and monstrous.

While stating that under capitalism the stronger countries strive toward hegemony, toward domination over other nations and toward world domination, exploit and oppress the weak countries, the authors of the draft write: "Analogous tendencies represent a constant danger in the early phases of Socialist development; that is, as long as the deep differences in the economic development of individual countries create fundamental differences in the position of the working people in each of them, and the possibility for one or another nation, or one or another state, due to its position of hegemony attained for one reason or another, to utilize this or that form of economic exploitation of another country—as long as such possibilities exist, both the desire and attempt to utilize such possibilities will exist."

Is it not clear that the statements made by the authors of the Draft Program of the League of Communists on the exploitation tendencies in the relations between Socialist countries fundamentally contradict the truth of life and are absolutely arbitrary? All these claims are based on the proposition made by them that there allegedly exists uneven development of Socialism, which is contradictory to objective reality. In the given case, the authors of the draft confuse

the laws of the development of imperialism with the laws of the development of Socialism. Under imperialism, as is known, the law of the uneven economic and political development of the capitalist countries operates. . . .

Socialist revolutions by overthrowing capitalism, by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and nationalizing the decisive means of production, destroy the basis for the operation of the law of the uneven economic and political development of countries. Contrary to the law of the uneven development of the capitalist countries under imperialism, the law of the proportionate, even development of countries operates in the world Socialist system. As the economic might of the Socialist countries increases and the position of Socialism becomes consolidated in the world arena, this proportionality acquires greater significance.

Characteristic of Socialism is the fact that due to fraternal mutual aid and cooperation, the countries of the world Socialist system that are relatively backward economically and culturally, quickly overtake the advanced countries and general progress is observed. The stronger the unity of the Socialist countries, the broader and more perfected their cooperation, the more successfully this progressive process proceeds. Under Socialist construction, the actual economic and cultural inequality of nations inherited from the past is actively overcome, and the development of nations and countries is straightened out. . . .

If, however, a foreign policy line is taken which is, as a matter of fact, set down in the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it may lead to the disunity of the Socialist countries, to a weakening of the friendship and solidarity between them, which undoubtedly is fraught with great danger to the independence of the Socialist countries and to the cause of Socialism as a whole. The more consistently the principles of proletarian internationalism are implemented, the more determined is the struggle against chauvinism and nationalism, and the firmer the unity of the Socialist countries, the Communist and Workers' Parties. . . .

This article has touched on certain essential problems dealt with in the Draft Program of the League of Communists. An analysis of the theses contained in the draft permits one to draw the conclusion that the authors of this document, after declaring their desire to promote the enrichment of the all-human, all-Socialist treasure-house, introduced many ideas alien to Marxism-Leninism. At the same

time the authors of the Draft Program have the boldness to assert that Marxist thought in the past decades has lagged behind the development of modern society.

In our days it is strange to hear of the lagging of Marxist-Leninist thought, when it has grasped the minds of millions of people, when almost one-third of humanity is building Socialist society under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, when Socialism has attained such world historic victories, when Socialist construction is advancing not gropingly, but brightly lit-up by the light of Marxist-Leninist ideas that become enriched in the process of this construction. What convincing evidence of the powerful development of Marxist-Leninist thought is the elaboration of the fundamental problem of modern social development contained in the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China, and other Marxist-Leninist Parties. Theoretical generalizations of great significance were presented by the conferences of representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in the autumn of 1957.

Bourgeois propaganda has grabbed up and is utilizing for its own ends the theses contained in the Draft Program which are contradictory to the ideological basis of Communism. It is showering the authors of the draft with praises, and commends the draft for presenting a broad theoretical argumentation that fundamentally differs from the Moscow line, for repeating the ideological views that caused the sharp conflict with the Kremlin in the autumn of 1956. But it has long been known that, by attacking the Moscow line and the Kremlin, bourgeois propaganda has in mind the line of the entire international Communist movement. Bourgeois propaganda, which always miscalculates in its hopes of weakening the international Communist movement, is sure to be wrong this time as well.

The Draft Program of the League of Communists, in generalized form, reflects the differences revealed in the past between the Yugoslav comrades and the international Communist movement. The draft shows that on many important problems these differences still exist. As is known, the CPSU and other fraternal Parties have done much in recent years to bring themselves and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia closer together on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the interest of the cause of peace and Socialism. At the same time, the CPSU has always proceeded from

the point that this cannot be done by means of concessions at the expense of Marxist-Leninist principles. Now when the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia contain obvious divergencies from the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory on a number of important problems, it cannot remain unanswered, without principled comradely criticism. Obviously, comradely Party criticism must not be an obstacle to the further development of friendly relations between our Parties and countries.

The program commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is continuing to work toward improvement of the draft. We wholeheartedly wish the Yugoslav comrades success in this big matter. We permit ourselves to hope that the new draft will be completely based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and thus correspond to the interests of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the people of Yugoslavia, the interests of strengthening the unity of the fraternal Socialist countries, the Communist and Workers' Parties, the interests of peace, democracy and Socialism. All Communists would receive such a Draft Program with deep satisfaction.

"... it is evident that some highly responsible people in our neighborhood, instead of learning a lesson from the past, are beginning to whet the rusty old weapons of the Cominform again. . . ."

16. SPEECH BY VICE-PRESIDENT ALEXANDER RANKOVIC TO THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE YUGOSLAV LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS, LJUBLJANA, APRIL 23, 1958.

(Excerpts)

The Yugoslav Communists reacted strongly to Moscow's criticism of their Draft Program. The sharpest answer was given by Vice-President Rankovic in a speech in which he again told the Soviet Union that Yugoslavia did not

intend to tolerate any interference in its own affairs. He recalled Yugoslavia's firm resistance to Soviet pressure in 1948, and added that it would resist similar pressures just as firmly in 1958.

The tone of Rankovic's speech was belligerent, and voiced the assertion, made without any reference to ideological viewpoints, of Yugoslavia's unconditional right to decide her own policies, whether or not the Soviet Union, or anyone else, approved of them.

... The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was created in the difficult and grim national liberation war and the great revolution carried out by our peoples. Our entire internal development and our foreign policy have served the cause of independence and of the progress of our people in our Socialist community which we have created with such great enthusiasm and so many sacrifices.

The Communist Party, or rather the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, has in its glorious past always been governed by the interests of the working class and working people and has stood at the helm of the struggle to overcome the various, and often enormous, difficulties which obstructed our national and social development.

No attempt from abroad to destroy the just struggle for independence and Socialism by the Communists and people of Yugoslavia, or to turn them in another direction, could succeed.

We pursued this course faithfully in 1948, when we were asked to abandon it in the name of what were called "higher interests," and to renounce our independence and our Socialist development. Many very responsible and eminent leaders of the USSR and certain other East European countries, have in a number of cases expressed their admiration at the fact that in spite of powerful pressure from the Stalinists and the Cominform, we succeeded in maintaining and consolidating our independence and achieving further successes in the Socialist construction of our country, at the same time making a contribution to the development of Socialism in general.

Now, however, we are again hearing voices from various sides making thinly disguised allusions to the effect that we are "sitting on two seats," to "our bowing and scraping before the imperialists" in order to get some of their "tainted goods," and so on.

They say that only countries of the Socialist bloc do not bow before the imperialists and pursue an independent policy and a policy of peace, meaning that Yugoslavia, as a Socialist country which does not belong to the camp, is by this very fact bowing and scraping before the imperialists and is not pursuing an independent policy or a policy of peace.

How absurd that claim is! The entire struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia under the leadership of the League of Communists has been an anti-imperialistic one; Socialist Yugoslavia itself was created in that struggle, which was organized and led by the Yugoslav Communists. Neither the Communists nor the peoples of Yugoslavia who followed their lead sit on two chairs, nor did they sell out to Fascism or reconcile themselves to it; nor did they sell out to anyone in 1948, even when there was a rattling of arms on the Yugoslav frontiers.

On the contrary, they have always defended the barricades of the basic rights and interests of their country, of freedom, independence and Socialist development suited to Yugoslav conditions and to contemporary conditions in general, the barricades of the fundamental principles of free and equal cooperation and international solidarity among all the Socialist forces of the world.

It seems to me that it is in the interest of some people to forget unpleasant facts quickly. If we Yugoslav Communists had such flexible spines, we would have bent under the powerful pressure of the great propaganda machine turned against us from several countries in 1948. And not only propaganda! Despite this, our Party and peoples have neither repudiated nor sold out their revolutionary principles. On the contrary, we bore the blows from both sides, and justified the confidence of our people with honor and did our duty both to our people and to Socialism in general.

As far as our sitting on two chairs on the question of relations between states is concerned, Socialist Yugoslavia has shown that it has never followed such a policy, but that on the contrary it has always opposed it and will continue to do so.

If we have blundered in this respect, that does not give anyone the right to interfere in the internal affairs of our country, and to pin their hopes on alleged disunity in the League of Communists and among its leaders. The experience of the past shows that the

method of playing one people off against another cannot last long. We have behind us all those years when epithets were hurled at us from all sides, when guesses were made as to the degree of loyalty of this or that Communist.

A Communist can be faithful only to Marxist-Leninist teaching on Socialism, to the working class, and to his people. And this is unquestionably a sufficient guarantee of his orientation in his revolutionary work. That is why all propaganda moves to play the leaders of one country off against the leaders of another are senseless; they can only serve to provoke mutual suspicion and distrust which is not conducive to the creation of friendship and cooperation among nations and Communist and labor Parties.

Recently, however, we have again been hearing tales about the necessity for a struggle against the "revisionism" of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia." Some even consider this their main task.

Let us leave aside for the moment the existence of certain differences of views and attitudes on some matters of the theory and practice in Socialism. Our people normally ask what kind of a policy it is that does not take on as its chief task a concern for its own people, for Socialism in its own country, and for its proper development, but—availing itself of the occasion—adopts the settling of accounts with the Yugoslav Communists as its chief task, interfering in this fashion in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia?

It is widely known that the members of the League of Communists, the working people, and the people of our country have always been equal to their historical task both in armed struggle and in the peaceful construction of their Socialist community. They alone are entitled to make decisions on their internal development.

Unfortunately, it is evident that some highly responsible people in our neighborhood, instead of learning a lesson from the past, are beginning to whet the rusty old weapons of the Cominform again, and are openly reviving long discredited charges that the Yugoslav Communists have departed from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, that they serve the bourgeoisie, and so forth, while in fact initiating a policy of pressure against Yugoslavia, its Socialist institutions and organization. In this we see nothing but an absurd and barren attempt to isolate the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Least of all, on this occasion, did we wish to speak of manifestations which resemble the difficult past, and we did not expect to be forced to do so at such length at the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, as always, we still consider that we should on our part continue to make every effort to oppose the remnants of that negative past and should look with confidence to the future in the hope that others are fundamentally of the same opinion and that they have learned a lesson from everything that happened in the past.

We considered, and consider, as experience has shown thus far, that divergencies of an ideological nature need not affect the friendly development of interstate relations in general, and especially among countries which are building Socialism. Certain natural and necessary differences in the practice and views of the Parties of the Socialist countries need not be a cause for conflicts and for the impairment of relations among states and Communist Parties, but should be an incentive for still closer acquaintance and exchange of experiences. Only in this way, generally speaking, can a policy of cooperation among people be carried out. The policy of voluntary and equal cooperation among Communist Parties and friendship among Socialist countries in their joint efforts for lasting peace and progress in the world should serve as an example and incentive for this.

This is how we, Yugoslav Communists, view the relations which ought to exist between Socialist countries and workers' Parties. That is why we rightly ask ourselves what is the ultimate aim of presenting our practice and our attitudes on specific questions of the construction of Socialism and the international workers' movement in a wrong light? Who wants Yugoslavia to be isolated from the workers' movement of other countries, and why are falsehoods about the League of Communists and about some of its leaders disseminated through various channels? We must ponder over all this, for the sake of our country and our League of Communists. The problem affects not only us, the Yugoslavs, but the entire workers' movement. No one has the right, by their various maneuvers, to harm the movement in whose hands the fate of mankind lies. . . .

“ . . . We consider as basically correct the criticism made in June 1948 by the Information Bureau of Communist Parties . . . in regard to the mistake of the Yugoslav Communist Party in departing from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and sinking into bourgeois nationalism . . . ”

17. EDITORIAL, JENMIN JIHPAO (THE PEOPLE'S DAILY), PEIPING, MAY 5, 1958.

With the publication of this editorial the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute took a new turn. The Chinese attack on the Yugoslavs was by far the sharpest since the reconciliation after Stalin's death and harked back to the language and specific content of the 1948 dispute.

The Chinese Communist Party accused the Yugoslavs of being "revisionists," of slandering the international workers' movement, and in effect of supporting the United States against the Socialist bloc. This, of course, was tantamount to charging Tito with treason, as the Chinese were fully aware. They explicitly reaffirmed the Cominform's 1948 resolution which read Yugoslavia out of the international Communist movement.

The Chinese entry into the dispute was remarkable not in itself alone, but because Peiping took a far harsher line than Moscow had taken. This was a striking reversal of Peiping's earlier position when support was accorded to the Polish Communist Party in its dispute with Moscow during the earlier months of 1957. The Chinese statement on the Yugoslav position evidently found ready support in Moscow. It was promptly reprinted in Pravda, and helped to aggravate the new rift between Moscow and Belgrade very significantly.

Today is the one hundred and fortieth anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, founder of scientific Communism. Since 1844,

Marxism has been carrying on a persistent struggle against all trends of reactionary bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thought and against all kinds of opportunist ideas in the ranks of the international workers' movement. Marxism has continually emerged victorious in the struggle, for revolutionary practice has borne out its correctness. It was in the course of the struggle in the age of imperialism and the proletarian revolution that Lenin developed Marxism and carried it forward to a new stage, the stage of Leninism. Now the international workers' movement has placed before Marxism-Leninism the new sacred task; to carry out irreconcilable struggle against modern revisionism or neo-Bernsteinism. This is a struggle between the two fundamentally different lines of Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism, a great struggle involving the success or failure of the cause of the working class of the world and the cause of Socialism.

The recently closed Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has adopted a "Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," which is an anti-Marxist-Leninist, out-and-out revisionist program. To sum it up briefly, in method of thinking the Draft Program substitutes sophistry for revolutionary materialistic dialectics—politically, it substitutes the reactionary theory of the state standing above classes for the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state, and reactionary bourgeois nationalism for revolutionary proletarian internationalism. In political economy, it takes up the cudgels for monopoly capital and tries to obliterate the fundamental differences between the capitalist and Socialist systems. The Draft Program openly forsakes the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, sets itself against the declaration of the meeting of representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries held in Moscow last November, and at the same time repudiates the "Peace Manifesto" adopted by the meeting of representatives of sixty-four Communist and Workers' Parties, endorsed by the representatives of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself. The Draft Program brands all the basic principles of revolutionary theory established by Marx and Engels and developed by Lenin and other great Marxists as "dogmatism," and the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia style themselves "irreconcilable enemies of any dogmatism."

What are the most basic elements in the "dogmatism" which the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia have chosen

to attack? They are proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship. But it is common knowledge that without proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship there can be no Socialism. The Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia concentrates its opposition on proletarian revolution and its attack on proletarian dictatorship smears the Socialist state and the Socialist camp, and beatifies capitalism, the imperialist state and the imperialist camp. This cannot but give rise to doubt about the "Socialism" avowed by the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Speaking like the reactionaries of all countries and the Chinese bourgeois rightists, the leading group of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has viciously slandered proletarian dictatorship, alleging that it "leads to bureaucratism, the ideology of statism, separation of the leading political forces from the working masses, stagnation, the deformation of Socialist development, and the sharpening of internal differences and contradictions." They maliciously slander the Socialist camp, alleging that it also has a policy of "positions of strength and struggle for hegemony." They describe the two radically different world politico-economic systems, the Socialist camp and the imperialist camp, as a "division of the world into two antagonistic military-political blocs." They represent themselves as standing outside the "two blocs" of Socialism and imperialism, or in a position beyond the blocs. They hold that the US-dominated United Nations can "bring about greater and greater unification of the world," that economic cooperation of all countries of the world, including the imperialist countries, is "an integral part of the Socialist road to the development of world economy." They maintain that "the swelling flow of state-capitalist tendencies of the capitalist world is the most tangible proof that mankind is irrepressibly and by the most diverse roads deeply entering into the epoch of Socialism." These propositions cannot but call to mind the revisionist preachings about "evolutionary Socialism," "ultra-imperialism," "organized capitalism" and "the peaceful growth of capitalism into Socialism" made by right-wing Socialists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Bernstein, Kautsky, Hilferding and their ilk, which were intended to induce the working class in the various capitalist countries to give up revolutionary struggle for Socialism and uphold bourgeois rule. The present preachings of the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia also harbor a

wild attempt, namely to induce the working class and other working people of various countries to take the road of surrender to capitalism.

In his speech delivered at Pula in November 1956, Tito, leader of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, said: "What is actually involved is whether the new trend will triumph in the Communist Parties—the trend which really began in Yugoslavia" He also said: "It is a question whether this [Yugoslav] course will be victorious or whether the Stalinist course will prevail again. Yugoslavia must not concentrate on herself, she must work in all directions." These statements fully betray their true ambition.

It is by no means accidental that the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has appeared at the present time. Since the great October Socialist Revolution, the international Communist movement has achieved a series of great historic victories. The Socialist system has been successfully set up among a population of nineteen hundred million and more, and the general crisis of capitalism has greatly extended, with the imperialist countries, headed by the US, experiencing a new and profound periodic economic crisis. Therefore the imperialists, led by the US, are stepping up their sabotage of the international Communist movement. The bourgeoisie has been resorting to two methods to undermine the workers' movement—suppression by brute force and deceit. In the present new international situation, when the revisionist harangues of the right-wing Socialists are daily losing their paralyzing effect on the working class and the laboring masses, the program put forward by the Yugoslav revisionist fits in exactly with what the imperialists, and particularly the American imperialists, need.

In his speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Comrade Mao Tse-Tung said: "Revisionism, or rightist opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought which is even more dangerous than doctrinairism. The revisionists, or right opportunists, pay lip service to 'Marxism' and also attack 'doctrinairism,' but the real target of their attack is actually the most fundamental elements of Marxism." Now facts have proved that this thesis of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung answered not only to the situation in China, but also to the international situation.

The declaration of the meeting of representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist countries says: "The main danger at present is revisionism or, in other words, right-wing op-

portunism, which as a manifestation of bourgeois ideology paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands the preservation or restoration of capitalism." It points out with special emphasis: "Modern revisionism seeks to smear the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism, declares that it is 'outmoded' and alleges that it has lost its significance for social progress. The revisionists try to exorcise the revolutionary spirit of Marxism, to undermine faith in Socialism among the working class and the working people in general. They deny the historical necessity for a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat during the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism, deny the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, reject the principles of proletarian internationalism and call for rejection of the Leninist principles of Party organization and, above all, of democratic centralism, and for transforming the Communist Party from a militant revolutionary organization into some kind of debating society."

The declaration clearly portrays the features of modern revisionism which show themselves in the contents of the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

It is quite obvious that open and uncompromising criticism must be waged against the series of anti-Marxist-Leninist and out-and-out revisionist views assembled in the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. If theoretical criticism of the revisionism of Bernstein and Kautsky and their ilk by the Marxists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was inevitable, then it is even more necessary now for us to criticize neo-Bernsteinism. This is because modern revisionism is propounded as a comprehensive and systematic program by the leading group of a party that wields state power. It is also because modern revisionism is aimed at splitting the international Communist movement and undermining the solidarity of the Socialist countries, and is directly detrimental to the fundamental interests of the Yugoslav people.

We consider as basically correct the criticism made in June 1948 by the Information Bureau of Communist Parties in its resolution "Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" in regard to the mistake of the Yugoslav Communist Party in departing from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and sinking into bourgeois nationalism—but there were defects and mistakes in the method adopted at that time by the Information Bureau in dealing with this question.

The resolution concerning Yugoslavia adopted by the Information Bureau in November 1949 was incorrect and it was later withdrawn by the Communist and Workers' Parties which took part in the Information Bureau meeting. Since 1954, the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist camp have done their utmost and taken various measures to improve their relations with Yugoslavia. This has been fully correct and necessary. The Communist Parties of various countries have adopted an attitude of waiting patiently, hoping that the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia might return to the Marxist-Leninist standpoint in the interest of adherence by the Yugoslav people to the road of Socialism. However, the leading group of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has spurned the well-intentioned efforts made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communists of other countries. Around the time of the Hungarian event they tried to disrupt the unity of countries in the Socialist camp on the pretext of so-called "opposition to Stalinism." During the Hungarian event, they supported the renegade Nagy clique and, in their recent Congress they have gone further and put forward a systematic and comprehensive revisionist program. The leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia should think soberly: Will the League of Communists of Yugoslavia be able to maintain its solidarity with the Communist Parties of other countries by abandoning fundamental viewpoints? Can there be a basis for solidarity without a common Marxist-Leninist viewpoint? Will it be in the interests of the Yugoslav people to reject friendship with the countries in the Socialist camp and with the Communist Parties of other countries?

We deem it absolutely necessary to distinguish between right and wrong on vital questions in the international workers' movement. As Lenin said: "A policy based on principle is the only correct policy." The world is now at a new historic turning point with the east wind prevailing over the west wind. The struggle between the Marxist line and the revisionist line is nothing but a reflection of the sharpening struggle between the rising class forces and moribund class forces in society, a reflection of the sharpening struggle between the imperialist world and the Socialist world. It is impossible for any Marxist-Leninist to escape this struggle. Historical developments will testify ever more clearly to the great significance of this struggle for the international Communist movement.

“ . . . what is involved is a problem exactly ten years old and for Yugoslav Communists the price is as unacceptable today as it was ten years ago . . . ”

**18. KOMUNIST (BELGRADE) ARTICLE OF MAY 9, 1958 IN
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.**

On May 9, 1958 Belgrade gave its answer to the intemperate attack made by the Chinese Communist Party in Jenmin Jihpao some days earlier. The gist of Yugoslavia's reply was that it would not accept dictation from any source, that the tactics of the Chinese were just as unacceptable as those of the Cominform in 1948, and that they would prove equally unsuccessful. Belgrade's tone was anything but conciliatory. Komunist attacked Jenmin Jihpao's "filthy insinuations" and firmly repeated its traditional stand that: "Nobody has the right to prescribe what relations between Socialist countries should be" Komunist was so blunt as to remind the Chinese of the fate of those who signed the original Cominform resolution when it recalled that: "Out of seventeen who signed . . . twelve have finished ingloriously or tragically."

The quarrel was again becoming as bitter as it had been ten years earlier. Now, however, while the Yugoslavs were again trying to avert a break, they were much more self-confident and much less conciliatory than they had been in 1948. A comparison between the excerpts below and any of the letters and notes exchanged in 1948 indicates the extent to which Yugoslav self-assurance had grown during the intervening decade.

. . . The authors of the [Chinese] article, in the name of Socialist internationalism, proclaim a Socialist country as the No. 1 Enemy. . . .

They simply took the Cominform resolution of 1948 out of the archives, throwing themselves on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, using all kinds of epithets for various revisionist trends which appeared in definite historical conditions in different countries, and even making open insinuations about serving the imperialist. . . .

To all this was added a dosage, to put it mildly, of very insipid and quite superfluous warnings—superfluous because the League of Communists in Yugoslavia is steeled in the fire of the revolutionary struggle, and therefore any attempt at exerting pressure can only meet with resolute resistance among the Yugoslav Communists. . . .

However, the authors of the article we are speaking of neither try to set forth any arguments whatsoever nor do they hesitate to make the worst insinuations. . . . There is no question of any kind of comradely discussion between two Communist Parties, but a harsh rupture of such a discussion. . . .

Actually no criticism and discussion is involved here, but a judgment without the right of defense, a judgment which somebody is expected unconditionally to implement. . . .

Two things are possible here: Either the former attitudes of those who are now attacking us were insincere, with concealed intentions, or they have meanwhile changed their attitude for the worse, returning to the old methods, which they themselves criticized and rejected, in relations between Communist Parties and Socialist countries.

We do not wish to give a reply to this question. Time will tell. But it should be clear to everyone that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Socialist Yugoslavia do not want to be and will not be a passive object of anyone's policy. Therefore, as Comrade Tito said at the congress, it is a waste of time for any Party to expect that we shall deviate from our attitude of principle both in international and internal questions. . . .

Espousing the logic and methods of the Cominform, the Chinese Communists set as their main task interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, struggle against Socialist Yugoslavia, "the great struggle on which the success or failure of the cause of the working class in the world and cause of Socialism depend." Ten years ago the authors of the first Cominform resolution also set themselves this same task. Perhaps it is useful to mention that, while setting

as their chief task the struggle against Socialist Yugoslavia, and not the concern for their own people, for Socialism in their own country and its proper development, the authors of the first resolution experienced an inglorious end, while Socialist Yugoslavia remained Socialist, firmer, stronger, more united than ever before.

What happened to most of those who signed the first Cominform resolution, which the Chinese comrades are now rehabilitating so lightly?

Out of seventeen who signed the resolution from Socialist countries, twelve have finished ingloriously or tragically. Trajko Kostov was sentenced to death. Vuklo Chervenkov was removed from the post of Prime Minister and sharply criticized. Ana Pauker was expelled from the Party. Vasili Luka was sentenced to life imprisonment. Matyas Rakosi led Hungary to the brink of ruin and now lives as an *émigré* away from his country. Mihaly Farkas is in prison for crimes against his fellow Communists. Erno Gero is also living as an *émigré*. Jakub Berman has been stigmatized in Poland for breach of the law, for arresting and persecuting honest Communists. Georgi Maksimilianovich Malenkov has been condemned by the Party for belonging to the well known anti-Party group. Gustav Bares has been removed from Party functions. Rudolf Slansky was hanged. Bedrich Geminder was also hanged.

We are not mentioning this tragic chapter from the past of the Socialist countries because we consider it necessary to accuse anybody today, but in order to point to the paradoxical situation in which the authors of the article in *Jenmin Jihpao* have landed by fishing out of the archives the documents which events have so tragically and mercilessly disproved. Therefore, those who try to resuscitate the methods which history has branded with condemnation take upon themselves a great responsibility. . . .

Yugoslavia's attitude on individual questions has always been clearly and publicly expressed and in good time. No special effort has been needed to understand it nor is it clear why it should have been understood only at this late date. However, if some people think that friendly cooperation between Yugoslavia and other Socialist countries can develop only if the League of Communists changes its attitudes of principle, then the question arises: What ensures any equality of cooperation and where then do the methods and actions introduced by the article in *Jenmin Jihpao* differ from

the methods and intentions of the first and second resolutions of the Cominform?

If this is the price and condition for cooperation, then what is involved is a problem exactly ten years old, and for Yugoslav Communists the price is as unacceptable today as it was ten years ago. Precisely in this, it would seem, lies the meaning of the call to the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to "ponder soberly" as to "whether it will be in the interests of the Yugoslav people to reject friendship with the countries of the Socialist camp and with the Communist Parties of other countries."

Striving always and resolutely—despite the campaign conducted against our country—for friendly relations and cooperation with all Socialist countries and Communist Parties, and accordingly accepting their initiative for normalization of relations, the Yugoslav Communists considered that the restoration of those relations meant a break with the old harmful methods, which found their expression in the Cominform resolutions. They considered that the establishment of the only possible and normal practice in the relations between Socialist countries and Communist Parties, consists in developing their relations in the spirit of solidarity and friendship even when they differ in certain concrete aspects of internal and international policy.

Nobody has the right to prescribe what the relations between Socialist countries should be, but every Socialist country is obliged to strive for the greatest possible cooperation within the framework of the common and equal interests of the Socialist countries. We have always endeavored to do this, even when we did not agree with certain attitudes of other Socialist countries and Communist Parties. We also said that we did not agree with and refused to take part in actions with which we did not agree; apart from this, we endeavored to cooperate in those fields where common attitudes and views have existed and do exist.

These were precisely the essential questions of Socialism, that is, the question of the struggle for peace, the question of the struggle for the defense of Socialism and the Socialist system from every attempt of imperialist interference from outside, the question of cooperation in the struggle for strengthening all forces of social progress and Socialism, as well as in support of anti-imperialist forces in the struggle for national independence.

Of course, in the realization of these aims, every country or

Communist Party should approach them in accordance with the specific conditions in which it operates. . . .

However, *Jenmin Jihpao*'s article now shows matters to be different. It represents not only a reinforcement of the Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia, but also the establishment of the methods and actions which accompanied the work of the Cominform and which marked a period which even its most conservative defenders today note as a period in which a number of major "mistakes" were made.

If this is really the intention of the author of the article in *Jenmin Jihpao*, then not only cooperation between Yugoslavia and other Socialist countries and Communist Parties will suffer from this, but international Socialism generally as well. . . .

There is an actual need for "sound meditation" among those who allow themselves to indicate in such a drastic way, in connection with the fact that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia "dared" to set out in its program its views on the contemporary problems of Socialism, the possibility of breaking off friendship with Socialist Yugoslavia. . . .

We can pass over, with indignation but nevertheless quietly, the filthy insinuations on the interconnection of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its policy with the political plans of American and other imperialists. . . .

On its part the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will—despite the absence of principles in the hue and cry now conducted against it—continue in the future to develop the most fruitful relations of cooperation with all Socialist countries and Communist Parties, on principles of equality, voluntariness, non-imposition of views, as well as the true Socialist internationalism which is not deformed by any monopolism. The success of these endeavors certainly does not depend only on us.

"Every Communist is justified in wondering why the U.S. imperialists, the worst enemies of Socialism, consider it profitable to themselves to help Yugoslavia . . ."

19. PRAVDA EDITORIAL OF MAY 9, 1958, ON THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT PROGRAM AND SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

The Chinese attack of May 5, 1958 was clearly calculated to bring about an exacerbation of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, and Yugoslavia's belligerent reply did nothing to ease the tension. The CPSU, on the same day, published a further criticism of the Yugoslavs in a Pravda editorial which indicated a hardening of Soviet attitudes.

The Pravda attack differed from the Chinese in tone. It was far more mildly phrased and there was no suggestion that the CPSU considered the Yugoslavs traitors. On the other hand, it was considerably sharper than the Kommunist critique of April 19, and it contained an unmistakable threat of economic sanctions.

Pravda's argument followed logically from the earlier Kommunist article. The CPSU had found the Yugoslav Draft Program unacceptable and had suggested a number of changes. The Yugoslav leaders not only failed to make them, but voiced objection to Moscow's interference. The CPSU's resentment at this rebuff is palpable. In 1958, as in 1948, the CPSU evidently expected its opinions to be heard and its criticism to be heeded. There is no reference in Pravda to the "arrogance" of the Yugoslav leadership but otherwise the Soviet reaction is remarkably similar to that of 1948.

Pravda's objections to the Draft Program are familiar: Yugoslavia is fostering the growth of revisionism, and by failing to distinguish between the capitalist and the Socialist "blocs," the Yugoslav League of Communists is imput-

ing to the USSR a share of the guilt for current international tension. This, says Pravda, implies that the Soviet Union is not dedicated to peace, but is as aggressive as any capitalist nation, which is an incredible error and misstatement of fact. That argument had already been expressed in Kommunist, but Pravda now added a new and ominous warning on the subject of economic aid. Since Belgrade, in Pravda's view, seems to consider American aid valuable, and regards Soviet aid as "exploitation," "it would be possible to free Yugoslavia from such exploitation."

With this sentence the CPSU again raised the threat of economic sanctions—a threat which became a reality on May 27, 1958, when the USSR's unilateral decision to postpone implementation of existing credit agreements with Yugoslavia was announced. This constituted the third instance in a decade in which the USSR had used economic pressure against Yugoslavia in a political and ideological dispute.

Our times, the epoch of the historic victories of the world Socialist system, are characterized by the growing unity and solidarity of the international Communist movement and the increasing friendship of the peoples of the Socialist countries. . . .

The Communist and Workers' Parties regard themselves as a component part of the great international Communist movement and display lively interest in the work and experience of each of the fraternal Parties. . . . Hence the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in April, which discussed so important a question as the Party's program, also commanded the attention of the Communist and Workers' Parties. . . .

The Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia . . . evoked serious criticism from the Communist and Workers' Parties of many countries. . . . Statements by the central committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of a number of countries pointed out that many of the theories contained in the Draft Program of the League of Communists contradicted the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. . . . As the press of the Communist Parties unanimously noted, there are many theses in the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists which actually

amount to a revision of Marxism-Leninism. This applies in particular to the description and appraisal of such vital questions as the present international situation, the two world systems and two camps, the significance of the building of Socialism in the USSR and other countries, the role of the Communist Parties and the Socialist state in building a new society, the development of Marxist-Leninist theory and the struggle with bourgeois ideology, the principles of proletarian internationalism and mutual relations between the Socialist countries and between the fraternal Communist Parties. . . .

The Draft Program of the Yugoslav League of Communists had the appearance of a document opposing the declaration of the conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist countries which was approved by all the fraternal Communist Parties. Because of this the Draft Program proved a document directed toward weakening rather than strengthening the unity of the Communist and Workers' Parties, toward weakening the unity of the Socialist countries. . . . The fraternal Communist Parties hoped that their comradely remarks on the Draft Program would be accepted by their Yugoslav comrades in the proper spirit. However, at the Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, Yugoslav leaders spoke about these remarks with irritation and refused to have anything to do with them, without going into a discussion of the essence of the matter. . . .

The materials of the Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists showed that the incorrect theses of the Draft Program were developed in detail and defended by the Congress speakers and certain of the others who took the floor. Such speeches require criticism and a decisive rebuff. It is impossible to ignore the mistaken appraisal of the international situation after the Second World War as given at the Congress, and the distorted estimate of the reasons for international tension, the distortion of the substance of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

The report by Tito, the General Secretary of the Yugoslav League of Communists, as reported by TANYUG, propounded the idea that the policy of the great powers after the Second World War was based on the principle of strength and not on the principle of the right of all nations to decide their own destinies. . . . [According to Tito,] one example of this foreign policy was the many years of Stalin's pressure on Yugoslavia. It is clear from their statement that the leaders of the Yugoslav League of Communists

placed the USSR on the same level as the imperialist powers. Crudely distorting the facts of history, they ascribed to the USSR a position of strength policy and a policy of aggression, and a desire for world supremacy.

The whole world knows that the USSR . . . waged a steadfast and persistent struggle for a democratic path of development, against the resurgence of Fascism and for Socialism. . . . To declare that Soviet policy in the first postwar years was characterized by a desire to win domination over other nations, as was done in the speeches at the Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, is to repeat the inventions of imperialist propaganda about a so-called Soviet "empire" surrounding itself with "satellites."

This attempt to whitewash the imperialist powers . . . was most clearly expressed at the [Yugoslav] Seventh Congress . . . in the allegation that the policy of the USSR was "the main reason for the creation of the Atlantic Pact."

. . . The distortion of the real reasons for the formation of the North Atlantic bloc is actually nothing more nor less than a justification of US imperialism, which set up this aggressive military bloc as its principal tool for achieving world domination

It must be noted that in their analysis of the international situation the speakers at the Congress . . . ignored the indisputable fact that a fierce struggle is now being waged between the imperialist forces of war and the forces of peace in which the Socialist countries are in the vanguard. . . .

The leaders of the Yugoslav League of Communists do not agree with the characterization generally recognized by the Communists of all countries of a world divided today into two opposing camps—Socialism and imperialism.

They declare that Yugoslavia is outside these camps. The division of the world into two camps, however, did not occur at the whim of any person or party. . . . The Socialist and imperialist camps are a reflection of the indisputable fact that there are in the world today not one but two social and economic systems. . . . Two economic systems exist and will continue to exist for a long time to come. The goal now is to establish peaceful economic coexistence between the two systems, to normalize the economic relations between the world of Socialism and the world of capitalism.

The problem of mutual relations between the Socialist countries, and the Communist and Workers' Parties at their head, is of even greater significance for the development of Socialism and Communism. This is a new problem. It arose only after the Second World War with the appearance in the international arena of other Socialist countries of Europe and Asia alongside the USSR. . . . Socialist countries build their mutual relations on principles of full equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty and noninterference in one another's internal affairs. These are important principles. They do not, however, exhaust the entire substance of the relations between the Socialist countries.

Fraternal mutual assistance is an integral part of these mutual relations. . . . The Socialist states are united in a single community . . . by their common interests and goals, in their efforts for the victory of Socialism and Communism. The emergence of Socialism beyond the bounds of a single country, its conversion into a world social and economic system, the formation and consolidation of the camp of Socialist countries—this is the main thing which defines international development and is characteristic of the present epoch. . . .

Now that the new Socialist society already unites more than one-third of mankind, the building of practical and theoretical cooperation between the Socialist countries becomes a vital necessity. . . . Yet the line followed in the speeches at the Congress of the League of Communists is to substantiate the separate individuality of the Socialist countries and to set them off in opposition to one another. . . . Now that there are not one but many Socialist countries, it is impossible to build Socialism and Communism in isolation. . . .

The very existence of any country as a Socialist country and its successful advance are possible only thanks to the existence of the Socialist camp and thanks to the fact that it is possible to find support in the economic might and political unity of this camp. . . .

The main speakers, and certain others, at the [Yugoslav] Congress spoke with gratitude and appreciation of United States aid to Yugoslavia. . . .

When reading these speeches kowtowing to the US ruling circles, one is prompted to ask: Why is Yugoslavia in such favor with the US ruling circles? One is prompted to ask: Why is Yugoslavia in such favor with the US monopolists? Every Communist

is justified in wondering why the US imperialists, the worst enemies of Socialism, consider it profitable to themselves to help Yugoslavia. . . . For what services? Is it not because the Yugoslav leaders are trying to blacken the USSR and to weaken the unity of the international Communist and working-class movement? . . . Everyone knows that US aid to any country is not unselfish and entails one or another form of economic and political dependence. Under the guise of this "aid" the US monopolies ship to the recipient countries goods that find no market elsewhere. Such assistance from the US monopolies does not promote a development of the recipient's national economy. As a result of this so-called disinterested aid from the US imperialists, Yugoslavia's general state debt abroad has reached the stupendous figure of more than \$800,000,000. . . .

As for Soviet-Yugoslav economic ties, they are based on another foundation. The report made to the Yugoslav Congress listed the major agreements concluded between the two countries in recent years. These were primarily the agreements to build industrial enterprises in Yugoslavia costing \$110,000,000; then the agreement for a commodity credit worth \$54,000,000 from the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia. Mention was also made of the \$30,000,000 loan in gold or foreign currency, the special agreement for the construction of an aluminum plant, a fertilizer factory and so on.

Even this brief list shows the basic difference in principle between so-called US aid and the economic relations linking the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. . . . While US aid aims at subjugating the recipient countries, the Soviet Union tries really to help the other Socialist and economically underdeveloped countries to strengthen and develop their economy and to industrialize. . . .

Yet the authors of the Draft Program of the Yugoslav League of Communists flagrantly distorted the nature of the ties linking the Socialist countries, accused them in an unfriendly and even slanderous way of a desire for hegemony. They claimed that in the initial phases of the development of Socialism in individual nations or states there exists a possibility of utilizing economic exploitation of other countries in one form or another.

Do certain persons in Yugoslavia feel that this tendency toward exploitation also exists in the economic relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia? If so, it would be possible to free Yugoslavia from such exploitation. We are not imposing anything on anybody—neither our state structure, nor our forms of public life,

nor our ideology. The Soviet Union does not impose its friendship or economic assistance on anyone.

The Yugoslav leaders think that existing ideological differences should not cause a worsening of state relations between Yugoslavia and the Socialist countries. But a simple repetition of this platitude is insufficient, as experience shows. It is impossible not to see that ideological differences deepen if they are not eliminated. Naturally this leads to differences on political issues. . . .

The Soviet Union and its Communist Party have energetically advanced along the line of eliminating all injustices and mistakes made in the past with regard to Yugoslavia. But it must be bluntly stated that Yugoslavia, in 1948 and the following years, made mistakes of a nationalistic nature and departed from the principles of Marxism-Leninism on a number of major issues. . . .

The Yugoslav League of Communists and the Draft Program clearly show that the Yugoslav leaders continue to adhere to their positions, which contradict the principles of Marxism-Leninism. They consider it their particular glory. . . .

Statements unprecedented in their pretensions were made at the tribune of the Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists to the effect that the actions of the leaders of the League . . . were like the struggle of Lenin for the victory of the principles of Marxism. These statements are really blasphemous. . . .

The untenability of the positions held by the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists and their violation of the principles of inter-Party relations, as well as the principles of proletarian internationalism, were forcefully manifested in their incorrect attitude toward criticism on questions of principle. In response to comradely criticism of shortcomings and mistakes in the Draft Program, there came a shower of ridiculous accusations of interference in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs.

There must be complete clarity on this major issue. How can one accuse other Communist Parties of aspiring to interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs if the Central Committee of the League of Communists itself sent its Draft Program to all fraternal Parties? Why was this done? Apparently it was done so that they could give their opinions on the draft.

When these opinions were voiced, however, the most unceremonious attacks began against the fraternal Parties. . . .

The most important question for each Communist or Workers' Party in the present conditions is its attitude to the whole Communist movement on a world scale. . . . The slightest deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, any manifestation of separateness or sectarianism, inevitably leads to the quagmire of revisionism. . . . The great invincible vital force of the Communist movement throughout the globe, of the Socialist world, lies in its unity and solidarity based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. . . .

“ . . . the Soviet government has unilaterally deferred the fulfillment of these agreements. . . . ”

20. STATEMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF SOVIET CREDITS, RELEASED BY JAKSA PETRIC, SPOKESMAN FOR THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA AT AN OFFICIAL PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 30, 1958.

On May 27, 1958, Pravda's earlier hints of economic reprisal against Yugoslavia became a reality with the receipt in Belgrade of a Soviet note which announced that the implementation of the credit agreements in force would have to be postponed for five years in view of new plans to expand the USSR's own chemical industry. These comprised agreements concluded on January 12, 1956, covering Soviet undertakings to build important industrial plants, as well the agreement made jointly with East Germany August 1, 1956, to construct an aluminum combine in Yugoslavia. The Soviet note stated that the East German government concurred in the postponement.

The Yugoslavs promptly replied in a formal note that they regarded the action as unilateral and a breach of contract for which reparation would be due. The sense of the Yugoslav note is contained in the statement made to the press by Petric.

The Soviet credits in question totaled 285 million dollars. A relatively negligible portion has been expended so far, mainly on planning and other preparatory work. This is the second time that the Soviet government has unilaterally deferred the fulfillment of these agreements. The Yugoslav government has adopted the position that the Soviet government is obliged to fulfill the obligations assumed under the aforementioned agreements and [the Yugoslav government] therefore cannot accept any postponement or discussion on the matter, all the more so as the arguments cited in the Soviet note are entirely one-sided.

The step taken by the Soviet government is actually a unilateral cancellation of valid economic agreements, this being obviously contrary to the generally accepted norms of international relations. This measure by the Soviet government will give rise to certain difficulties in the implementation of the [Yugoslav] long-range economic plan.

In the event that the Soviet government does not concede the above stated Yugoslav standpoint, the Yugoslav government will be obliged to advance claims for indemnity for the damages incurred.

"Some theoreticians . . . exist only because of the alms they receive from imperialist countries in the form of leftover goods. . . ."

21. SPEECH BY N. S. KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, SOFIA, JUNE 3, 1958.

Khrushchev's visit to the Bulgarian Party Congress, a pointed contrast to the absence of any Soviet delegates at its Yugoslav counterpart, provided the opportunity for further aggravation of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. The exchanges between Belgrade and Moscow, unlike those with Peiping, had remained within the bounds of courtesy prior to Khrushchev's appearance in Sofia. Certainly the dispute had again become serious, and had indeed already

spread from arguments to economic sanctions, but the CPSU had at least displayed some restraint and a disposition, which the Yugoslavs shared, to treat the various disagreements as a family quarrel. Peiping's attacks notwithstanding, it was still possible to pretend that a complete break between Belgrade and Moscow had not, in fact, taken place. This speech by the First Party Secretary and Premier of the USSR made such a pretense impossible. In the sharpest statement by a Soviet leader since Stalin's day, Khrushchev accuses the Yugoslav leaders of spreading anti-Marxist revisionism, accepting bribes from the "imperialists," and of acting as a Trojan horse in the Socialist camp.

Reversing his earlier stand, Khrushchev now endorses the 1948 Cominform resolution, and insists that the Yugoslavs have violated the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 by aiding and abetting the Hungarian revolt, inciting other "Socialist countries to follow the so-called Yugoslav course," refusing to sign the twelve-Party Moscow Declaration, and, in general, by attempting to split the Socialist camp. Speaking not only for the CPSU, but for all the "fraternal Parties," he expresses regret that the Yugoslavs have learned little from the past and that great Soviet forbearance and patience have not succeeded in making them correct their errors. Soviet magnanimity, he says, has met with obstinacy and arrogance. Hence, the entire Socialist camp, standing "resolutely against contemporary revisionism," has no choice but to follow "the course of Marxist-Leninist teaching" without Yugoslavia. Thus, almost ten years to the day after its formal expulsion from the Cominform, the Yugoslav Party, for all intents and purposes, found itself excommunicated once again.

... The Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists and statements by Yugoslav leaders at the Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists were attempts to accuse other Com-

munist Parties of Socialist countries of "practicism."⁴² Apparently the Yugoslav comrades interpret as "practicism" the fact that Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist countries direct their main effort toward the development and implementation of practical measures for cultural and economic development and for improving the people's well-being.

We consider that such "practicism" meets the vital interests of the masses as also those of Socialism. The working masses judge the advantages of the Socialist system and its superiority over the capitalist system mainly by who possess political power and the means of production. They also judge by the results achieved by the development of the national economy, successes in science and technology, and improvement of the cultural level and well-being of workers in Socialist countries.

In our opinion, interpretation of questions of theory and practice regarding the construction of Socialism and Communism is indeed the real creative development of Marxism and Leninism. . . . The strength of Marxism-Leninism lies in its indissoluble tie with life and the processes of social development. . . .

Some theoreticians are striving in every way to lower the practical activities of the Communist and Workers' Parties in their construction of Socialism by disparaging accusations of "practicism." But, at the same time, they themselves exist only because of the alms they receive from imperialist countries in the form of leftover goods. It is clear to everyone that a Socialist economy cannot be strengthened by such means. What successes of Socialism can we cite here, what development of Marxist-Leninist theory can be dealt with here? If such poor theoreticians do not understand how much harm the theories they put forward can do to the working-class cause, the imperialist circles for their part know full well what they want and do everything in their power to support and encourage that which helps them in their struggle against Communism.

I would not wish to offend anyone. But, on the other hand, I cannot refrain from asking the question which deeply concerns all Communists everywhere. Why do the imperialist bosses, while striving to obliterate the Socialist states from the face of the earth

⁴² This is, apparently, a not very oblique reference to repeated Yugoslav charges against the growth of bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.

and suppress the Communist movement, at the same time finance one of the Socialist countries, granting that country credits and free gifts?

Nobody will believe that two Socialisms exist in the world—one Socialism which bitterly hates reaction, and another Socialism acceptable to the imperialists. . . .

Everyone knows that the imperialists never give money to anyone without a purpose. They invest their capital in those enterprises from which they hope to receive a good profit. If the imperialists agree to give assistance to a Socialist state, they do not take such a step in order to strengthen it. One can in no way suspect the monopolistic circles of the United States of America of being interested in strengthening Socialism and the development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Because the recipient country is one which says that we are the ones who are deviating from Marxist-Leninist theory while they maintain the correct positions, a rather curious situation arises: The American monopolists wish to support Marxist-Leninist theory through that country.

It is useful to remember here certain words uttered by Bebel: "If you are praised by your enemy, think what stupidity you have committed." Remember that while the imperialists unite their efforts in their attack against Socialism and the working class, and while they unjustly call themselves fighters for Socialism, they are striving to weaken the free will of the working class in the struggle against capitalism, to weaken the vanguard of the working class of the Communist and Workers' Parties, to lull their vigilance, and to weaken the unity of Socialist countries. . . .

The Communist Party guards the unity of its ranks like the apple of its eye. It wages a decisive struggle against revisionism and dogmatism. In this struggle the principal fire of the Communist Party is directed against revisionists, the lackeys of the imperialist camp. The ancient legend about the Trojan horse is well known. When the enemies were unable to besiege and assault Troy, they presented a wooden horse to the Trojans, hiding their people inside the horse so that they could open the city gates during the night. Present-day revisionism is in its way a Trojan horse. The revisionists are striving to corrupt the revolutionary Parties from within and to disrupt the unity of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Comrades, the Communist and Workers' Parties in their historic declaration unanimously and stringently evaluated revisionism as the main danger to the international Communist movement under certain conditions. Revisionism is rightist opportunism, a manifestation of bourgeois ideology which paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands the reestablishment of capitalism. It is justly emphasized in the declaration that the presence of bourgeois influence is an inner source of revisionism, while capitalism and pressure on the part of imperialism is its outer source. Communists of all countries warmly approve the declaration adopted at the conference of fraternal Parties of the Socialist countries and have approved it as the most important program and document in the international Communist movement. . . .

Of all the Communist and Workers' Parties, only the League of Yugoslav Communists proclaimed their dissent from the declaration, thus putting themselves in opposition to all Marxist-Leninist Parties. This position of the Yugoslav leaders is most clearly defined in the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists. All Communist and Workers' Parties have been unanimous in strongly condemning the revisionist premise—contradictory to Marxism-Leninism—which is contained in the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists, as well as the depraved position of the Yugoslav leaders.

Allow me, comrade delegates, in this connection to express certain considerations regarding the relationship between the CPSU and the League of Yugoslav Communists. It seems to me expedient to express these considerations at your Congress because this concerns relations not only between the CPSU and the League of Yugoslav Communists but also concerns relations between all brotherly Parties and the League of Yugoslav Communists.

As has already been stated, the declaration by the fraternal Parties expresses a unanimous point of view. Their common point of view regarding the most important contemporary problems has been determined on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. Marx, Engels, and Lenin always attributed primary importance to the struggle for the purity of ideological principles of scientific Communism. They were irreconcilable toward all kinds of attempts to remove the revolutionary soul from the militant theory of the working class. . . .

True to the will of our teachers and leaders, the Communist and Workers' Parties are vigilantly protecting the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles. They are very sensitive toward any misinterpretation and deviation from these principles. Marxist-Leninist Parties steadily and decisively oppose those who attempt to weaken the unity among fraternal Communist Parties, subvert the international unity of the working class in all countries, and disorganize its revolutionary struggle.

Particularly dangerous to the revolutionary movement are all those who call themselves Marxists-Leninists, but who in reality, whether they want it or not, carry out the role of agents of the class enemy in the workers' movement. This is why the Communist and Workers' Parties are very touchy about theoretical problems and irreconcilable toward any attempt to revise Marxism-Leninism.

The relationship between our Parties and the League of Yugoslav Communists has its own history. Certain important events in this history must now be recalled. You know that until 1948 good relations existed between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, created during the joint struggle against Fascist usurpers during World War II and during the first postwar years.

In September 1947, when the imperialist reaction started intensified attacks against the Socialist countries, the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, the European countries, the people's democracies, as well as some Communist Parties of capitalist countries of Europe, organized an Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, the Informburo, a working organ which was first located in Belgrade.

Looking back on the past, we must say that the Informburo for a certain period of time played a positive role in the history of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement in rallying the forces of the Communist and Workers' Parties on the basis of international proletarianism in the struggle for a stable peace, democracy, and Socialism. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, together with the CPSU and a number of other fraternal Parties, was one of the organizers of the Informburo and an active participant in its activity during the first period.

This is how matters were up to 1948. Then came a worsening in relations between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and other fraternal Parties. In 1948, a conference of the Informburo issued

a resolution on the state of affairs in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which contained just criticism of the activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on a number of questions of principle. This resolution was fundamentally correct and corresponded to the interests of the revolutionary movement. Later on, from 1949 to 1953, a conflict arose between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and other fraternal Parties. In the course of this struggle, mistakes and rigidities were permitted to arise which caused damage to our common cause. Fully conscious of its responsibility to our countries and peoples and the international Communist movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took the initiative in liquidating this conflict, and achieved a normalization of relations between our countries and established contacts, cooperation, and alliance according to Marxist-Leninist principles.

In this connection, talks between representatives of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were conducted on our initiative in May and June 1955 and ended with the signing of the Belgrade Declaration.

It is very important to note that during the talks in Belgrade Comrade Tito spoke of forgetting the past and starting our relations on a new basis. We willingly agreed to this and on our part did everything to strengthen friendly relations. While doing this we were conscious that between our Parties there were ideological differences on a number of important questions. On our part, much endurance and patience was shown in trying to achieve unity of views on a Marxist-Leninist basis. It proved, however, that the burden of the past was too heavy for these authoritative leaders, and they proved to be incapable of giving up their wrong position and of standing firmly on a Marxist-Leninist position.

Even after the normalization of relations Yugoslav leaders continued to come out with anti-Soviet declarations, making attacks on the Socialist camp and the fraternal Communist Parties. Particularly great harm was done to the cause of Socialism by Yugoslav leaders in their public speeches and actions during the Hungarian events. During the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Budapest the Yugoslav Embassy became in substance a center for those who started the war against the people's democratic regime in Hungary—a refuge for the capitulatory, treacherous Nagy-Losonczy group. Remember the unprecedented speech of Comrade Tito in which the rebels in Hungary were defended and the fraternal assistance of the

USSR to the Hungarian people was called Soviet intervention—a speech which contained direct appeals to certain forces in other Socialist countries to follow a so-called Yugoslav course.

We know what kind of course this is, comrades. Whoever wants to follow this course can go to it, but we shall not follow this course. We follow the Marxist-Leninist course. Our Socialist ship sails along the course of Marxist-Leninist teaching. As a result of this attitude of the Yugoslav leaders, we were forced to come out with open criticism of their views and actions. Our position was fully supported by the Communist and Workers' Parties. Thus it was not the fraternal Parties standing on the position of Marxist-Leninist principles but the Yugoslav leaders, by their dissident actions against the Socialist countries and fraternal Parties, which put Yugoslavia and themselves in a position of isolation from the Socialist countries and the international Communist movement.

Later, in August 1957, on the initiative of the Yugoslav leaders, a well-known meeting of delegations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia took place in Bucharest. During this meeting we frankly stated to the Yugoslav leaders our views on the policy of the League of Yugoslav Communists with regard to the Hungarian and other problems.

In the course of the negotiations agreement was reached on the basic problems of the present-day international situation, although it had to be admitted that certain differences of opinion on ideological questions continued to exist between us.

During the meeting in Bucharest we hoped that we would find a common language and would open the way for further friendly cooperation. On the other hand we openly declared to the Yugoslav leaders that if they should permit themselves again to make attacks against the countries of the Socialist camp and fraternal Parties, such attacks would not go without our reply.

I said this, fully conscious of my responsibility to the fraternal Bulgarian Communist Party which we respect for its bravery and devotion to the great Marxist-Leninist ideals. During the meeting in Bucharest an agreement was reached to the effect that the delegation of the League of Yugoslav Communists would take part in the forthcoming conference of fraternal Parties of Socialist countries and in the drawing up of a draft declaration at the conference.

Subsequent events showed, however, that the Yugoslav leaders retreated from the positions agreed upon. While having refused to sign the declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist countries, the Yugoslav leaders decided to come out with their platform, a Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists opposed to the coordinated views of the Marxist-Leninist Parties and pretending to be a program of the international Communist and workers movement. Of course the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists is an internal affair of the Yugoslav Communists but, insofar as this Draft Program contains a petty and insulting appraisal of other Parties and Socialist countries and a revision of the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory, our Party considers it its express duty to come out with criticism of the anti-Marxist statements in this document.

The principled position of our Party, expressed in letters by the CPSU Central Committee and in our Party press, found the unanimous support and approval of all the Communist and Workers' Parties. Having rejected fraternal criticism based on principles voiced by fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders once again found themselves isolated and continued persistently to maintain their mistaken anti-Marxist views. Instead of seriously analyzing the reasons which put the League of Yugoslav Communists in such a difficult position, the Yugoslav leaders now attempt to accuse the fraternal Parties of taking an objective attitude toward them and of interference in the internal affairs of the League.

This is really what I would call passing the blame to somebody else. Some Yugoslav comrades attempt to find differences in the appraisal of their mistakes by some Communist and Workers' Parties. They attack the CPSU. They want to stress in particular the Chinese Communist Party, asserting that it criticizes their mistakes in a special way. But all attempts to find different shades in the criticism of present-day revisionism on the part of the fraternal Parties are in vain.

All the fraternal Parties are united in this matter. We consider that the Chinese comrades, as all the other fraternal Parties, very justly criticize the revisionist statements of the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists and that they consistently defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism. We fully agree with this principled criticism. The forces of Socialism, the unity of the Communist and workers Parties, can be strengthened only in the struggle against

revisionism and in the struggle for the purity of Marxist Leninist theory.

Recently the weekly *Komunist*, organ of the League of Yugoslav Communists, published an article devoted to the third anniversary of the signing of the Belgrade Declaration. At first sight it appears that the article is written in quiet tones and seeks to reduce the tension which has arisen between the League of Yugoslav Communists and other fraternal Parties. But it is far from being so. It tries to justify the mistaken position of the Yugoslav leaders. Thus the article contains the assertion that the struggle for peace is the main content of the struggle for Socialism. One cannot agree with such assertions.

No one disputes that those who struggle for Socialism consistently struggle for the cause of peace. But many leaders who do not support the principles of Socialism also struggle for peace. Even some conservatives, religious cult ministers, and different kinds of bourgeois public and political leaders are struggling for peace. Naturally we are uniting our efforts in our struggle for peace. Thus in the struggle for peace, forces and organizations of various views and political opinions can be united.

It is another question when we speak of the struggle for the victory of Socialism. Here one cannot rely on uniting the efforts of the working class with capitalists, of Communist with bourgeois parties. The struggle for the victory of Socialism requires unity of views and unity of action by the parties of the working class, standing on positions of Marxism-Leninism and consistently implementing the principles of proletarian internationalism and fraternal mutual assistance among the nations building Socialism.

We have stood and continue to stand on this position: that it is necessary to strengthen cooperation between all states in every way in the struggle for peace and for the security of nations. We want to maintain such relations with the Yugoslav Federal Republic. But we as Communists would like more. We would like to reach mutual understanding and cooperation on the Party level. The Yugoslav Communists have considerable revolutionary experience and have achieved great merits in the struggle against our common class enemies. The working class and all the working people of Yugoslavia made a considerable contribution to the struggle against Fascism in the years of World War II. Of course, if cooperation

on the Party plane cannot succeed, then we shall support and develop normal relations with Yugoslavia on the state plane.

At the same time, we state frankly that we shall not reconcile ourselves to deviations in questions of ideology. We shall guard the unity of the Marxist-Leninist Parties and struggle for the purity of revolutionary theory.

Comrades, I recall one conversation which I had with the Yugoslav leaders in 1956 when we exchanged views during friendly talks. Speaking of our differences, I drew Comrade Tito's attention to the need for a deeper analysis of events and of our mutual relations, for a more correct appraisal of the situation, so as to arrive more quickly at a unity of views on the basis of principle. I quoted a well-known expression: "The whole platoon marches in step and only one soldier is out of step." And I asked: "Who should be corrected, the platoon or the soldier?"

Present at the meeting was Koca Popovic, who asked: "Who is the platoon and who is the soldier?"

I replied: "Think for yourself who is the soldier and who the platoon. In any case," I said, "every soldier knows that a platoon is a platoon, and every soldier is a part of the platoon, and therefore the platoon should not adjust itself to the soldier, but the soldier to the platoon."

If you take a different attitude, then you must say frankly that you are not a soldier belonging to that Communist platoon which marches smartly in step, guided by Marxism-Leninism. We shall always defend as sacred the unity of the Marxist-Leninist army of fighters of Communism. The workers and Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, China, Bulgaria, and other Socialist countries, the Communist Parties of the whole world, are united and rallied. They are resolute against contemporary revisionism.

“Comrade Khrushchev often says that Socialism cannot be built on US wheat, but I think that . . . those who do not know how will not even be able to build it on their own wheat. . . .”

22. MARSHAL TITO'S SPEECH AT LABIN, JUNE 15, 1958.

The sequel to Premier Khrushchev's appearance at the Bulgarian Party Congress came when Marshal Tito used a scheduled appearance in an Istrian mining community to deliver a major speech in rebuttal to the charges which the Soviet leader had voiced in Sofia. Tito's speech is a full scale counterattack in which he declares that Soviet bloc criticism of Yugoslavia is deliberately slanderous and falsified, and clearly in reprisal for Yugoslavia's "principled" refusal to join the Soviet bloc. As he warms to his subject, Tito implies that such attacks are designed to quash the Yugoslav version of Marxism-Leninism precisely because it is the true and correct version, and therefore dangerous to the "Stalinist" elements whose influence continues paramount in the Soviet bloc. His severest stricture, however, is reserved for the Chinese Party, whose reading of Marxism-Leninism would, he says, cause Marx, Engels and Lenin to "turn over in their graves if they knew who was interpreting them and in what way." He suggests, furthermore, that the Soviet First Secretary appears to be under Chinese influence, and that he hardly knows how to "build Socialism" himself.

Thus Tito sees his Party in the heroic role of building the one true Socialism "under constant blows from all sides." He believes "that history bestowed on us this hard road to preserve the development of Socialism from degeneration. . . ." His answer to Khrushchev's bull of excommunication for heresy is that the fount of Socialism has itself become corrupt and that Yugoslavia alone must

lead the reformation "to enable Socialism to emerge . . . with such moral strength that it will hew a victorious road in its further development."

The essential and long standing dispute has thus arrived at the juncture, to which it has steadily tended, where each declares the other's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism false and detrimental to the interests of world Communism. This outcome, inherent in Yugoslav-Soviet relations since 1948, sheds some interesting light on the divisive role which Communist ideology itself can play in relations among Communist states. One of the brightest promises of Marxist theory is that, if followed, it will eventually lead to the achievement of a new society in which there is justice and equality among nations as among men. Rightly or wrongly, the Soviet position demands unanimous, albeit "voluntary," solidarity of all Communist countries under Russian leadership as a precondition for achieving this aspiration. On the other hand, the Yugoslav heresy, with its firm principles of non-alignment and opposition to blocs, claims to be as much Communist and internationalist as it is Yugoslav and nationalist. As such, its capacity to act as a constant irritant and recurrent threat to the Soviet bloc system would appear to be substantial.

... It has been our misfortune that throughout the postwar period of building Socialism in our country, in our efforts and—how should I say—our not always vain attempts—to pull ourselves out of various difficulties as soon as possible, we have often encountered obstacles and difficulties put forward by the side from which we least expected them.

Comrades, our Seventh Congress was a real demonstration, not only of the unity of our people, I wanted to say: Not only of the monolithic unity in the ranks of the League of Communists but also of the Socialist Alliance of the working people and of all people of our country. Our main aim at this congress was to summarize our results, to make a general analysis of our work since the Sixth Congress, to draw certain lessons, and to analyze the

significance of these results, not only for our country but also outside the boundaries of our country. As a Socialist country, we considered it our duty to present at the congress what is positive and what is negative, as much in our domestic development and work as outside our country, and to present that which we think is harmful to the further development of Socialist thought, harmful to the victory of Socialism in the world.

Against our will, we met poor understanding on the part of our eastern neighbors, that is, the leaders of countries building Socialism. First we were attacked because of the program and then because of the reports at the congress. Certain things which were neither said nor written were imputed to us, while other points were given an erroneous interpretation and presented to their people in a different form from that in which they were actually made.

It might be thought that the present campaign against Socialist Yugoslavia was caused by the theoretical formulations in the program of the League of Communists and the reports at the Seventh Congress of the League. But this is not so. This campaign, comrades, has deeper roots. It was organized much earlier than our congress, when our program and congress reports were not yet known. Our program has been used only as an excuse for the attack on the League of Yugoslav Communists and Yugoslavia—Socialist Yugoslavia.

The main reason for this campaign is that we refused to sign the declaration of the 12 countries in Moscow last November and to join the so-called Socialist camp because, as it is well-known, we oppose the division of the world into camps.

With regard to the program, after certain criticisms were received, we accepted the objection that a few points ought to receive further emphasis. Since the program is a document of historical importance, we ourselves considered that we must cast as much light on it as possible right up to the congress, and that is why we made it available for broad discussion. You know that about 1,500 responses were received, some important and some not. Also, we told comrades outside our country, in the Soviet Union and other countries, that the program was not yet finished, that it represented only a draft, that we and the commission preparing it were trying to make it even better, that we had already omitted certain points, that we had thrown out some things and amended others, that they should not be impatient, and that they should wait until

the program was finished and adopted by the congress before saying what they wanted to say, and that we would take this into account. In fact, when some well-meaning comrades, from Poland for instance, made certain observations we accepted them. But when somebody, without mentioning matters of principle, begins outright slander, it is clear that this cannot be included in the program.

It does not follow that because we did not sign the declaration and join the Socialist camp we are against the best possible cooperation with all Socialist countries. On the contrary, comrades, we are for such cooperation in all fields, but in the present tense international situation we consider it better to conduct a constructive peaceful policy together with other peace-loving countries which also do not belong to any bloc rather than to join a camp and thus intensify the present tense world situation even further.

We feel that in the interests of our foreign policy and in the interests of the principles of coexistence, it is necessary to cooperate with all countries, and that in the interests of our peaceful foreign policy it is necessary to work with all our strength to prevent a further exacerbation of the situation and to avert an armed clash. We consider it necessary to establish such relations with all countries and cooperate with them, and not to be limited to two camps, two blocs, which will keep on attacking each other and one day perhaps bring on an armed conflict.

As for the program and reports at the Seventh Congress, which were used as an excuse for beginning this violent and by no means comradely campaign against our country and the League of Communists, I must emphasize that the quotations from the program and the reports which are now being used in the press and speeches of the eastern countries and China, especially in China, are, as I said before, incorrect and sometimes faked or taken out of context in such a way that they give a false picture of our attitude.

I will cite as an example the statement carried by Soviet, Chinese, and other papers, and included in the speeches of some leaders, to the effect that I praised American aid and American imperialism—you know very well that I never praised imperialism—and that I ignored Soviet aid and attacked the Soviet Union. You surely remember that after the normalization I was one of the first to advocate with all my strength that our people forget the grave wounds inflicted on them by Stalin in 1948, that is, in the entire period after 1948, and that I worked with all my strength,

together with other comrades, to have us forget what had happened and to move along a new road of correct Socialist relations between our country and other Socialist countries—and above all with the Soviet Union.

Therefore, I did not in any way attack the Soviet Union. Yet they say I did, and this being used as an excuse for directing the most insolent vilification and slander against the League of Communists. They are using an incorrect statement in order to attack and slander us in a most insolent manner. Here is what I said in the report at the congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists. I quote:

“We received economic aid from the United States at a time when it was most needed, that is, at the time of the political, economic, and propaganda pressure exerted on our country by Stalin. This helped us greatly to overcome the enormous difficulties in which we found ourselves. Although the American aid amounted to only four per cent of our national income, it would be incorrect and incomprehensible on our part if we denied the great significance of this aid which was received at the time when our situation was at its worst.

“Certain people in the East wanted to use this for propaganda purposes, expressing doubt that this aid was being given to us without any political or other conditions. However, facts are facts. We have not made any concessions to the United States, political or otherwise, nor did anyone at that time make such conditions.”

This is what I said, and this is why they are attacking me. It is true, however, that we needed this aid at that difficult time. I do not think there is anybody in Yugoslavia who loves his people, who wishes them well, who did not agree. As far as Yugoslav-Soviet relations are concerned, I said the following in the report:

“Yugoslav-Soviet relations, based on the Belgrade Declaration, are developing very successfully. A series of agreements has been concluded, such as on the building of industrial plants in Yugoslavia valued at 110 million dollars, on credits for goods amounting to 54 million dollars, on scientific-technical cooperation, on a loan of gold and foreign currency amounting to 30 million dollars, and on cooperation in the field of atomic energy.

“In addition, a cultural convention was concluded on the basis of which broad cooperation developed, as well as a convention

regulating dual citizenship. A special agreement was also signed on the construction of an aluminum factory combine and an artificial fertilizer factory. All this shows that the normalization and establishment of good and friendly relations have acquired their material basis in the form of economic cooperation which greatly benefits both countries."

This is what I said. Did I attack anyone by this? I did not. Did I say anything untrue? I did not. This is the truth, and what can I do if they are disturbed by my saying that this would be beneficial to both countries? I did not say which would benefit from it more.

From this it emerges that I neither belittled Soviet aid nor attacked the USSR, but gave a picture of the real state of affairs. And I was quite justified in saying that such cooperation benefited both countries. I did not go into which country would benefit more from that cooperation. Nor should I like to say now that we would not have derived great benefit from it, had they not abrogated those treaties.

We find the same situation also with regard to the other charges in connection with my report, from which some passages were torn out of context and misinterpreted. And conditions are similar with various quotations and excerpts from our program and the other reports. We are particularly surprised that Comrade Rankovic's report could arouse such fury, for we only mentioned things which were said about us which offended us, without even referring to the name of the person who said them, although those things had been said quite openly, before the whole world.

I believe that practices, such as, for instance, preventing our material from being printed in any of the Eastern countries and preventing the public of these countries from becoming acquainted with it, are neither good nor customary in relations between Socialist countries. As you have already seen, we print their things even when they rebuke us. We printed the resolution of the Cominformburo and we print other material as well. However, they do not print our things because they are afraid for their people to see what we say.

But it is obvious that this is precisely a case of trying to slander our country by an easy method, and for this reason they publish only the things that can deceive and embitter the public opinion

of those countries. And when people who do not know the real facts are only told things that are not good, it goes without saying that they may sometimes become embittered.

But I must tell you in nearly all those countries the overwhelming majority of people no longer are convinced, and they say: You did the same in 1948 and later you confessed that it was a mistake. Who can guarantee us that you are not doing the same now, only to say later that it was a mistake?

Comrades, if in our program—let us say in our program and in the reports of the Seventh Congress—there are certain theoretical formulations which some comrades in other Communist Parties do not like, it should be possible to have a comradely discussion about them, but there is no reason for such a violent attack against the leadership of the League of Yugoslav Communists and of Socialist Yugoslavia as a whole.

Let us take as an example the article in the *People's Daily*, a Chinese newspaper well known in the world for its abusive language, or other Chinese newspapers and speeches by certain Chinese leaders who indulge in hostile abuses and slanders against the state and the Party leadership of Socialist Yugoslavia. All these abuses and slanders, to make things even worse, are reprinted in the Soviet press and in the press of other Communist countries and Parties. With such a slanderous vocabulary these Marxists—and I use the word with quotation marks—allegedly defend the purity of the theoretical ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The three of them would turn over in their graves if they knew who was interpreting them and in what way.

Comrades, Marxist science seems to have undergone such a metamorphosis on its way from Europe to the Chinese leaders that its creators would hardly recognize it today and would be particularly astounded by the ethics which individual Chinese leaders attribute to Marxism. Of course, it is no fault of Marx, Engels and Lenin that their science is given such a twisted interpretation in that distant country by certain quasi-Marxists who interpret Marxism and want to lecture on it in their inhuman way.

If the Chinese leaders have their internal difficulties—and they certainly have them—they should solve them in another way, and not by such hostile speeches against Yugoslavia. We know what an obstacle to building Socialism is presented by shortages of

investment funds and credits, but we are trying to solve these problems in an honorable way, and not to the detriment of any other Socialist country.

They reproach us abusively on the ground that the United States has given us two billion dollars in order to buy us. First of all, it is not true that we have been given two billion dollars, although that would be of great benefit to us. Second, they forget that other countries, in World War II and later as well, received great material aid—both military supplies and food—from the United States as well as aid from the UNRRA. This includes the Soviet Union and certain other East European countries. They forget that Yugoslavia was almost completely destroyed in World War II and that it has a right to act in order to heal the wounds left by that war, at least partially.

The fact that the Chinese leadership stands firmly on Stalinist positions with regard to relations among Socialist countries is their own business, but another question can be asked: Who benefits and where does it lead when pressure is exerted on a small Socialist country like Yugoslavia, similar to that of 1948, a kind of pressure which they themselves condemned at one time?

They may be sure that such pressure will not be successful and that it will only leave even deeper scars on the international workers movement. They write and say that 1948 should not be repeated: They revile us and then say that 1948 should not be repeated, and yet they use the same language, the same slanders, the same methods of distortion and lies in their propaganda as in 1948.

It is also interesting to note that the Chinese leaders attacked us on account of our foreign policy, a policy of coexistence among states and peoples with different state systems. That means that they are against relaxation of world tension and that they hold, in this respect, the same positions as the most reactionary warmongering elements in the West.

Comrades, that is precisely the trouble. They do not like our peaceful policy—the policy of peace, the policy of coexistence. But war cannot solve the various difficulties encountered in building Socialism, even if a country has 600 million inhabitants—a fact which some of its people are fond of stressing, saying that in a possible war, in a conflict, there would still be 300 million left: That is to say, 300 million would get killed and 300 million would be left behind, but there would be no one left except them.

We maintain and say that Socialism cannot be built and spread around the world by war and war's destruction, but that it can be achieved only through consistent work, creative work by workers in every country, and through constructive cooperation with other peoples. War is the greatest enemy of mankind, and particularly of Socialism, and we rejected it as a means for settling accounts among nations because of their different social forms and concepts.

In quantity and in abusive quality, the Bulgarian leaders and the Bulgarian press keep in step with the Chinese against Yugoslavia, not to mention the Albanians. They are always among the first, if not the first, when Yugoslavia and its leaders are to be slandered. The Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Party was mainly devoted to attacking, slandering, and insulting Socialist Yugoslavia and, of course, its leaders. There was so much mention of Yugoslavia at their congress that the congress resembled a Bulgarian-Yugoslav faction's congress. Instead of admitting shortcomings and difficulties in the internal development of their country, instead of giving an account of past wrong deeds, instead of admitting their mistakes at work, the Bulgarian leaders assumed the right to interfere in the internal development of Yugoslavia. They invented various false data, criticized allegedly bad conditions in Yugoslavia, at the same time praising their own in order to show that things are better in their own country and thus pacify the Bulgarian people.

But the things which I have enumerated so far do not exhaust the list of attacks against the League of Communists and against Yugoslavia. Other Communist Parties try not to lag behind and reprint all the slanders and insults against our country, with occasional additions of their own which also contain insults and falsifications.

Judging by all the speeches, the offensive tone, and the slanders, this campaign seems to have been organized over a long period of time. From time to time some leaders of those countries make various conciliatory statements which have a definite aim—that is, to deceive the world public in order to be able to isolate us and compromise us as much as possible.

It is natural that we adhere to the point of view that state relations should not deteriorate, but that it is not entirely up to us. The campaign itself considerably worsens state relations between our country and the countries whose leaders are attacking us. The

statements which some leaders have made to the effect that theoretical discussion must not worsen state relations have already been fully discredited. We believe that if a really principled and comradely discussion were held state relations would not deteriorate.

But this is a campaign led by state and Party leaders of the Socialist countries against Socialist Yugoslavia, and because of this, state relations inevitably deteriorate. That this has already affected state relations is proved by several facts.

First, immediately after our congress, the Soviet government for the second time in the last two years violated an interstate agreement on extending credit for some projects of importance to us. Second, immediately after our congress, the Soviet Union canceled a return state visit. Third, the visit of a disabled war veterans delegation was canceled. And fourth, other mutual visits, planned earlier, were also canceled. It is clear that this was not done on ideological lines, but on state lines. Thus, any emphasis of ideological lines is absurd, because the real issue in this matter can be seen quite clearly.

In order to deceive the world, Comrade Khrushchev made a speech at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party recently held in Sofia, in which, among other things, he attacked Yugoslavia and the leadership of the League of Yugoslav Communists without justification and with expressions which have no connection with comradely criticism.

He called us a Trojan horse by means of which the Western imperialists hope to destroy the Socialist countries. In his speech, as you will see later, he not only attacked the Yugoslav leaders but also our people. Our people suffered a lot from Stalin's policy of economic and political pressure and we are deeply hurt to hear Comrade Khrushchev repeat and justify this now, even though he sharply condemned such Stalinist policies at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

Implying that we were the agents of the class enemy in the workers movement, Comrade Khrushchev said the following in Sofia: "Nobody should suspect the monopolist circles of the United States of being interested in the consolidation of Socialism and the development of Marxist-Leninist theory. The representatives of that country, that is, of Yugoslavia, maintain that we allegedly retreat from Marxism-Leninism and that they, the Yugoslavs, retain a correct

position. A queer enough situation emerges. The imperialists want to develop Marxism-Leninism through that country, through Yugoslavia." This means that he charges us sarcastically with collusion with the United States which, and of course I agree, does not like Socialism.

I fully agree that the United States does not give us aid so that Socialism can triumph in Yugoslavia, just as in 1921 and 1922, when the United States gave aid to the Soviet Union during great hardships and drought, they did not intend it to strengthen the Soviet regime. They gave great aid there then because there was famine in the USSR.

The United States started giving us aid in 1949, not so that Socialism would triumph in our country—they do not like Socialism and they do not conceal this; they state openly that they do not like it—but because we were threatened by famine and because Yugoslavia would in this way be able more easily to resist Stalin's pressure and strengthen its independence.

And if certain US circles possibly entertained other hopes, that was no concern of ours. The Stalinist policy of economic blockade and threats inflicted enormous damage on Yugoslavia which amounted to about 600 billion dinars according to the estimates of experts. Thus the tripartite aid of the United States, Great Britain and France helped Yugoslavia in her distress due to the blockade and Cominform pressure. And the United States, Great Britain and France gained a lot in the world, in the moral respect, as a result of this aid.

Comrade Khrushchev often says that Socialism cannot be built on US wheat, but I think that those who know how can do it, while those who do not know how will not even be able to build it on their own wheat.

Comrade Khrushchev said in his speech that we lived on charity received from imperialist countries, which is to say that our people live on charity given to us in the form of rejected goods, presumably moldy or something of the kind. First of all, our people do not live on anyone's charity but exert enormous efforts to create a better life for themselves. Second, I have already said earlier why even today we have to receive aid to a certain extent, in the form of long-term credits and not free aid. Third, the US wheat, cotton and lard are not discarded goods. They are not discarded goods,

but products which are in high demand on world markets. After all, US wheat is no worse than the Soviet wheat which we are not getting, and we are getting wheat from the United States.

We find all these things very good, and in the rest of the world as well they are considered useful because they enable us more easily to surmount obstacles, which regrettably are placed before us by those who should help us repair the damage caused from 1948 to 1953 by economic blockade and political pressure.

Finally, what moral right have those who are attacking us to reproach us on account of US aid or credits, when Comrade Khrushchev himself recently offered extensive trade exchange to the United States in order to get credits? There is no logic in this, and it is pure cynicism to attack and slander us as selling ourselves for US aid and credits. They may, we may not.

In this speech in Sofia Comrade Khrushchev said many insulting things about Yugoslavia and its leaders, but the most curious thing is that now he assumes the same attitude as the Chinese leaders, that is, the attitude of a defender of the infamous resolution of the Cominform. That is a document which will remain a disgraceful stain on the history of Socialist relations and the international workers movement. When today one reads that so-called resolution, one can see on what monstrous fabrications and slander it was based, with the sole aim of smearing our Party and our country as much as possible.

Much more surprising is the fact that in today's campaign, and not through discussion, Comrade Khrushchev and others are reviving that act, so disgraceful to Socialism. Comrade Khrushchev likes to say, ostensibly as a joke, "In a fight any club will do."

I think that this is, however, a very poor and compromised weapon in today's so-called discussion or, more accurately, in the unprincipled campaign against Socialist Yugoslavia. It would be logical for us also, parallel to their revival of the Cominform resolution for an attack against Yugoslavia, to go back to the past and reveal various misdeeds against our country and people during more than four years, and bring up our arguments against Stalin's fabricated accusations from 1948. But where would all this lead us?

I am reproached for speaking in my report about Stalin's policy having been negative and harmful to Yugoslavia and, as much as to Yugoslavia, also to some other small countries and to the

Soviet Union itself. I think, however, that I did not say anything sharper than had already been said at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Besides, the facts which I cited have been known to the whole world for a long time. It is the history of Stalin's policy of pressure and mistakes with regard to Yugoslavia. However, we must not and do not desire to allow history to be falsified. Therefore, I cited this as a historic fact, and nothing more.

The Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists has historic significance for all domestic life and it could not keep silent about the negative phenomena of the past and ignore the developments of the period between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses.

Comrades, all this is very difficult for us, but we shall fight and defend ourselves against all unjust accusations, against all slanders and attacks, because this entire campaign is aimed at silencing our principled stand on the correct and just relations between Socialist countries.

Comrades, you can see that this time again, in connection with these attacks, not only the leading men of our country but also all our people remained calm and collected. It appears that it is our fate to have to build Socialism in our country under constant blows from all sides, and the worst blows are coming from those who should be our most loyal and best friends. It appears to us that history bestowed on us this hard road to preserve the development of Socialism from degeneration and to enable Socialism to emerge from the chaos which today prevails in the world with such moral strength that it will hew a victorious road in its further development. . . .

You see, comrades, today some leaders, the Chinese for instance, write and talk in the same vein as was customary in 1948, namely, that during all these disputes our people are not in agreement with us but with them; that is, our people are against us but that they are powerless and cannot help themselves. Now, just think—our people, who are powerless to help themselves yet were able to settle accounts with the Hitlerite and occupation troops and quislings, are powerless to do the same with a few leaders.

Comrades, this is how they incorrectly interpret the mood of our people and their political maturity. The old methods of 1948 are again appearing on the scene of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, with the only purpose being to deceive their own people, because

this propaganda cannot deceive our people who are well acquainted with these things and who have several years' experience in this respect. We therefore do not conceal anything and, insofar as possible, print all their speeches and commentaries in order to acquaint our people with them. And what do those who attack and accuse us do? They do not print anything of ours because they are afraid. Such false accusations would be harmful to them also, because in the end the truth will again prevail, comrades.

We will not abandon the building of Socialism because of this campaign. We will be able to overcome these new difficulties. We will be able to preserve unstained the banner of Marx, Engels and Lenin which in the past, too, we carried with honor through all storms and attacks from all sides. Comrades, we did not want this struggle because we already have enough to worry about. However, since this struggle has been imposed on us we will defend ourselves and nothing will scare us out of fighting for what we believe to be correct and just. The main point is that we preserve the unity of our people and firm ranks of our workers, the League of Yugoslav Communists, and the Socialist Alliance of the working people of Yugoslavia. . . .

We shall have to answer from time to time, calmly and coolly, not using their language, but a human language—the language of truth. Meanwhile we must strive to preserve our unity and the firmness of our ranks, because it is important that we create in our country a progressively better life and true Socialist relations. This will be useful to us and to the further development of Socialism in Yugoslavia.

“The Imre Nagy group, which had previously come forward under the pirate flag of national Communism, escaped to the Yugoslav embassy. . . .”

23. ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST IMRE NAGY AND HIS COMPANIONS. BROADCAST RADIO BUDAPEST JUNE 16, 1958.

(Excerpts)

The announcement of the trial and execution of Imre Nagy, though probably timed to serve some specific purpose

of the Hungarian regime, also became an important vehicle for carrying the Soviet campaign against Yugoslavia one step further. Khrushchev had charged in Sofia that Belgrade had assumed the role of a "Trojan horse" in the Socialist camp. This statement from Budapest attempts to give substance to that accusation by suggesting not only that the Yugoslavs had rallied to the "pirate flag of national Communism," but that they had also encouraged "counterrevolutionary activity" by Imre Nagy and his associates while they were receiving asylum at the Yugoslav embassy. Significantly, the announcement implies that "Western imperialists" and Yugoslavia had acted in concert to support a "counterrevolutionary insurrection" when it says that "individual groups of the Imre Nagy conspiracy sought refuge where they had formerly received support." Nor is it unimportant to note the fact that Moscow released the initial news of Nagy's execution which in turn led to the publication of a fuller statement by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice precisely at a time when the text of Khrushchev's Sofia speech was likely to have been distributed and read within the ranks of the international Communist movement.

The judicial authorities have completed the proceedings in the case of the leading group of persons who on October 23, 1956, with the active cooperation of the imperialists, brought about the outbreak of an armed counterrevolutionary uprising aimed at the overthrow of the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic.

The supreme prosecutor of the Hungarian People's Republic in his indictment charged Imre Nagy and his accomplices, Ferenc Donath, Miklos Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Pal Maleter, Sandor Kopacsy, Jozsef Szilagyi, Ferenc Janossy and Miklos Vasarhelyi with the criminal act of conspiracy for the overthrow of the state order of the Hungarian people's democracy, and in addition, Imre Nagy with high treason, and Sandor Kopacsy and Pal Maleter with the criminal act of military mutiny.

The criminal proceedings against the accused Geza Losonczy have been dropped by the prosecutor's office, as the defendant has died from illness.

The findings of the people's court bench of the supreme court in the criminal case of Imre Nagy and his companions, on the basis of the confession of the accused, evidence of twenty-nine witnesses, after hearing the indictment and defense, and examining material evidence were as follows:

Imre Nagy and his closest accomplices, Geza Losonczy, Ferenc Donath, Miklos Gimes, and Jozsef Szilagyi, in December 1955 brought into being a clandestine anti-state organization for the purpose of seizing power by force and of overthrowing the Hungarian People's Republic. In the course of the hearings of the criminal case, it was established that Imre Nagy and his accomplices had assumed a leading role in the preparation and outbreak of the counterrevolutionary uprising in October 1956.

Zoltan Tildy and Pal Maleter became acquainted with the hostile objectives of Imre Nagy and his companions in October 1956, approved of them, and actively joined the counterrevolutionary uprising. The members of the conspiratorial group at the head of the reactionary forces at home and in alliance with the imperialists abroad, carried out an attempted putsch for the overthrow of the Hungarian People's Republic.

The court established that Imre Nagy, in the interests of seizing power by force, had set up a narrow illegal group with his closest supporters as early as the end of 1955. The illegal group carried out its hostile activity by illegal means and by abusing legal possibilities. In order to carry out their aims of overthrowing the people's power, they mobilized and included in their activity all kinds of people who were enemies of the people's democratic state order.

At the same time, camouflaging their true aims, in a demagogic and mendacious way, by proclaiming Socialist slogans, they also temporarily misguided and used for their anti-state purposes some people of good faith. The group of conspirators, primarily the leader of the group, Imre Nagy himself, elaborated the political platform of the movement against the people's democracy, its direct tasks, methods, and more remote aims. . . .

Imre Nagy and his accomplices, well before the October uprising, had built up secret relations and conducted talks with the representatives of bourgeois restoration, with whom they allied themselves in the interests of seizing power by force. In the course

of these talks, for instance, Geza Losonczy and Sandor Haraszti had personally agreed as early as July 1956, and later also with Anna Kethly, through the mediation of Istvan Erdei, concerning participation in the intended Nagy government. Imre Nagy decided in December 1955 to restore the former so-called coalition parties, and to form a government jointly with them.

When, however, leaning on counterrevolutionary forces, he acquired the post of premier through force and fraud, he went much further than this. Without any inhibitions he permitted and made possible, during the few short days of the counterrevolution, the setting-up of 70 different parties and organizations in contravention to the constitution, among them such notorious bourgeois-Fascist parties—also prohibited by the peace treaty—as for instance the party of Hungarian Life, the Christian Democratic Party, the Hungarian Christian Party, the Hungarian People's Party, the National Camp, the Christian Front, the Catholic People's Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Arrow-Cross Party in Gyor.

In order to secure power, the Imre Nagy group of conspirators concluded an alliance with other groups of the most extreme reaction. This group even rehabilitated the legally and justly sentenced former Prince Primate Jozsef Mindszenty, released him and used him against the people's republic. After reaching agreement through Zoltan Tildy, Mindszenty proclaimed the program of capitalist restoration over the radio on November 3.

Imre Nagy and his companions also reached an agreement with the bourgeois-Fascist Hungarian *émigrés* in the pay of the imperialists. This is proved by the declaration on October 28, 1956, of Bela Varga, chairman of the so-called National Council, in which he said: "Members of the council are in constant contact with leaders of the Hungarian rebellion. . . ."

Imre Nagy and his group of conspirators, after dissolving, or rather, setting aside, the central organs of power of the people's republic, set about annihilating the local organs of power. The councils, the legal administrative bodies, were liquidated, as were the organs of economic management, and they were replaced by so-called revolutionary committees, organized primarily from among bourgeois-Fascist elements, and the so-called workers councils, intended to mislead the workers.

Through their treasonable and disruptive activity, Imre Nagy and his accomplices finally, by the cease-fire order which they had

enforced, paralyzed the armed forces defending the people's republic; at the same time, they organized, supplied with arms, and finally legalized the insurgent counterrevolutionary forces. They recruited into the so-called National Guard war criminals, those who had committed crimes against the people, convicts released from prison, and all types of persons who were enemies of the people's democracy.

After this, the white terror started in Budapest and throughout the country. According to data so far investigated, detachments of terrorists during the few short days of the rule of Imre Nagy and his companions murdered 234 defenseless citizens. . . .

In the interests of realizing the aims of, and furthermore, to make the road quite free for imperialist intervention, Imre Nagy and his group of traitors attempted to denounce the country's defensive pact, the Warsaw treaty, in an illegal and one-sided manner. The crowning of this attempt was the radio appeal broadcast by Imre Nagy on November 4 in which he appealed to the Western imperialists for an open, armed intervention against the revolutionary worker-peasant government and the Soviet troops it had called in.

After the fall of the counterrevolutionary insurrection, individual groups of the Imre Nagy conspiracy sought refuge where they had formerly received support. From among the participants of the coup, Bela Kiraly, Anna Kethly, Jozsef Kovago and others escaped to the West to evade being called to account. Jozsef Mindszenty, according to the information of the Hungarian authorities, went into hiding in the US legation. Istvan B. Szabo tried to escape to the British legation in Budapest. The Imre Nagy group, which had previously come forward under the pirate flag of national Communism, escaped to the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, to evade being held responsible.

It is characteristic of the infamy of the conspiracy that they continued their counterrevolutionary activity without a change even after the Hungarian people, under the guidance of the revolutionary worker-peasant government, had already begun re-establishing legal order, insuring the peaceful life of the people, and reparation of the grave damages wrought by the counterrevolution.

Anna Kethly, Bela Kiraly, Jozsef Kovago and their companions from the West, and Imre Nagy, Gezo Losonczy and others from

the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, sent out instructions for the continuation of armed resistance, the organization of strikes to paralyze life, and for the reorganization of underground subversive work.

Nagy and Losonczy, for instance, through Miklos Gimes and their other accomplices, established contacts from the Yugoslav embassy with the Central Workers Council of Budapest, with Radio Free Europe, and even published a new illegal paper under the title "October Twenty-Third."

All this has been proved by irrefutable facts in the investigations conducted later and in the court proceedings now instituted.

The material of the case at the court proceedings has also shown and proved that Imre Nagy and his companions, as a result of their earlier revisionist, bourgeois-nationalist political attitudes, necessarily had to arrive at an alliance with the most reactionary, imperialist forces of the bourgeoisie, had to become traitors to the workers' regime, the people's democratic system, the Hungarian working people, and the Socialist homeland.

At the court hearing, the accused Ferenc Donath, Miklos Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Sandor Kopacsy, Ferenc Janossy and Miklos Vasarhelyi showed repentance and admitted their guilt entirely. Imre Nagy, Jozsef Szilagyi and Pal Maleter denied that they were guilty; however, in the course of the hearing, as a result of the damning evidence of their accomplices and the witnesses, as well as material evidence, they were unmasked and they made a partial confession concerning their criminal acts.

The people's court bench of the supreme court, considering the gravity of the criminal acts and taking into account the aggravating and extenuating circumstances on the basis of the hearings, has declared the accused guilty of the acts which formed the grounds for the indictment, and has sentenced Imre Nagy to death, Ferenc Donath to twelve years' imprisonment; Miklos Gimes to death, Zoltan Tildy to six years' imprisonment; Pal Maleter to death; Sandor Kopacsy to life imprisonment; Dr. Jozsef Szilagyi to death; Ferenc Janossy to eight years' imprisonment; and Miklos Vasarhelyi to five years' imprisonment.

The sentences are final. The death sentences have been carried out.

**“ . . . a harsh and completely unprovoked
attack on the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia”**

**24. NOTE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT DELIVERED TO
THE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JUNE 24, 1958.**

The diplomatic note from the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia protesting the execution of Imre Nagy, the bad faith of the Hungarian regime, as well as the false accusations made by it, concludes the present series of documents. Although the text is brief when compared with some earlier exchanges in the ten-year-old dispute between Yugoslavia and the states of the Soviet orbit, it is nevertheless a useful summary of the principal causes of tension between Belgrade and the other Communist states, whether large or small. The Yugoslavs deny that either singly or with others they helped to encourage the Hungarian events of October 1956. They recall the false accusations made against them at the time of the László Rajk trial a year after their own expulsion from the Cominform as well as the subsequent formal withdrawal of these charges. They suggest that the Hungarian regime is not a master of its own house, but is acting at the behest of others. Implicitly, they repudiate the suggestion that Nagy was a traitor to the cause of Socialism and they are outspoken in their condemnation of the death penalty as a means of dealing with ideological heterodoxy. They refer once again to the Stalinist system as one wholly unacceptable to them and deplore the apparent return to some of its methods. In short, the Yugoslav note presents a short recapitulation of several facets which had gone into the making of the Yugoslav position and uses the opportunity to speak not only in defense of Imre Nagy but

also on behalf of the League of Yugoslav Communists in its continuing struggle with the Soviet Union.

The embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary and pursuant to the instructions of its government has the honor to communicate the following:

On June 17, 1958, the Ministry of Justice of the Hungarian People's Republic published a statement of the pronouncement of sentence on Imre Nagy and his companions and on its execution. The statement alleges, among other things, that "certain groups of the Imre Nagy conspiracy sought refuge there whence they had formerly received support"; that Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy and others "sent out their instructions from the building of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest for the continuation of the armed resistance, the organization of strikes to paralyze life and for reorganizing underground subversive activity"; that "from the building of the Yugoslav embassy" they "established, through Miklos Gimes and other accomplices, contact with the Central Workers Council of Budapest, with the radio station, Radio Free Europe, and what is more, that they published the new illegal paper October Twenty-Third."

The Yugoslav government, and our people, have received the sudden news about the secret trial and the execution of Imre Nagy with profound indignation. The assertions of alleged activities by the persons mentioned after their arrival in the Yugoslav embassy building are untrue, and are fabricated from beginning to end.

The Hungarian government knows very well that these persons, while staying in the Yugoslav embassy building, did not commit any of the acts mentioned in the statement of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice.

As soon as they came to the Yugoslav embassy building the persons mentioned gave, as a normal condition for using asylum, a statement to the effect that they renounced any political activity during the term of their asylum, and this they strictly adhered to.

The president of the revolutionary workers-peasant government, Comrade Janos Kadar, was also informed of their statement soon after his arrival in Budapest on the fourth day after Imre

Nagy and his companions came to the Yugoslav embassy. Apart from this, the embassy building was, during the whole time, under the strictest supervision of Soviet military detachments and the Hungarian security service. In that same period, on November 5, 1956, the Yugoslav diplomat Milovanov was killed in the embassy building by the shots fired from the tanks in the street.

Judging by the staged accusations against Yugoslavia, and by the circumstances under which the trial was held (the statement contains no data of the time when the trial was held and when the sentences were executed), there is justified doubt regarding the accuracy of the other material evidence as well, certainly in all that is directly or indirectly imputed to Yugoslavia.

The manner in which Yugoslavia was accused in the Hungarian statement as well as the secrecy of the trial obviously make possible the fabrication of all kinds of new charges.

The Yugoslav government stresses this finding all the more resolutely, as there have also been similar trials in the past, such as the trial of Rajk,⁴³ in which Yugoslavia was likewise accused.

At the time also, allegations were made that reliable evidence was available concerning Yugoslavia's guilt and interference, and then later, when much innocent blood had been shed, it was established that this evidence, along with the explicit admissions of responsible Hungarian men, had been invented. These attacks, as is known, inflicted great difficulties on us at that time, but the chief victims were the peoples of the countries in which these trials were staged.

Therefore, the Yugoslav government does not consider it at all necessary to prove its uprightness in this matter. It never interfered in the internal affairs of Hungary, nor is it doing so now. The facts about the position of the Yugoslav government in this regard are known not only to the Hungarian government but the whole international public as well. Thus, it is generally known that precisely at the time to which the accusations refer, Yugoslavia was making considerable efforts, selfless efforts, to contribute toward the stabili-

⁴³ Laszlo Rajk, former Minister of Interior of Hungary, executed in October 1949 for treason, including conspiracy with Yugoslavia. In March 1956, it was officially acknowledged that charges had been false and Rajk was belatedly honored with a state funeral on October 6, 1956.

zation of conditions in Hungary, for which tribute was often paid by the Hungarian leaders themselves.

From the above, it follows that the quoted assertions given in the said statement constitute a harsh and completely unprovoked attack on the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with the obvious aim of sharpening and justifying—by again using the most sinister methods from the recent past—the existing organized and merciless anti-Yugoslav action, of fundamentally violating Hungarian-Yugoslav relations, and of trying to cast the responsibility for those events in Hungary onto Yugoslavia.

This is undeniably confirmed by the fact that the allegations in the Hungarian statement were immediately made use of in the press of certain governments which are taking part in this action. This attack, regardless of whether it was made by free will, is all the more deplorable and to be condemned as the relations between the Yugoslav and Hungarian peoples have been developing favorably, which could only be to the interests of both countries, as well as in the interest of all those who really want the consolidation of peace in this part of the world. It is obvious that by this act the government of the Hungarian People's Republic has inflicted a heavy blow on relations with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

In connection with the statement of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice, the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers it necessary to recall the following facts as well: By the exchange of letters between the governments of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Hungarian People's Republic of November 18 and 21, 1956, respectively, agreement was reached on the solution of the question of asylum for Imre Nagy and other persons who had been given asylum in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, to the effect that the Hungarian government guaranteed personal security and free departure of those persons to their homes, directly after leaving the Yugoslav embassy building, undertaking the obligation that "it would not apply any sanctions against them for their past activities."

As the Hungarian government did not insure the implementation of the agreement mentioned, thereby violating it, the Yugoslav government lodged a protest with the Hungarian government with its note of November 24, 1956. In its reply, set out in the

note of December 1, 1956, the Hungarian government, rejecting the Yugoslav government protest, asserted that the fact that the persons in question had not returned to their homes was "a secondary question of technical importance," and that it was otherwise keeping to the obligations of the agreement between the two governments, reaffirming that "it was prepared to guarantee the personal security of the persons mentioned, and declared that it did not intend to apply any punishments for their past activities."

In this connection the Hungarian government stated also the following in its note:

"Whereas in the political situation in Hungary there was danger of counterrevolutionary elements organizing attempts against Imre Nagy and other persons belonging to this group, with the object of turning over responsibility for the consequences to the revolutionary workers and peasants government, and further, bearing in mind that their personal security is threatened by possible revenge on the part of their political opponents, Imre Nagy and his companions, on the basis of an agreement on this issue concluded between governments of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Rumanian People's Republic, have left for the Rumanian People's Republic until such time as appropriate conditions of security are brought about in the Hungarian People's Republic."

It is obvious that the government of the Hungarian People's Republic has on two occasions harshly offended the obligations it gave to the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia: By not making possible the free return of Imre Nagy and other persons to their homes, but instead sending them to the Rumanian People's Republic for a compulsory stay; and by the fact that, contrary to the guarantees given regarding personal security and impunity because of their past action, it brought some of these persons to a secret trial, and sentenced Nagy and some companions to death, which punishment was executed, whereby the fully valid agreement was severed beyond repair.

The government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia most energetically protests to the government of the Hungarian People's Republic because, in addition to harshly violating the aforesaid agreement between the two governments reached by the exchange of letters of November 18 and 21, 1956, respectively, and confirmed by the Hungarian note of December 1, 1956, and in the

statement of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice of June 17, 1958, which announced the pronouncement and execution of death sentence on Imre Nagy and his companions, the Hungarian government lays a number of heavy accusations against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia which are groundless, thereby inflicting a heavy blow on the relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Hungarian People's Republic, and thus taking upon itself, before its people and world public opinion, full responsibility for the ensuing consequences.

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